This is an overview of Davidson's theory of anomalous monism. Objections and replies are also detailed.

Assessments of an action done intentionally, as we might expect, influence judgments of moral responsibility. What we don't expect is the converse--judgments of moral responsibility influencing assessments of whether an action was done intentionally. Yet this is precisely how people decide, according to Knobe (2003, 2004) and Mendlow (2004) and Nadelhoffer (2004a). I evaluate whether the studies actually support this biasing effect. I argue that the studies are at best inconclusive and that even if they demonstrated that people fall under (...) the biasing effect, such tendencies ought to have no bearing upon philosophical analyses of the concept of intentional action. (shrink)

This is an encyclopedia entry on accounts of mental causation, starting from Descartes to the present.

One of the driving questions in philosophy of mind is whether a person can be understood in purely physical terms. In this presentation, I wish to continue the project initiated by Donald Davidson, whose subtle position on this question has left many more perplexed than enlightened. The main reason for this perplexity is Davidson’s rather obscure pronouncements about the normativity of intentionality and its role in supporting psychophysical anomalism – the claim that there are no laws bridging our intentional states (...) with states of our brain. Insofar as Davidson’s thesis is an ontological one – about the existence of laws or otherwise modally significant connections between the mental and the physical – I think his critics are correct: Davidson has not provided us with a successful argument for psychophysical anomalism. There is, however, a different argument, also based upon considerations about the normativity of intentionality that lead to an equally important conclusion. The conclusion is not ontological but rather epistemic: if thoughts do indeed display normativity, it is hard to understand how they would arise out of mere mechanical occurrences in the brain. To borrow a well-worn phrase, there is an “explanatory gap” between the mental and the physical. Originally coined to capture the epistemic darkness we confront in our attempt to understand phenomenal experiences in purely physical terms, the idea has yet to be explored in the area of contentful mental states or intentionality in general. My argument shall be this: considerations about the normativity of intentionality demonstrate that there is an explanatory gap between the intentional and the physical. In fact, if there were laws of the kind Davidson denies, then the world be more mysterious than if no such laws existed. The presence of an explanatory gap explains why this is so. (shrink)

Non-reductive physicalism is committed to two theses: first, that mental properties are ontologically autonomous, and second, that physicalism is true. Jaegwon Kim has argued that this view is unstable – to honor one thesis, one must abandon the other. In this paper, I present an account of property realization that addresses Kim’s criticism and that explains how the two theses are indeed comfortably compatible.

Davidson has been instrumental in dampening the prospect of reductively explaining the mind. The core of his arguments turn upon his insistence that contentful mental states, the bread and butter of folk psychology, have a “normative element.” In spite of its pivotal role, as well as its intrinsic interest, the concept is very poorly developed and understood. This paper attempts to discern four different strands of the normativity of intentionality and to spark a long overdue systematic examination of a fascinating (...) and significant thesis. (shrink)

Modern schooling in Korea, which was officially established by law in 1949, is well known for its function as an engine of economic success in modern Korea. Although this fact seems to be world-wid...

It is often taken for granted that Paul Hirst’s switch from emphasis on liberal education to a social practices view of education is a radical one. This depends on how we understand the relation between the two views. From the perspective of a ‘weak’ interpretation I argue that Hirst’s later position differs little from his earlier one in the light both of the relation between the forms of knowledge and social practices, and of the rationalistic character of Hirst’s conception of (...) social practices in their connection with education. (shrink)

It is often taken for granted that Paul Hirst’s switch from emphasis on liberal education to a social practices view of education is a radical one. This depends on how we understand the relation between the two views. From the perspective of a ‘weak’ interpretation I argue that Hirst’s later position differs little from his earlier one in the light both of the relation between the forms of knowledge and social practices, and of the rationalistic character of Hirst’s conception of (...) social practices in their connection with education. (shrink)

Adolescents often create social relationships with their gaming peers who take on the role of offline friends and peer groups. Through collaboration and competition in the games, the social relationships of adolescents are becoming broader and thicker. Although this is a common phenomenon in online games, few studies have focused on the formation and roles of social capital among adolescent gamers. In particular, longitudinal research that examines the role of social capital in terms of influencing gaming time on adolescent gamers’ (...) psychosocial factors has been minimal. This study was designed to fill this gap to see the long-term effect of social capital among adolescent gamers. Specifically, by using the three-year longitudinal data involving 403 adolescents, we analyzed the effect of gaming time on psychological factors with the moderating role of social capital. Results showed that social capital played a crucial moderating role. In the higher social capital group, gaming time enhanced the degree of self-esteem and life satisfaction. However, a vicious circle was found in the lower social capital group: Gaming time increased the degree of depression but decreased self-esteem, which in turn led to increase in gaming time. These results indicate that games work as an important tool for social capital cultivation among adolescent gamers, which imply successful cultivation of social capital is a key to positive gaming effects. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. (shrink)

Assessments of an action done intentionally, as we might expect, influence judgments of moral responsibility. What we don't expect is the converse--judgments of moral responsibility influencing assessments of whether an action was done intentionally. Yet this is precisely how people decide, according to Knobe and Mendlow and Nadelhoffer. I evaluate whether the studies actually support this biasing effect. I argue that the studies are at best inconclusive and that even if they demonstrated that people fall under the biasing effect, such (...) tendencies ought to have no bearing upon philosophical analyses of the concept of intentional action. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

We examined the associations of different types of prayer with subjective well-being—with a religious support as a potential moderator—in a sample of Korean adults. In a cross-sectional study, 468 participants completed measures of five prayer types, subjective well-being, and religious support. After controlling for background variables, the thanksgiving prayers had positive associations and supplication prayers had negative associations with subjective well-being. In examining the potential moderating role of religious support, the current findings showed that religious support strengthened the relationship between (...) reception prayer and subjective well-being, especially among individuals who perceived moderate and high levels of religious support. These findings indicate differential associations between prayer type and well-being in Korean adults. (shrink)