Pietroski on possible worlds semantics for belief sentences

Analysis 55 (4):295-298 (1995)
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Abstract

Pietroski (1993) offers a semantics for belief sentences that is supposed to address the problem of equivalence. This paper argues that his proposal fails to solve the problem.

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Joe Y. F. Lau
University of Hong Kong

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