The author examines briefly some texts belonging to the thomistic corpus, in which is shown that tolerance is not a proper value of modernity, but it was practiced and explained by Thomas Aquinas who lived in a rich multicultural period of history as the medieval age was, where he defended convincingly his own beliefs with respect and toleration in the presence of all kind of thinkers with whom he didn’t agree entirely. After concluding that prostitution is inmoral but not illegal (...) according to Aquinas, such any tolerant philosopher would do it, the author determines the nature and limits of this ethic virtue, giving good reasons to be cultivated it by anyone. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene por objeto analizar la noción salesiana de ira desde una perspectiva filosófica, algo poco habitual entre sus intérpretes. Para ello, me propongo (1) primeramente encuadrar el tema a partir de la polémica de la filosofía antigua entre Séneca y Aristóteles sobre la moralidad de la ira y su valor antropológico, seguida de un análisis de la ira en Agustín de Hipona. Posteriormente (2), abordaré algunas consideraciones filosóficas de la ira realizadas por Francisco de Sales a través (...) de los autores griegos, medievales y monásticos con los que se relaciona su pensamiento. Finalmente, (3) haré una valoración general de la postura salesiana sobre el valor moral de la ira, poniendo de relieve que, sin tratarse de un pensador propiamente estoico, Francisco de Sales se desmarca a grandes rasgos de la postura aristotélica. (shrink)

This work aims to contribute new elements to the debate which took place in Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía between Ezequiel Téllez Maqueo and Jörg Alejandro Tellkamp about Thomas Aquinas’s theory of sensitive knowledge. The concepts of spiritus and immutatio spiritualis will be the key to solve the dilemma between the coherence or inconsistency of that theory.

Considero la propuesta reciente de Vicente, Fraser y Castroviejo según la cual hay (al menos) dos tipos distintos de lenguaje peyorativo en español, uno de los cuales (el que apela a términos neutros usados como insultos) no ha sido, según los autores, suficientemente apreciado y estudiado. Si bien concuerdo con la importancia de la distinción, sugiero una explicación alternativa a la que ellos dan del fenómeno de los términos neutros usados como insultos, que sugiere entenderlos como un caso particular de (...) uso metafórico, y del contenido peyorativo genérico transmitido, que apela a fenómenos generales de la interpretación de metáforas y de la acomodación de presuposiciones. (shrink)

In the present paper I defend an interpretation of the Cartesian notion of material falsity that it would be adequate to describe as ‘epistemic’, as opposed to most other views in the literature, which could be described as ‘metaphysical’. Whereas metaphysical conceptions of material falsity consider an idea to be such because of some kind of failure in their representative properties, that is, in the relation between what they exhibit and their objects, an epistemic view considers that what makes an (...) idea materially false is some kind of opacity that precludes their representational properties to be known in the first place. In the paper the evidence for these two kinds of reading is assessed, and it is shown that epistemic views are clearly more adequate. (shrink)

I defend in this paper the following two theses: first, that Descartes was a Pluralist as regards extended substances, that is, that for him the extended world includes a plurality of bodies, including ordinary objects, each of which may be adequately described as a substance; and that for him the notion of substance is a rather slim notion, making no specific requirements as regards individuation or persistence conditions, and determining therefore no strict constraints on the kind of material objects that (...) may count as substances. In short, I will be arguing for a certain view concerning the extension of the phrase ‘extended substance’ by defending a specific view of what ‘substance’ means.Keywords: substance, body, Monism, dependence. (shrink)

El contexto actual de las desigualdades sociales en Latinoamérica cuestiona y, al mismo tiempo, desafía el escenario de la educación superior en la búsqueda de procesos de transformación social. Estos desafíos se comprenden, en el marco de esta ponencia, desde la justicia educativa, entendida como la posibilidad de acceso con calidad a la enseñanza-aprendizaje como consecuencia de prácticas individuales y acciones colectivas. A partir de este panorama, y desde una reflexión teórica, se intentan identificar los aportes que ofrece la perspectiva (...) pedagógica y filosófica de la Fundación Universitaria Claretiana en su apuesta de educación superior de frontera, con mirada humanista, liberadora, crítica y contextual, como respuesta a las aspiraciones que tienen aquellas comunidades que afrontan realidades de pobreza, exclusión y violencia sociopolítica, especialmente indígenas, afrodescendientes y campesinas, de acceder a una universidad que se ajuste a su contexto y dinámicas de vida; no obstante, las exigencias del modelo socioeconómico y del sistema educativo en particular dificultan su materialización. (shrink)

