Two types of logical consequence are compared: one, with respect to matrix and designated elements and the other with respect to ordering in a suitable algebraic structure. Particular emphasis is laid on algebraic structures in which there is no top-element relative to the ordering. The significance of this special condition is discussed. Sequent calculi for a number of such structures are developed. As a consequence it is re-established that the notion of truth as such, not to speak of tautologies, is (...) inessential in order to define validity of an argument. (shrink)

A new characterization of all the MV-algebras embedded in a CL-algebra has been presented. A new sequent calculus for Lukasiewicz ℵ0-valued logic is introduced. Some links between this calculus and the sequent calculus for multiplicative additive linear logic are established. It has been shown that Lukasiewicz ℵ0-valued logic can be embedded in a suitable extension of MALL.

In this paper, we present a modality-free pre-rough algebra. Łukasiewicz Moisil algebra and Wajsberg algebra are equivalent under a transformation. A similar type of equivalence exists in our proposed definition and standard definition of pre-rough algebra. We obtain a few modality-free algebras weaker than pre-rough algebra. Furthermore, it is also established that modality-free versions for other analogous structures weaker than pre-rough algebra do not exist. Both Hilbert-type axiomatization and sequent calculi for all proposed algebras are presented.

Classical commentary on Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, aphoristic work on Nyaya philosophy.

Political philosophy of E.W. Adikaram, a Sri Lankan philosopher.

Exegesis, with text, on the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, basic aphoristic text of Nyāya.

Contributed articles on the works of Yaśovijaya, 1624-1688, Jaina philosopher, a sourvenir brought out on the completion of three hundred years to his death.

In this article, epoch-based dynamic features such as sequence of epoch interval values and epoch strength values are explored to classify infant cries. Epoch is the instant of significant excitation of the vocal tract system during the production of speech. For voiced speech, the most significant excitation takes place around the instant of glottal closure. The different types of infant cries considered in this work are hunger, pain, and wet diaper. In this work, epoch strength and epoch interval features are (...) used to represent infant cry-specific information from the acoustic signal. In this study, the proposed features such as epoch interval and epoch strength values are determined using zero-frequency filter-based method. Gaussian mixture models are used to classify the above-mentioned cries from the features proposed in this work. GMMs are developed separately for each of the cries using the proposed features. The infant cry database collected under a telemedicine project at the Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur has been used for this study. In the first step, infant cry recognition accuracy is investigated separately using epoch interval and epoch strength features. To enhance recognition performance, GMMs developed using various features are combined through score level fusion techniques. The recognition performance using a combination of evidence is found to be superior over individual systems. (shrink)

This essay seeks to characterize one of the leading ideas in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī, the fundamental role that the idea of complexity plays in its theory of knowledge. The appeal to the causally complex nature of any event of valid awareness is framed as a repudiation of the lean ontology and epistemology of the Buddhist theorists working in the tradition of Dharmakīrti; for Jayanta, this theoretical minimalism led inevitably to the inadmissible claim of the irreality of the world (...) outside of consciousness. In countering this Buddhist position, Jayanta adopts some of his opponents’ characteristic terminology, most notably in his use of sāmagrī, “causal complex” itself. He resituates this borrowed vocabulary within a strong appeal to the theory of the kārakas or the semantic roles detailed by grammarians since the time of Pāṇini. Possibly borrowing this sāmagrī-kāraka amalgam from the Buddhist grammarian-epistemologist Jinendrabuddhi, Jayanta uses it as a point of departure for a sustained attack on the views of Dharmottara, who Jayanta understood as offering the most advanced and most problematic Buddhist philosophical position available in his time and place. (shrink)

Critical study of Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, active 850-910, work on Nyaya philosophy.

Critical study of the commentary on Gautama's Nyāyasūtra, aphoristic work of the Nyaya school in Hindu philosophy.

Critical study of the commentary on Gautama's Nyāyasūtra, aphoristic work of the Nyaya school in Hindu philosophy.

