With special attention being paid to recent developments in Artificial Intelligence and the Law, specifically related to evidentiary reasoning, this book ...

Pragma-dialectical approaches to legal argumentation seem to be rather different from traditional approaches appealing to standards of propositional logic. Pragma-dialectical analysis of arguments by analogy and e contrario seem to fall foul to the rigors of logical analysis, in which problems or even concepts of analogy and e contrario seem to disappear. The brunt of both types of special legal argumentation appears to be borne by often implicit general principles and an appeal to the system of the law as a (...) whole. Still, pragma-dialectics and logical analysis of legal argument are best seen as fruitfully supplementing each other in ongoing research of ever evolving legal argument. (shrink)

Quine seems to maintain that there is no sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences, and also that 'analytic' and 'synthetic' have no meaning. the dependence of these concepts on 'meaning' is used to show the incompatibility of these two interpretations of quine's conception of the analytic and the synthetic, and to show that both have a paradoxical character of their own. that may threat reductionist semantics as a whole. still the need for a totally different (rationalistic, essentialistic) semantics may (...) be obviated by a reasonable explication of a vague distinction between the analytic and the synthetic. (shrink)