Está escrito que escribe ensayísticamente el que compone experimentando, el que vuelve, interroga, palpa, examina y atraviesa el objeto de su reflexión. Por ser así, la escritura ensayística está presente en novelas, cuentos, poemas y en mayor grado en los ensayos. El parecido de la escritura ensayística con el "pensar" es evidente. Exceptuando al monologo interior –hallazgo de la narrativa– no hay ninguna escritura que se asemeje más al fluir del pensamiento.

Are inborn characteristics deserved or undeserved? Using Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions and Peter Strawson's objection to this theory, I argue that this question does not make sense. In order to know whether a person deserves something she has, it is necessary to evaluate what she did before having it. But people did not exist before their birth, so they did not exist before having their inborn characteristics. Therefore, talking about people deserving their inborn characteristics does not make sense: these (...) characteristics are neither deserved nor undeserved. (shrink)

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...) serving the 'somatic nervous system[. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and “low level” than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is 'descriptive' (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than 'normative' (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness. (shrink)

Este trabajo cuestiona el supuesto carácter intuitivo o natural del escepticismo acerca del mundo externo. En §1 examinamos una versión del argumento escéptico que se sostiene a partir de dos principios: clausura del conocimiento e indiferencia. Para profundizar la postura que ha defendido Michael Williams, en §2 ofrecemos un examen novedoso de la argumentación escéptica cartesiana que nos permite establecer que en dos argumentos de esta estrategia argumentativa resulta claro que la presunta naturalidad que el escéptico reclama es falsa y (...) que, antes bien, para lograr su conclusión, necesita asumir compromisos con el realismo epistémico, es decir, con la tesis de que nuestras creencias se ubican al interior de una jerarquía epistemológica de acuerdo únicamente con su contenido y en abstracto. Finalmente, basados en argumentos de inspiración wittgensteiniana, en §3 mostramos cómo es que, en contra del realismo epistémico, cada creencia desempeña un papel justificativo según el contexto pertinente. (shrink)

En este trabajo, critico una estrategia argumental que ha sido utilizada para defender la concepción de la rigidez para expresiones predicativas entendida como identidad de lo designado en los distintos mundos posibles. Se trata de una estrategia basada en la suposición de que las descripciones tendrían la capacidad de designar individuos inusuales en la misma medida en que ciertas expresiones predicativas descriptivas serían capaces de designar propiedades inusuales. Señalo que esta suposición no es compatible con ciertos principios que gobiernan el (...) funcionamiento semántico de las descripciones y con la verdad intuitiva de ciertas predicaciones que las incluyen.In this paper, I criticize an argumentative strategy that has been used in the literature to defend the view according to which rigidity for predicative expressions should be understood as identity of designation across possible worlds. It is a strategy that is based on the supposition that definite descriptions could designateunusual individuals just as well as some descriptive predicative expressions are able to designate unusual properties. I point out that this presupposition is at odds with some principles governing the semantic behaviour of definite descriptions and with the intuitive truth of some predications that include them. (shrink)