The authors make an attempt to comparatively analyse some stances of the Old Indian philosophy of language, exemplified by the Medieval Indian author Jayanta, along with the Western tradition of the analytical philosophy of language, and to highlight the differences as well as the similarities. The main focus is on Jayanta's discussion of the meaning vs. reference problem.

In the Āgamadambara (“Much Ado about Religion”), Jayanta Bhatta appears to be making a case for religious toleration and pluralism. This paper considers whether Jayanta has a concept like toleration in mind at all, or at least something that we today might understand to be toleration. If he is doing neither, our understanding of the nature of tolerance and its conceptual limits may be furthered by determining exactly what he is talking about and why it looks so much (...) like tolerance. (shrink)

In the Āgamaḍambara (‘Much Ado About Religion’), Bhaṭṭa Jayanta presents an argument for an inclusivist approach to the problem of religious diversity, building upon some of the arguments given in his Nyāyamañjarī. Although his arguments are restricted to consideration of a form of Hinduism particular in time and place, I argue that Jayanta’s solution to the problem of religious diversity has wide-ranging relevance and some applicability to contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion. I consider possible pluralist objections (...) to inclusivism, such as those given by John Hick in An Interpretation of Religion and elsewhere. In response to these objections, I argue that an inclusivism like Jayanta’s addresses all the reasons someone might have for adopting a pluralist position and in fact does so better than the pluralists by remaining within a live religious tradition. (shrink)

The present paper is an inventory and a description of the known manuscripts of the Nyāyamañjarī, meant as a tool for philological research on Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s magnum opus. The inventory is gradually built through a systematic analysis of archival data found in catalogi catalogorum, bibliographies of catalogues, individual catalogues, unpublished lists, and editions of the Nyāyamañjarī. The list is followed by a concise description of each manuscript, including an external description, an outline of the contents, and historical information.

The epistemology of śabda is one of the main themes in Bhaṭṭa Jayanta’s Nyāyamañjarī, and, in the hypotheses explored in this paper, also the conceptual basis of Jayanta’s textual re-use. The sixth chapter of the Nyāyamañjarī contains a debate between Vaiyākaraṇas and Mīmāṃsakas who, respectively, advocated an holistic or atomistic theory of language. Selected Jayanta’s re-uses from Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā, and Nyāya sources are here surveyed and analyzed, with a focus on their meaning and on the context. The (...) method of analysis is partially following Moravcsik’s scheme for a classification of citations, as well as Small’s classification by symbolic functions. By re-using texts Jayanta not only imparted authority to his own arguments, but also reassessed the relation of his tradition with other ones. Re-used ideas and words stand for symbols of those authors’ tenets, and those authors represent symbols of their respective traditions. Moreover, by quoting a certain author Jayanta often anointed him with a symbolic status of trustworthy authority, and his statement with a status of śabdapramāṇa. (shrink)

This article is an attempt at understanding the use that Abhinavagupta, the Kashmiri Śaiva philosopher and scholar of poetics, makes of a few concepts and theories stemming from the tradition of Vedic ritual exegesis. Its starting point is the detailed analysis of a key passage in Abhinavagupta’s commentary on the “aphorism on rasa” of the Nāṭyaśāstra, where the learned commentator draws an analogy between the operation of the non-prescriptive portions of the Veda in the ritual and the “generalisation” taking place, (...) according to him, in the appreciation of a work of art. Arguing against the tendency of modern historiography to explain this analogy exclusively in terms of Kumārila’s theory of effectuation in its two modalities, the article endeavours to show how Abhinavagupta relies on a variety of other textual sources he knew extensively and presumably first-hand. Some of them belong to the great Mīmāṃsaka tradition ; others, to different trends of medieval Brahmanism claiming exegetical heritage, as in the case of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī The nature of Abhinavagupta’s debt to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and his concept of bhāvanā is also reconsidered in light of these new findings. This investigation finally leads to identify, in the Abhinavabhāratī, an original theory of scriptural narratives and their efficacy, irreducible to any of its exegetical sources. According to this theory, mythological passages of the Veda directly prompt action, through the same capacity of abstraction or “de-temporalisation” that is at work in our appraisal of literature and theatre. (shrink)

