It is well known that the modal logic S5 can be embedded in the classical predicate logic by interpreting the modal operator in terms of a quantifier. Wajsberg [10] proved this fact in a syntactic way. Mints [7] extended this result to the quantified version of S5; using a purely proof-theoretic method he showed that the quantified S5 corresponds to the classical predicate logic with one-sorted variable. In this paper we extend Mints' result to the basic modal logic S4; we (...) investigate the correspondence between the quantified versions of S4 (with and without the Barcan formula) and the classical predicate logic (with one-sorted variable). We present a purely proof-theoretic proof-transformation method, reducing an LK-proof of an interpreted formula to a modal proof. (shrink)

The modal logic of Gödel sentences, termed as GS, is introduced to analyze the logical properties of 'true but unprovable' sentences in formal arithmetic. The logic GS is, in a sense, dual to Grzegorczyk's Logic, where modality can be interpreted as 'true and provable'. As we show, GS and Grzegorczyk's Logic are, in fact, mutually embeddable. We prove Kripke completeness and arithmetical completeness for GS. GS is also an extended system of the logic of 'Essence and Accident' proposed by Marcos (...) (Bull Sect Log 34(1):43-56, 2005). We also clarify the relationships between GS and the provability logic GL and between GS and Intuitionistic Propositional Logic. (shrink)

It is well known that the modal logic S5 can be embedded in the classical predicate logic by interpreting the modal operator in terms of a quantifier. Wajsberg proved this fact in a syntactic way. Mints extended this result to the quantified version of S5; using a purely proof-theoretic method he showed that the quantified S5 corresponds to the classical predicate logic with one-sorted variable. In this paper we extend Mints’ result to the basic modal logic S4; we investigate the (...) correspondence between the quantified versions of S4 and the classical predicate logic. We present a purely proof-theoretic proof-transformation method, reducing an LK-proof of an interpreted formula to a modal proof. (shrink)

In this paper, we show the equivalence between the provability of a proof system of basic hybrid logic and that of translated formulas of the classical predicate logic with equality and explicit substitution by a purely proof–theoretic method. Then we show the equivalence of two groups of proof systems of hybrid logic: the group of labelled deduction systems and the group of modal logic-based systems.

In a classical 1976 paper, Solovay proved the arithmetical completeness of the modal logic GL; provability of a formula in GL coincides with provability of its arithmetical interpretations of it in Peano Arithmetic. In that paper, he also provided an axiomatic system GLS and proved arithmetical completeness for GLS; provability of a formula in GLS coincides with truth of its arithmetical interpretations in the standard model of arithmetic. Proof theory for GL has been studied intensively up to the present day. (...) However, it might sound somewhat strange that no proof theory for GLS was ever developed nor even suggested thus far, except for the axiomatic system offered by Solovay. In this paper, we develop a proof theory for GLS based on the sequent calculus method. We provide a sequent calculus for GLS and prove the cut-elimination and some standard consequences of it: the interpolation and definability theorems. As another consequence of cut-elimination, we also prove the equivalence of GL and GLS with respect to a special form of formulas which we call Gödel sentences, using a purely proof-theoretical method. (shrink)