The idea of public reason involves a standard of legitimacy that requires that laws and institutions be acceptable to all reasonable people, regardless of their conceptions of the good. Many philosophers have argued that public reason should be understood as an answer to the question of how to justify state coercion. However, some authors have criticized this traditional account because it overlooks noncoercive state actions that seem appropriate topics of public reason. More recently, some philosophers have defended the traditional account (...) against that objection. In this paper, I argue that these approaches cannot effectively deal with that objection and offer a different version of the traditional account that can do so. This version rests on the ideas of overlapping consensus and stability. According to this version, the point of public reason is preserving an overlapping consensus on a coercive system of laws and institutions and achieving a stable society. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Daniel Whiting has argued that there are no exclusionary reasons (i.e., second-order reasons not to act for a reason). The premise of the argument is what he calls the motivation constraint, according to which for the fact that p to be a reason for you to ϕ, it must be possible for you to ϕ for the reason that p. However, the argument goes, it is not possible to act (or not to act) for a reason (...) for a reason. Therefore, he concludes, there are no second-order reasons. In this paper, I shall argue that Whiting's argument ought to be rejected. Thus, I will argue that we should not accept the motivation constraint on which it is based. It is true that for the fact that p to be a reason for you to ϕ, it must be possible for you to ϕ guided in the right way by the consideration that p favours you ϕing. However, I shall argue that it is possible for exclusionary reasons to guide us in the right way, even if it not possible for us to not to ϕ for a reason for a reason. (shrink)

El concepto de los fenómenos saturados y su posterior desarrollo y evolución en la obra de Marion han suscitado la discusión por el problema de la hermenéutica. En esta discusión surge la necesidad de un discernimiento hermenéutico de los fenómenos y la posibilidad de clarificar criterios para este, abriendo el debate a una ética de la fenomenalidad. Para esto proponemos revisar la obra de Marion para encontrar los elementos que nos puedan ayudar en este camino.

In this essay, I present a problem that originates in Kripke's contention, in Naming and Necessity, that natural kind terms are rigid, namely, the problem of how to understand the notion of rigidity when it is applied to general terms. I also give an account, in a principled way, of the main theoretical options that seem to be available to solve that problem, and sketch the main features of Michael Devitt's proposal against that background. En este trabajo, hago una presentación (...) de un problema que Kripke deja planteado al sostener, en El nombrar y la necesidad, que los términos de género natural son rígidos, a saber, el de cómo debería ser entendida la noción de rigidez cuando ésta es aplicada a los términos generales. Asimismo, trazo un panorama de las distintas opciones teóricas disponibles, y presento las tesis centrales de la propuesta de Michael Devitt a la luz de este marco. (shrink)

In the present paper, I examine how Michael Devitt's proposal as to how to understand the notion of rigidity for general terms fares as regards what I have called the 'criterion of extensional adequacy' for any such notion -namely, the condition according to which any notion of general term rigidity should make the class of rigid terms coincide with that of natural kind terms. I try to show that Devitt's defense of his view from the usual objections raised in the (...) literature fails. In the first place, the proposal seems to overgeneralize, as terms such as 'television set' or 'table', would also be rigid appliers; as I try to show here, the arguments presented by Devitt in order to show that that is not the case are based on some alleged properties of those terms that are also true of some of the expressions he does consider as rigid. In the second place, the proposal also undergeneralizes; even though Devitt himself accepts that this is so, I try to show that his strategy to lessen the disappointment this causes also fails. En este trabajo examino el desempeño de la propuesta acerca de cómo entender la noción de rigidez para términos generales defendida por Michael Devitt respecto de lo que denomino el 'criterio de adecuación extensional' para una noción de rigidez -a saber, la condición según la cual una noción de rigidez para términos generales debería hacer coincidir la clase de términos rígidos con la clase de términos de género natural. Intento mostrar que las estrategias desplegadas por Devitt para defender su postura de las objeciones usuales no son exitosas. En primer lugar, la propuesta parece sobregeneralizar, dado que términos como 'televisor' o 'mesa' también serían aplicadores rígidos; en efecto, según intento defender aquí, los argumentos de Devitt tendientes a mostrar que no lo son se basan en supuestas características de estos términos que son igualmente válidas respecto de las expresiones que él considera rígidas. En segundo lugar, la propuesta también subgeneraliza; si bien Devitt acepta esto, hago notar que su estrategia para quitar dramatismo a este resultado también falla. (shrink)