The Nyayamanjari was composed in Kashmir, in the ninth century CE, by Bhatta Jayanta. It is a compendium of theses concerning ontological, epistemological and linguistic issues developed in the classical period of Indian philosophy. Jayanta's approximate date is confirmed by both internal and external evidences, so the Nyayamanjari has become a landmark in the historiography of Indian philosophy. Despite its relevance, however, the history of the textual transmission of the Nyayamanjari is in many respects still unknown. This new (...) critical edition is based on a comprehensive inventory of all the known sources, on a detailed description of the manuscripts, on a textual bibliography of the printed editions, on a genealogical study of the textual transmission, and on a rich apparatus of the indirect transmission. An important result of this research has been the development of a new, rigorous, and yet pragmatic method to edit Nyayamanjari passages, without the demand of formidable resources in terms of time, man-power, and funds. The first part of this publication includes all the propaedeutic steps in view of the critical edition. More specifically, it consists of the recensio of the known Nyayamanjari sources, including their inventory, their description, the collation of their variants, and the study of their genealogy, resulting in a fully documented stemma codicum which guides the editorial choices during the reconstruction of the edited text. The second part contains the critical edition, which covers the first of the three sections composing the sixth book of the Nyayamanjari. This particular section consists of a discussion on semantics and epistemology from the perspective of the Vyakarana, Mimansa and Nyaya traditions, hinging around the holistic theory of the sphota. (shrink)

Analytic philosophers have, since the pioneering work of B.K. Matilal, emphasized the contributions of Nyāya philosophers to what contemporary philosophy considers epistemology. More recently, scholarly work demonstrates the relevance of their ideas to argumentation theory, an interdisciplinary area of study drawing on epistemology as well as logic, rhetoric, and linguistics. This paper shows how early Nyāya theorizing about argumentation, from Vātsyāyana to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, can fruitfully be juxtaposed with the pragma-dialectic approach to argumentation pioneered by Frans van Eemeren. I (...) illustrate the implications of this analysis with a case study from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s satirical play, Much Ado about Religion (Āgamaḍambara). (shrink)

Of all the cognitive means recognized in Indian philosophical schools, perception is considered the primary. Gautama, the philosopher who authored Nyāyasūtra—the first aphoristic collection of the Nyāya tenets—defines perception as the principal cause of true perceptual cognition, that is, of a cognition generated out of sense-object contact, non-deviating, non-vacillating, and nonverbal. Of these, the adjective “nonverbal”—the translated version of the Sanskrit term “avyapadeśyam”—ignited a serious debate that was argued for about a millennium. This article tries to trace different interpretations of (...) the term in the classical Nyāya commentarial literature, especially in the writings of Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. It also attempts to show briefly how the contributions of these philosophers in the debate were influenced by the prevalent Indian philosophical scenario. (shrink)

Cases of past absence involve agents noticing in retrospect that an object or property was absent, such as when one notices later that a colleague was not at a talk. In Sanskrit philosophy, such cases are introduced by Kumārila as counterexamples to the claim that knowledge of absence is perceptual, but further take on a life of their own as a topic of inquiry among Kumārila’s commentators and their Nyāya interlocutors. In this essay, I examine the Nyāya philosopher Gaṅgeśa’s epistemology (...) of past absence, according to which agents learn that a recollectable object or property was absent by inferring its past absence from failing to recall that object or property. Gaṅgeśa’s account is best appreciated against the backdrop of earlier theories and their shortcomings, and I begin by presenting historical views leading up to his. I identify two groups of views about the epistemology of past absence: recollection views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents recalling negative information; and recollection failure views, according to which cases of past absence involve agents failing to recall positive information. I reconstruct two early recollection views: a Bhāṭṭa view belonging to Uṃveka, and a competing Nyāya view belonging to Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña. I then examine Śālikanātha and Sucarita’s critiques of recollection views, following which I reconstruct a Bhāṭṭa recollection failure view belonging to Pārthasārathi. I then examine Gaṅgeśa’s critiques of Pārthasārathi’s account and the recollection failure view he constructs out of its shortcomings. (shrink)

