The spreading phenomenon of Euroscepticism is manifested in critical practices in discourse that oppose European integration. This paper explores Euroscepticism as an element of discourse, which cannot only be measured as party positions or individual attitudes. Based on this understanding, our argument is twofold. Firstly, Euroscepticism relates to the unsettled and principally contested character of the European Union (EU) as a political entity: its basic purpose and rationale, its institutional design and its future trajectory. It correlates with (...) pro-European discourse and the attempts to promote the (democratic) legitimacy of the EU. Secondly, we argue that Euroscepticism unfolds primarily through mass media. As such, it is given public expression through general news values, drama and narratives that are targeted to draw the attention of the wider audience. Understanding this responsive and public nature of Euroscepticism leads us, in the end, to a comprehensive typology of six forms of polity evaluation of the EU. (shrink)

In the face of enduring crisis phenomena, quantitative evidence of the renewed salience of socio-economic agendas advanced by radical right populist parties calls for more qualitative research work and in-depth case studies. The present paper aims to contribute to filling this gap through a cultural political economy (CPE) investigation of the Italian League (Lega) party that foregrounds its socio-economic positioning by reconstructing the party’s ‘economic imaginary’. The suggested synergy between CPE and a critical discourse analysis of the League’s practical argumentation (...) in the 2013 and 2018 electoral manifestos points to a composite economic imaginary that prioritizes: 1) production (vs financialization); 2) support of internal demand; 3) lowering of fiscal pressure; 4) protectionism and 5) welfare. The analysis shows how, under Salvini’s leadership, the party’s practical argumentation in EU matters has become constitutive of its overall political strategy and so exacerbated the claims at the core of the respective economic imaginary. In this vein, the League’s Euroscepticism has also polarized the relationship between the party’s socio-economic and socio-cultural stance, thus urging to go beyond the focus on economic imaginaries and sketch out a CPE research agenda on the League’s more encompassing struggle for hegemony in the Italian political economy. (shrink)

This article analyzes how the development of the European Union (EU) fundamental rights policy feeds Euroscepticism—and notably political Euroscepticism—within segments of national political elites in EU Member States. More specifically, it argues that this relatively new policy also gives rise to a new form of political Euroscepticism, which has been defined as “value-based Euroscepticism,” e.g., the perception that the EU via its fundamental rights policy, unduly interferes in matters where value systems and core domestic preferences on (...) ethical issues are at stake. This happens in a context where the EU is resented, by some segments of political elites, for allegedly empowering diverse groups (such as ethnic minorities, immigrants' associations, judges, and so on) at the expense of popular sovereignty. This resentment is exacerbated by the fact that national governments are increasingly submitted to the critical assessment of EU-level actors (e.g., the European Parliament or the European Commission) in terms of democratic credentials. (shrink)

Studies point out that populism, a concept still in dire need of clarifications, resembles more of a rhetorical strategy than a fully-fledged ideology. Actually, populism has become a concept so frequently used that its orginial meaning seems to have been lost, leaving it as an empty shell, at least from an ideological point of view. I argue that in spite of this – or rather as a means of compensation – populism uses a very robust mythological apparatus, creating narratives that (...) allow voters to easily understand its messages. The current article underlines that in an attempt to over-simplify its discourse, populism makes use of all four political myths identified by Raoul Girardet. The conspiracy myth represents the main element revolving around the populist discourse. Politicians who embrace this rhetoric denounce a secret society that is rigorously organized, the actions of which defy morality, using all means to attain political power. The other three political myths, i.e. the myth of unity, the myth of the savior and the myth of the golden age, act together only as a counterweight for the first. The paper also points out that the success of Euroscepticism lies in the fact that it represents the perfect embedding for such myths, and that the EU needs to generate its own narratives if it hopes to confront the so-called “populist temptation”. (shrink)

European Journal of Political Theory, Volume 21, Issue 1, Page 178-186, January 2022. Few debates in political theory are challenged as much by the constant change of their empirical subject as those about democracy in the European Union. With A Republican Europe of States, Richard Bellamy responds to the EU’s post-Lisbon era, which has been characterized by the euro crisis, conflicts over migration, the rise of Euroscepticism and Brexit. Keeping an eye on these contextual conditions and the related legal (...) and political transformations, he has developed a general theory of international democracy aimed at securing non-domination between peoples and between citizens and their representatives at the international level, and elaborated its implications for the EU. The result is a distinctive version of demoi-cracy, whose firm centring on the nation-state as the natural locus of democracy is likely to be controversially discussed. In this article, I raise some critical considerations regarding the design of demoi-cratic institutions, the adequate understanding of EU citizenship and the normative credentials of differentiated integration. (shrink)