In this paper I present and critically discuss Simon Evnine’s account of hylomorphically complex objects (as presented in his 2016 book Making Objects and Events). On the one hand, I object to the account he gives of how artifacts (which are for him the paradigmatic cases of hylomorphically complex objects) allegedly acquire their existence and identity conditions. I elaborate on two problems I see for this account: first, that it seems unable to explain our knowledge of the kinds to which (...) artifacts belong; second, that it cannot offer a plausible solution to the grounding problem for coincident objects. I also object to the way in which he tries to adapt the sort of account he gave for artifacts to the case of organisms (in my view this fails because both cases are dissimilar at crucial points), and finally I also object to his attempt to extend that account, in a fictional way, to the case of natural non-organic objects (as I try to show, both his arguments to the effect that there are no such objects, and his positive fictionalist proposal to account for our talk about them, are flawed). (shrink)

By promising, requesting and commanding we can give ourselves and each other reasons for acting as promised, requested, and commanded. Call this our capacity to give reasons robustly. According to the triggering account, we give reasons robustly simply by manipulating the factual circumstances in a way that triggers pre-existing reasons. Here I claim that we ought to reject the triggering account. By focusing on David Enoch’s sophisticated articulation of it, I argue that it is overinclusive; it cannot adequately distinguish between (...) threats and robust reason-giving; and it cannot adequately explain why epistemic reasons cannot be robustly given. I suggest that when we give reasons robustly, we do so directly, without explanatory intermediaries. (shrink)

Let ${\cal I}$ be an ideal on ω. By cov${}_{}^{\rm{*}}$ we denote the least size of a family ${\cal B} \subseteq {\cal I}$ such that for every infinite $X \in {\cal I}$ there is $B \in {\cal B}$ for which $B\mathop \cap \nolimits X$ is infinite. We say that an AD family ${\cal A} \subseteq {\cal I}$ is a MAD family restricted to${\cal I}$ if for every infinite $X \in {\cal I}$ there is $A \in {\cal A}$ such that $|X\mathop (...) \cap \nolimits A| = \omega$. Let a$\left$ be the least size of an infinite MAD family restricted to ${\cal I}$. We prove that If $max${a,cov${}_{}^{\rm{*}}\}$ then a$\left = {\omega _1}$, and consequently, if ${\cal I}$ is tall and $\le {\omega _2}$ then a$\left = max$ {a,cov${}_{}^{\rm{*}}\}$. We use these results to prove that if c$\le {\omega _2}$ then o$= \overline o$ and that as$= max${a,non$\}$. We also analyze the problem whether it is consistent with the negation of CH that every AD family of size ω1 can be extended to a MAD family of size ω1. (shrink)

A proposal for the biological grounding of intrinsic teleology and sense-making through the theory of autopoiesis is critically evaluated. Autopoiesis provides a systemic lan- guage for speaking about intrinsic teleology but its original formulation needs to be elaborated further in order to explain sense-making. This is done by introducing adaptivity, a many-layered property that allows organisms to regulate themselves with respect to their conditions of via- bility. Adaptivity leads to more articulated concepts of behaviour, agency, sense-construction, health, and temporality than (...) those given so far by autopoiesis and enaction. These and other implications for understanding the organismic generation of values are explored. (shrink)

Mark Greenberg argues that legal obligations are those moral obligations created by the actions of legal institutions in the legally proper way. Here I defend three main claims. First, I argue that, although very often misunderstood, Joseph Raz is also a defender of MITL. Secondly, I argue that while both Greenberg and Raz are committed to MITL, they disagree about the conditions under which a moral obligation can be said to be created in the legally proper way. Finally, I argue (...) that Raz’s variant of MITL is better than Greenberg’s. It rests on a more plausible account of authority and it avoids one of the crucial defects threatening Greenberg’s view, namely, its overinclusiveness. (shrink)

In this paper I first present Dan Korman’s (2015) recent defence of a conservative view as regards the existence and composition of material objects, and then go on to criticize some of his arguments. I will focus on two related issues: on the one hand, I argue that his defense of that kind of view by making use of what he calls “arguments from counterexamples” has some metaontological presuppositions that are indeed unacceptable for someone defending the revisionist views he opposes; (...) on the other hand, I also claim that his defence of the epistemic authority of the singular intuitions allegedly backing some key premisses in those arguments is also flawed, as it seems to be in tension with his realist commitments. (shrink)

