Theoria 80 (2):174-183 (2014)

Authors
Joseph Long
State University of New York, Brockport
Abstract
Cornell realists claim, among other things, that moral knowledge can be acquired in the same basic way that scientific knowledge is acquired. Recently in this journal Elizabeth Tropman has presented two arguments against this claim. In the present article, I attempt to show that the first argument attacks a straw man and the second mischaracterizes the Cornell realists' epistemology and ends up begging the question. I close by suggesting that, given Tropman's own apparent views, her objections are also probably misplaced
Keywords ethical naturalism  Tropman  Cornell realism  moral epistemology
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12033
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References found in this work BETA

How to Be a Moral Realist.Richard Boyd - 1988 - In G. Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. pp. 181-228.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ethical Reductionism.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):32-52.

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