Reidentification scepticism is the view that we cannot knowledgeably reidentify previously perceived objects. Amongst classical Indian philosophers, the Buddhists argued for reidentification scepticism. In this essay, I will discuss two responses to this Buddhist argument. The first response, defended by Vācaspati Miśra (9th century CE), is that our outer senses allow us to knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will claim that this proposal is problematic. The second response, due to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th century CE), is that the manas or the (...) inner sense, functioning as a capacity of attention, helps us knowledgeably reidentify objects. I will explain how this second response answers the Buddhists’ challenge. (shrink)

Study of inference in Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, fl. 850-910, work on Nyaya philosophy.

This essay introduces central features of classical Hindu reflection on the existence and nature of God by examining arguments presented in the Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhatta (9th century CE), and the Nyāyasiddhāñjana of Vedānta Deśika (14th century CE). Jayanta represents the Nyāya school of Hindu logic and philosophical theology, which argued that God’s existence could be known by a form of the cosmological argument. Vedānta Deśika represents the Vedånta theological tradition, which denied that God’s existencecould be known by (...) reason, gave primacy to the revelatory texts known as the Upanisads, and firmly subordinated theological reasoning to the acceptance of revelation. Jayanta and Deśika are respected representatives of their traditions whose clear, systematic positions illumine traditional Hindu understandings of “God” and the traditional Hindu debates about God’s existence and nature. Attention to their positions highlights striking common features shared by Hindu and Christian theologies, and offers a substantial basis for comparative reflection on the Christian understanding of God’s existence and nature, and the roles of reason and revelation in knowledge of God. (shrink)

Sometimes seeing sandal from non-smellable distance we obtain cognition in the form ‘surabhi candanam’ (that sandal out there is fragrant). According to the Naiyāyikas, this cognition is a single qualified visual perception, where fragrance is grasped by visual sense-faculty. Normally visual sense cannot grasp fragrance. But here fragrance is grasped by visual sense through an extraordinary sense-connection. The Nyāya holds that the memory of fragrance, working as cognition-induced extraordinary sensory connection (jñānalakṣaṇa alaukika sannikarṣa), connects its object, fragrance, with visual sense. (...) The Naiyāyikas use this thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa to explain illusion. For a direct realist like the Naiyāyikas, it is always difficult to explain illusion. But jñānalakṣaṇa explains how an object, which is absent in front, can be accessed directly by the operating sense-organ through an extraordinary sensory connection. However, there is a possible threat to the thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa. In the mechanism of jñānalakṣaṇa, memory plays a vital role. If one is already acquainted with the fragrance of sandal in some previous occasion, then the memory of fragrance can work as an extraordinary sensory connection for her. But the question arises as to what happens when she acquires the knowledge of fragrant sandal for the first time? Is it also an instance of extraordinary jñānalakṣaṇa perception? It is obvious that in such case no memory is there to help her connect her visual sense to fragrance. However, this first acquaintance is a precondition for the possibility of the later acquaintances of fragrant sandal. Hence, it is necessary for the Naiyāyikas to explain the mechanism of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandal. The Naiyāyikas will be able to save their thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa (and also their direct realism) if they can depict a moment-wise account of the whole process of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandal remaining consistent with their own basic tenets. It would require moment-analysis (kṣaṇavicāra) of that cognitive situation. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, several attempts have been made to solve the problem. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in Nyāyamañjarī mentions that ‘madhura śarkarā’ or ‘sugandhi ketakī’ are cases of mental perception or mānasa pratyakṣa. He says that here manas functions as the means of perception being aided by external senses to produce such cognition. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa explains the other cases like illusion and recognition by the same model. On the other hand, Śrīdhara Bhaṭṭa in Nyāyakandalī says that in the case of the first acquaintance, at first the fragrance is grasped by the olfactory sense. Then, the visual sense-faculty, taking the perception of the fragrance as an associate cause, produces a cognition of the qualificand. The paper constructs several versions of moment examinations (kṣaṇavicāra) for both of these suggestions and evaluates them. It is observed that although Jayanta’s thesis may be accepted as an alternative Nyāya account of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandalwood, Śrīdhara’s account fails partially. On the other hand, Jayanta fails to explicate the inner psychological steps involved in the said cognition. This paper suggests that we can successfully construct moment examination of the first acquaintance of fragrant sandal; hence, the Nyāya thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa suffers no threat of internal inconsistency. However, the relevant sensory connection working there is not an olfactory perception. Rather, it also is a memory cognition, which is generated out of the memory-trace of fragrance produced on the spot from the aforesaid olfactory perception. Thus, the Naiyāyikas may save their thesis of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa as well as their direct realism. (shrink)