Se suele plantear que a comienzos del siglo XX las investigaciones acerca del control social abandonan la prisión como tema central para pensar el problema del orden a partir de la ciudad. Sin embargo, poco se ha dicho de la conexión, a veces subterránea, que ello guarda con la obra de Franz Kafka. Consideramos posible rastrear en la literatura del autor checo el proceso por el cual la ciudad va convirtiéndose en un eje en el cual se desarrollan un sinnúmero (...) de sucesos, justamente cuando en la Escuela de Chicago comenzaban a elaborarse las bases para una teoría ecológica de la organización social. (shrink)

"Un escritor ejemplar", texto de Hernando Téllez sobre Gómez Dávila, quizás una de las primeras aproximaciones hechas a una figura autoral que ya empezaba a despertar un profundo interés en la crítica literaria colombiana.

I consider some of the objections that have been raised against a conceptualist solution to the “grounding problem”, I address in particular two objections that I call Conceptual Validity and Instantiation, and I attempt to answer them on behalf of the conceptualist. My response, in a nutshell, is that the first of these objections fails because it ascribes to the conceptualist some commitments that do not really follow from the view’s basic insight, while the second objection also fails because it (...) denies the conceptualist resources that the alternative positions are allowed to use. (shrink)

Anjan Chakravartty sostiene que – tradicionalmente - el debate realismo-antirrealismo científico ha sido eminentemente epistémico, estando en juego si debemos comprometernos o no con la creencia de que nuestras mejores teorías científicas son verdaderas o aproximadamente verdaderas y sus términos centrales refieren exitosamente a los aspectos del mundo. Sin embargo, las versiones contemporáneas del realismo científico muestran una clara tendencia hacia la profundización de los aspectos metafísicos de la ciencia, a tal punto que una de las características más prominentes de (...) estas son tesis metafísicas sustanciales. Frente a esta situación, Chakravartty afirma que, más allá de ciertos compromisos metafísicos “básicos” - basados en la práctica científica -, el realista científico puede mantener una postura más pragmática - incluso escéptica - frente a los compromisos metafísicos más “profundos”, más propios de la metafísica de la ciencia que del debate que nos compete. El presente trabajo se propone demostrar que los argumentos esgrimidos por Chakravartty no logran justificar dicha postura pragmática y ofrece un ejemplo en el cual dicha postura resulta insostenible para el realista científico. (shrink)

The enactive approach provides a perspective on human bodies in their organic, sensorimotor, social, and linguistic dimensions, but many fundamental issues still remain unaddressed. A crucial desideratum for a theory of human bodies is that it be able to account for concrete human becoming. In this article I show that enactive theory possesses resources to achieve this goal. Being an existential structure, human becoming is best approached by a series of progressive formal indications. I discuss three standpoints on human becoming (...) as open, indeterminate, and therefore historical using the voices of Pico della Mirandola, Gordon W. Allport, and Paulo Freire. Drawing on Gilbert Simondon’s philosophy of individuation we move from an existential to an ontological register in looking at modes of embodied becoming. His scheme of interpretation of the relation between modes of individuation allows us to understand human becoming in terms of a tendency to neotenization. I compare this ontology with an enactive theoretical account of the dimensions of embodiment, finding several compatibilities and complementarities. Various forms of bodily unfinishedness in enaction fit the Simondonian ontology and the existential analysis, where transindividuality corresponds to participatory sense-making and Freire’s joint becoming of individuals and communities correlates with the open tensions in linguistic bodies between incorporation and incarnation of linguistic acts. I test some of this ideas by considering the plausibility of artificial bodies and personal becoming from an enactive perspective, using the case of replicants in the film Blade Runner. The conclusion is that any kind of personhood, replicants included, requires living through an actual history of concrete becoming. (shrink)

In our research, we examine the efforts made by Latin American business schools in the last decade to deliver a value-based education. We carry out a survey with a sample of faculty members and program directors from the whole region. We find that societal demands influenced the direction of managerial education toward values and social responsibility, changing contents and teaching methodologies in the process. Our research shows that the teaching of value-based contents—social responsibility, business ethics and environmental sustainability—has gained ground (...) in the region in the last decade, and that the emphasis on value-based contents goes hand-in-hand with a more intensive use of active learning methodologies—the case method in particular. From the perspective of respondents, the emphasis on active learning seems to correlate positively with observed changes in students’ civility. (shrink)

