Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way.

This paper offers a brief historical survey of the development of analytic philosophy in Hong Kong from 1911 to the present day. At first, Western philosophy was a minor subject taught mainly by part-time staff. After the Second World War, research and teaching in analytic philosophy in Hong Kong began to grow and consolidate with the expansion of higher-education and the establishment of new universities. Analytic philosophy has been a significant influence on comparative and Chinese philosophy and played a crucial (...) role in the teaching and promotion of critical thinking. Analytic philosophers in Hong Kong are now active participants in the global philosophical community. We review the development of analytic philosophy across the major tertiary institutions in Hong Kong and discuss some of the future challenges faced by the discipline. (shrink)

There are two popular views regarding the origin of critical thinking: (1) The concept of critical thinking began with Socrates and his Socratic method of questioning. (2) The term ‘critical thinking’ was first introduced by John Dewey in 1910 in his book How We Think. This paper argues that both claims are incorrect. Firstly, critical reflection was a distinguishing characteristic of the Presocratic philosophers, setting them apart from earlier traditions. Therefore, they should be recognized as even earlier pioneers of critical (...) thinking. Secondly, John Dewey not only used the term ‘critical thinking’ before 1910, but there were also other authors who used it before him. The meaning of ‘critical thinking’ at the turn of the twentieth century was shaped by various traditions of linguistic usage, including literary criticism, science and medicine, and Kantian philosophy. (shrink)

This book is about the basic principles that underlie critical thinking and creativity. The majority of the content is on critical thinking since more topics are naturally involved and since they can be discussed readily and systematically. The last few chapters are devoted to creativity and research methodology, not typical the book's plethora of competition. Each chapter introduces a specific topic, usually by introducing the relevant theories in conjunction with realistic examples that show how the theories can be applied. Each (...) chapter concludes with a set of exercises whose solutions are detailed at the rear of the book. While the writing style is purposefully informal, the presentation is complete, at least with respect to the intended introductory level. (shrink)

The 2014 Umbrella Movement was one of the most significant social and political events in recent Hong Kong history. This paper offers some initial reflections on the connections between the movement and broader issues related to civic education, critical thinking, and theories of education. First, it is suggested that the movement closely resembles a form of civic education known as ‘action civics,’ offering an alternative pedagogy that might encourage more authentic civic participation. Second, the movement raises questions about how the (...) teaching of critical thinking can be made more practically relevant to modern citizenship. Third, the deep political polarization associated with the movement indicates that civic education and critical thinking training need to pay attention to cognitive biases that affect political ideology. Finally, the Umbrella Movement reflects the failure of democratization in Hong Kong and coincides with increasing political pressures on the local education system. We discuss how political reality connects to issues about democratic education, critical pedagogy, and the idea of political neutrality in education. (shrink)

The 2014 Umbrella Movement was one of the most significant social and political events in recent Hong Kong history. This paper offers some initial reflections on the connections between the movement and broader issues related to civic education, critical thinking, and theories of education. First, it is suggested that the movement closely resembles a form of civic education known as ‘action civics,’ offering an alternative pedagogy that might encourage more authentic civic participation. Second, the movement raises questions about how the (...) teaching of critical thinking can be made more practically relevant to modern citizenship. Third, the deep political polarization associated with the movement indicates that civic education and critical thinking training need to pay attention to cognitive biases that affect political ideology. Finally, the Umbrella Movement reflects the failure of democratization in Hong Kong and coincides with increasing political pressures on the local education system. We discuss how political reality connects to issues about democratic education, critical pedagogy, and the idea of political neutrality in education. (shrink)

Nussbaum’s theory of the emotions draws heavily on the Stoic account. In her theory, emotions are a kind of value judgment or thought. This is in stark contrast to the well-known proposal from William James, who took emotions to be bodily feelings. There are various motivations for taking emotions as judgments. One main reason is that emotions are intentional mental states. They are always about something, directed at particular objects or state of affairs. For example, fear seems to involve the (...) anticipation of danger. To grief for the passing of a loved one involves the thought that someone dear to us is now gone. In Upheavals of Thought and also in her Hochelaga Lecture, Nussbaum analyzed compassion as a set of judgments, including for example the judgment that someone is experiencing serious suffering, and that the person in question does not deserve the suffering. (shrink)

Pietroski (1993) offers a semantics for belief sentences that is supposed to address the problem of equivalence. This paper argues that his proposal fails to solve the problem.