Light is the most important analogy for the Vijñānavādin in proving self-awareness, namely the cognition that cognizes itself. Recent studies show that two opponents of the doctrine of self-awareness, Kumārila and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta alleged that the Vijñānavādin has also used light as an analogy for the view that cognition must be perceived before the object is perceived. However, this is a modification of the actual view of the Vijñānavāda that cognition must be perceived in order for it to perceive (...) its object. Based on Kumārila’s such modified restatement, Taber argues that “Kumārila’s Buddhist” fails to establish the light as a valid analogy in their theory. Taber’s argument is subsequently referred to by Watson and Kataoka in their works, in which they defend Vijñānavāda’s light-analogy against Taber. However, their defence is also based on a similarly modified restatement by Jayanta and the defence is set out in the view of Naiyāyika philosophy. This paper examines all these arguments and shows that Watson’s and Kataoka’s thought of the light-analogy might still be problematic. It also goes back to the original view of the Vijñānavāda and observes to what extent the light-analogy serves as a strong support for the establishment of the self-awareness. (shrink)

In PV 3.440ab and 473cd–474ab, Dharmakīrti raises the argument of infinite regress twice. The argument originates from the same argument stated by Dignāga in his Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.12ab1, in which the fault of infinite regress is called aniṣṭhā. In Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti 1.12b2, Dignāga presents another type of argument of infinite regress driven by memory, which is elucidated by Dharmakīrtian commentators. The arguments were criticized by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Bhaṭṭa Jayanta and even more intensively so by two modern scholars, Jonardon Ganeri and (...) Birgit Kellner. In this paper, I first examine the source of the arguments—Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti 1.12 and its translation, based on which I provide my interpretation of the two models of arguments of infinite regress. I then offer my response, according to Dharmakīrti and his commentators, to Ganeri’s and Kellner’s critiques. By doing so, I attempt to identify the essence of these arguments is and find out to what extent one can defend the infinite regress argument in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s theory. (shrink)

Since the first half of the nineteenth century in which English was introduced as the language of higher education in India, the word and concept of “philosophy” has played an important role in Indian intellectual life. First the study of philosophy must have meant the study of Western philosophy in Indian universities, butlater various attempts were made to discover the Indian versions of philosophical traditions in Sanskrit literature. Today no one doubts that there has been a rich and very long (...) tradition of such intellectual activities as are fully compatible with what European philosophers have actually been doing. Nevertheless, it is sometimes very difficult to draw a strict line between philosophy and religion in Indian thought. The present study will focus on that passage of the Nyāyamañjarī by a Kashmirian Nyāya scholar Jayanta which deals with the justification of the authority of the Vedas and other religious scriptures. From the analysis of the passage we may detect that there are two different dimensions in his application of logic for this issue. On the one hand he appeals to logical thinking for the defence of the Vedic authority and tries to establish the proper proof. But on the other hand he seems to be conscious of the limitation of reasoning, for he refers to those thinkers without refuting them in the latter half of the passage, according to whom every religious scripture must be accepted as valid insofar as the path of reasoning and argumentation is taken. (shrink)