The world financial crisis of 2008 reached a head in the Eurozone in 2012, when major problems became apparent affecting several countries in Southern Europe. During this time, the British press focused particularly on Spain, watching the potentially volatile political situation with interest, and documenting the negotiations between Spanish and European leaders. This article considers how this situation was reported in two British newspapers, The Guardian and The Independent, applying corpus linguistics techniques to identify salient aspects of the crisis and (...) to detect patterns in language use that had an ideological dimension. The 2012 crisis emerges mainly as a political issue, and the reporting focuses on solutions rather than causes or effects. However, even though these two publications are not noted for Euroscepticism, they both show a strong tendency to group South European countries together within a negative frame, collectivizing them and establishing a dichotomy with Northern Europe. (shrink)

The date 23 June 2016 brought in front of the United Kingdom and the European Union a very serious challenge named Brexit. In the June 23, 2016 referendum, the British voted to leave one of the most unique international organizations in the world, thus putting the EU in front of the UK’s request for the activation of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which the EU is facing for the first time. Brexit is opening new chapters in the history of (...) the UK, while the EU is engaging with the procedures of the voluntary withdrawal of an important member state, which is known about its high political and military role in the world. Some experts of international relations and European studies say that Brexit will have much more consequences for the UK, some for the EU, but truth is that Brexit will be accompanied with many consequences for both of its protagonists. Its risks are very serious so they may result with the dissolution of the UK. Meanwhile, the increase of euroscepticism within the EU’s member states, with particular emphasis the presence of Eurosceptic voices in its most important members is at a very worrying level. Based on these facts, the knowledge about the real meaning of Brexit is necessary. Therefore, the main focus of this research lies in the classification of the main political consequences of Brexit for the UK and the EU. (shrink)

El presente artículo trata de hacer ver que el desencuentro entre la modernidad ilustrada y la religión católica, fue debido a una serie de factores y circunstancias desgraciadas, y no a una incompatibilidad inevitable. Es más, a pesar de los malentendidos y desencuentros, no son pocos los ideales de la modernidad ilustrada que, si profundizamos en ellos, descubriremos su inspiración y raíces cristianas. Es más, guste o no a algunos, el patrimonio espiritual y moral que ha ido configurando la identidad (...) europea ha tenido una de sus más importantes fuentes de inspiración en la tradición judeo-cristiana, sin menoscabar, por supuesto, la herencia griega, el derecho romano, la tradición liberal-ilustrada, y la revolución científica. Especialmente, hemos hecho hincapié en la autoridad moral del sufrimiento de la tradición judeocristiana, como una baza fundamental de cara la defensa de la dignidad humana. Para profundizar en esta compleja problemática hemos tenido en cuenta, entre otros, los análisis de Karl Löwith, Hans Blumenberg, J. Habermas, Benedicto XVI y J.B. Metz. Nuestra conclusión es que no tiene razón el actual secularismo-laicismo excluyente al pretender minusvalorar, o borrar simplemente del mapa, las raíces cristianas de Europa, como portadoras de valores y actitudes, que son tan necesarias ante el relativismo, el nihilismo postmoderno, y la crisis de valores de una sociedad, cada vez más deshumanizada. Frente al euroescepticismo que hoy sobrevuela amenazante, hay que reivindicar el “humanismo socrático-cristiano” como una seña de identidad irrenunciable. Otra cosa es el integrismo religioso, que no acaba de admitir la autonomía de la sociedad civil y del Estado, como presupuesto fundamental de una sana secularidad. Es precisamente en el seno de la sociedad civil donde la institución religiosa tiene derecho a dejar oír su voz, en diálogo respetuoso con las otras voces que en ella se ubican, de cara a consensuar soluciones frente a los graves problemas que nos acucian. Y sólo desde una identidad europea bien asentada, podremos enfrentarnos con el reto de la multiculturalidad al que Europa se ve inevitablemente abocada, en el contexto de la globalización.This article attempts to show, that the disagreement between enlightened modernity and Catholic religion, was due to a number of factors and unfortunate circumstances and not to an unavoidable incompatibility. There is more, despite misunderstandings and disagreements, there are many ideals of enlightened modernity that when we go deeper into them, we discover their Christian inspiration and roots. Even more, like it or not some people, spiritual and moral heritage, which has configured European identity, had Judeo- Christian tradition as one of its sources of inspiration, without underestimating, of course, Greek heritage, Roman law, liberal enlightenment tradition and scientific revolution. We have emphasized, especially, the moral authority of suffering of Judeo-Christian tradition as something basic to defend human dignity. To go deeper into this complex problem, we took into account, among others, the analyses of Karl Löwith, Hans Blumemberg, J. Habermas, Benedit XVI, and J:B: Metz. Our conclusion is that the current exclusive secularism is not right trying to underestimate or eliminate the Christian roots in Europe as carriers of values and attitudes, so necessary against relativism, postmodern nihilism and the crisis of values in a society increasingly dehumanized. Against an Euroscepticism which overflies threatening, we must claim a Socratic-Christian humanism as a sign of indispensable identity. Religious secularismis something different, it does not admit the authority of a civil society and state, as a fundamental prerequisite for a healthy secularity. It is precisely within a civil society where a religious institution has the right to be heard in a respectful dialogue with others voices that are located in there to agree on solutions against the problems we are facing and, only from a well established European identity, we will be able to face the challenge of multiculturalism to which Europe is inevitably doomed in a context of Globalization. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article investigates the recurring concepts emerging in a transnational social-media arena focusing on Brexit in the period immediately after the June 2016 referendum. It mainly focuse...