Contra las imágenes que pretendían representar a las sociedades del siglo XXI como sociedades del conocimiento reflexivo (Beck, Giddens y Lash, 1997), en las que se habría vuelto finalmente posible un uso autorreflexivo y un control democrático de los efectos de la ciencia y la tecnología, vemos cómo reaparecen en la actualidad los viejos dilemas que Habermas había diagnosticado a finales de la década de 1960 sobre la función ideológica de la ciencia y la técnica. Tanto el dilema político, que (...) abarca el dislocamiento trágico entre la libertad y el sometimiento del sujeto que produce el discurso científico, como el dilema teórico, en el que la ciencia oscila entre la apertura y la clausura del mundo cultural, generan una serie de problemas que continúan exigiendo investigaciones teóricas y prácticas. En esta ocasión, quisiera pensar la actualidad de estos dilemas políticos y teóricos de la relación de la ciencia con la sociedad a través de una reflexión en dos pasos: primero, voy a intentar reactualizar el diagnóstico crítico que estudiaba las transformaciones de la ciencia y la técnica como nuevas formas de ideología, que seguía de cerca a las transformaciones de la esfera pública y el desarrollo de nuevas formas de poder que se justifican exclusivamente con criterios de perfeccionamiento técnico; luego, intentaré demarcar, mediante un análisis de algunos límites que este planteo podría tener en nuestra actualidad, cuáles son a mi entender los principales desafíos que la ciencia y la técnica vuelven a plantearle a nuestro mundo social contemporáneo. (shrink)

La crítica del sujeto moral realizada por Adorno resulta clave para comprender su proyecto filosófico. Por un lado, permite reconstruir los momentos esenciales de su crítica a la filosofía del sujeto. Pero la crítica moral también ofrece la posibilidad de realizar una indagación más formal de su obra, dado que la misma figura como uno de los objetos privilegiados de la Dialéctica Negativa. De este modo, al revisar su crítica moral uno tiene la oportunidad de plantear la difícil pregunta por (...) la forma de esa filosofía que se presenta a sí misma como una dialéctica que exacerba la negatividad del pensamiento. (shrink)

In a series of recent papers, Darwall has argued that Raz’s Normal Justification Thesis ought to be rejected. Here I shall argue that Darwall’s criticisms are unsuccessful. First, I argue that, contrary to what Darwall suggests, the NJT does not rely on an inference from the fact that B has a reason to treat A’s directives as protected reasons to the conclusion that A’s directives are protected reasons for B. Second, I argue that Darwall’s arguments to the effect that the (...) reasons that obtain in virtue of the satisfaction of NJT cannot ground accountability are either ill-conceived or insufficient. (shrink)

Ante el padecimiento de un dolor social producido en un entorno signado por la exclusión, la juventud despliega distintas estrategias entre las que pueden ubicarse las autoagresiones corporales. Este art í culo analiza los hallazgos de un estudio socioeducativo que recupera narrativas del dolor en las experiencias estudiantiles. *Este artículo recoge los resultados de una investigación finalizada con sede en el Programa de Investigación “Transformaciones sociales, subjetividad y procesos educativos”, bajo la dirección de Carina V. Kaplan, del Instituto de Investigaciones (...) en Ciencias de la Educación, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires. Proyecto UBACyT N° 20020170100464BA – periodo 2018-2021: “Violencias, estigmatización y condición estudiantil. Una sociología de la educación sobre las emociones y los cuerpos”. (shrink)

El artículo que sigue fue publicado originalmente con el título "Causation" en el Journal of Philosophy 70.17 : 556-567, y luego reimpreso en Lewis, D. Philosophical Papers. Vol. II. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1986. 159-172. Esta traducción se publica conla autorización del Journal of Philosophy y de Oxford University Press.Querría agradecer aquí a Santiago Erpen, María José García Encinas,Diego Morales y Carolina Sartorio por diversos comentarios y sugerencias que me han permitido, espero, mejorar la traducción.