Bermúdez argues for rational framing effects in the form of quasi-cyclical preferences. This is supposed to refute the extensionality principle in standard decision theory. In response, I argue that it is better to analyze seemingly quasi-cyclical preferences as ceteris paribus preferences. Furthermore, if frames are included as objects of choice, we can acknowledge rational framing effects without rejecting extensionality.

(1) It is not clear from Gold and Stoljar’s definition of biological neuroscience whether it includes computational and representational concepts. If so, then their evaluation of Kandel’s theory is problematic. If not, then a more direct refutation of the radical neuron doctrine is available. (2) Objections to the psychological sciences might derive not just from the conflation of the radical and the trivial neuron doctrine. There might also be the implicit belief that for many mental phenomena, adequate theories must invoke (...) neurophysiological concepts and cannot be purely psychological. (shrink)

One major obstacle in providing a compositional semantics for natural languages is that it is not clear how we should deal with propositional attitude contexts. In this paper I will discuss the Interpreted Logical Form proposal , focusing on the case of belief. This proposal has been developed in different ways by authors such as Harman (1972), Higginbotham (1986,1991), Segal (1989) and Larson and Ludlow (1993). On this approach, the that-clause of a belief report is treated as a singular term, (...) referring to the interpreted logical form (ILF) of its embedded sentence. The ILF of a sentence is made up of two parts : a syntactic representation of the sentence at the level of logical form, and an assignment of semantic values to parts of the representation. Thus, given a belief report such as. (shrink)

This paper is about possible worlds semantics for propositional attitude sentences. In particular I shall focus on belief reports in English such as "Lusina believes that tofu is nutritious." It is well-known that possible worlds semantics for such reports suffers from the so-called _problem of equivalence_ . In this paper I shall examine some attempts to deal with this problem and argue that they are unsatisfactory.

Cognitive science aims to provide scientific explanations of various mental phenomena. Attempts to study the mind, however, go back thousands of years, and what is distinctive about cognitive science is not its aim but the use of computations and representations in psychological explanations. We shall discuss whether the computational approach comes under challenge from dynamics, and look at some of the main themes in recent developments in cognitive science. In the final part of this paper we shall look at two (...) areas where cognitive science might provide significant benefits to the contemporary world. (shrink)

In everyday life, we typically explain what people do by attributing mental states such as beliefs and desires. Such mental states belong to a class of mental states that are _intentional_, mental states that have content. Hoping that Johnny will win, and believing that Johnny will win are of course rather different mental states that can lead to very different behaviour. But they are similar in that they both have the same content : what is being hoped for and believed (...) is the very same thing. According to the thesis of externalism that has been defended most notably by Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge, not all of the contents of our mental states are determined by our intrinsic properties. Instead, the contents of our beliefs and desires are often determined in part by our relations to the environment. They are, so to speak, "wide" contents that are "not in our heads." Although externalism is accepted by most philosophers, many have argued that mental states with wide contents must also have a kind of content wholly determined by the intrinsic properties of the individuals who are in those states. This kind of content is called "narrow content". The aim of this paper is to distinguish between three rather different motivations for postulating narrow content. I argue that, given a certain conception of narrow content that I shall explain below, none of these three motivations succeed in establishing the existence of narrow content. (shrink)

Michael Tye’s book is a powerful defense of the controversial theory that the phenomenal properties of our conscious mental states are representational in character. The theory is introduced and defended through discussing ten philosophical problems about consciousness. The book is clearly written and arguments are illustrated with interesting thought-experiments and empirical findings. It is one of those delightful occasions where a book is of interest both to professional philosophers and students.