The article concerns a mediaeval Indian debate over whether, and if so how, we can know that a self exists, understood here as a subject of cognition that outlives individual cognitions, being their common substrate. A passage that has not yet been translated from Sanskrit into a European language, from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī, ‘Blossoms of Reasoning’, is examined. This rich passage reveals something not yet noted in secondary literature, namely that Mīmāṃsakas advanced four different models of what happens when (...) the self perceives itself. The article clarifies the differences between the four, and the historical and logical relationships between them. It also hypothesizes pressures that constituted the need for the creation of the newer views, i.e. perceived problems with the earlier views, which the proponents of the newer views saw themselves as overcoming. (shrink)

Commentary on the Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, fl. 850-910, exegesis of Gautama's Nyayasutra, basic statement of the classic Hindu Nyaya philosophy; critical edition.

In Sect. 1 an argument for Yogācāra Buddhist Idealism, here understood as the view that everything in the universe is of the nature of consciousness / cognition, is laid out. The prior history of the argument is also recounted. In Sect. 2 the role played in this argument by light as an analogy for cognition is analyzed. Four separate aspects of the light analogy are discerned. In Sect. 3, I argue that although light is in some ways a helpful analogy (...) for the Buddhist Idealist, in other ways it is thoroughly inappropriate. At the end of the article I ask whether the lack of fit between light and cognition is unavoidable, or whether the Buddhist Idealists could have chosen a better analogy. (shrink)

In His Learned Book, Development Of Nyaya Philosophy And Its Social Context Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharyya Has Traced The History Of Nyaya Philosophy With Reference To Its Social Contexts. That This System Of Philosophy, Darsana, Is Not Unnecessarily Abstract But Has Taken Congizance Of Its Theoretical Ancestry As Well As Practical Circumstances Will Be Evident To The Perceptive Reader. As A Branch Of Knowledge, Vidya, Philosophy As Darsana Was Known In India For A Long Time. In Kautilya'S Arthasastra The Recognized Branches (...) Of Knowledge Are Four: (I) The Three Vedas (Trayi), (Ii) Trade And Commerce (Varta); (Iii) Law And Order (Dandaniti) And (Iv) Anvisiki, Which According To Kautilya Means Sankhya, Yoga And Lokayata. However, Later On Anvisiki Stood For Logic And Metaphysic. In The History Of Indian Philosophy The First Use Of The Term Darsana Has Been Attributed To Haribhadrasuri, The Jaina Philosopher And Author Of The Sad Darsana Samuccaya. Nearly 400 Years After Haribhadrasuri The Term Darsana In The Current Sense Was Used By Sankaracarya In His Commentary On The Brahmasutra. In This Comprehensive Book Professor Bhattacharyya Has Dealt With The Works Of Mostof The Famous Nyaya Thinkers Like Gautama, Vatsyayana, Jayanta Bhatta, Bhasarvajna, Udayana, Vardhamana And Various Other Writers Down The Centuries. This Scholarly Book From The Pen Of Bhattacharyya Is Highly Readable And Informative. It Is Hoped That The Book Will Be Profitably Used By Researchers, Scholars And The General Reading Public. (shrink)

Although seldom mentioned in the secondary literature on Vaiśeṣika, the cognitive category of ārṣajñāna (ṛṣi cognition) is accepted as a distinct category of vidyā (knowledge) within both early and later Vaiśeṣika texts. This article deals with how ārṣajñāna is conceptualized in Praśastapādabhāṣya (PBh), Śrīdhara’s Nyāyakandalī (NK), and Vyomaśiva’s Vyomavatī (Vy). The main focus lies on how ṛṣi cognition is treated in these texts and what terms are used in the process. I aim to clarify the analysis of ṛṣi cognition apparent (...) in the above sources and outline the implications this might have for the somewhat grander objective of a mapping of the semantic landscape of cognition and knowledge in Vaiśeṣika texts. The categories of yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa) and siddhic vision (siddhadarśana) are also treated since they are included within a shared discourse. (shrink)