ABSTRACT This article examines early twentieth-century British Commonwealth ideologies as historical precursors of empire-related Euroscepticism, with a particular focus on the thought of Reginald Coupland (1884–1952) and Alfred Zimmern (1879–1957). It shows that the liberal internationalists committed to advocating the Commonwealth, Coupland and Zimmern sought to promote an idealized view of the empire by portraying it as a harmonious and multiagency polity grounded in a supposed benign form of nationalism and internationalism. The essay also highlights a relatively disregarded ideological (...) source of the British Commonwealth projects at the time: Edmund Burke. Coupland and Zimmern built on aspects of Burke’s thought – respectively, his account of trust and manners – to characterize their schemes for the empire. Moreover, such Burkean elements helped them to distinguish between the systems of their envisaged Commonwealth and Continental states, among others, Germany. The essay presents Coupland’s and Zimmern’s imperial projects as two significant cases of the incorporation of Burke’s thought into the early century British Commonwealth accounts. (shrink)

This article analyzes how the development of the European Union fundamental rights policy feeds Euroscepticism—and notably political Euroscepticism—within segments of national political elites in EU Member States. More specifically, it argues that this relatively new policy also gives rise to a new form of political Euroscepticism, which has been defined as “value-based Euroscepticism,” e.g., the perception that the EU via its fundamental rights policy, unduly interferes in matters where value systems and core domestic preferences on ethical (...) issues are at stake. This happens in a context where the EU is resented, by some segments of political elites, for allegedly empowering diverse groups at the expense of popular sovereignty. This resentment is exacerbated by the fact that national governments are increasingly submitted to the critical assessment of EU-level actors in terms of democratic credentials. (shrink)

In recent research, the declining support for European integration is often attributed to the lack of a European public sphere. The comparatively low level of Europeanization in the news media is said to promote euroscepticism or at least hinder further integration. We ask if, and what kinds of, media effects are theoretically plausible and empirically observable in the context of European integration. Based on Eurobarometer data, we evaluate the impact of domestic media use of EU citizens on their attitudes (...) towards the EU and Europe. Using structural equation modeling techniques in a cross-national analysis, we can demonstrate that domestic media use has a positive but small effect on knowledge, attachment to Europe and support for the European Union. (shrink)

European identity can be considered in its objective dimension, as being the top-down project and also the bottom-up process of building the genuine form of the trans-national political community, as well as in its subjective dimension related to the identification of the individuals and groups – the Europeans – with this new political community and in addition to their already established identification with a certain nation-state. The third dimension, related to the relevant interpretative models – ethno-cultural/Euroscepticism approach, European constitutional (...) patriotism, pluralist/multiculturalism approach – has also been important factor of European identity-building. New type of political community opens new questions – whether it is a Europe as the family of nations, a Europe of citizens, a Europe which is going to be built through common practices, a Christian Europe or a Europe of mutual matching and crossing civilizations, a secular Europe or Europe of religious Christian heredity and/or different religions. Founding Treaties define European identity politically, starting from the motto “Unity in Diversity”. However, this motto is differently interpreted by communitarians/Euro nationalists, ethno-nationalists/Euro skeptics, liberals and republicans/European constitutional patriots. Controversial character of political identity has to be kept in mind always again. The politics of identity, the misuse of an ethnically concieved concept of identity with its war-like consequences, has represented one of the most destructive potentials of a contemporary politics, including the region of Europe . On the other hand, political communities cannot survive without homogenizing force of a common identity, and it is especially valid for proposed democratic communities, including European Union. When European identity is regarded, it is most important to define its meaning in a sense which will empower a democratic capacity of the European Union, which will contribute to overcoming its democratic deficit, and will also contribute to escaping particularist, xenophobic, Euro skeptic tendencies and sentiments. (shrink)

This article analyses the intersecting emotive expressions of nationalism, Euroscepticism, and Europeanness in Britain and Ireland during the European Union's 50th birthday festivities in March 2007. Such discursive manifestations in the Irish and British national press were occasioned by the display and public consumption of fifty-four national cakes at the Berlin Volkfest. The public, ritualistic, and convivial eating of national foods, represented a departure from the usual stale recipe of political summits, and was supposed to excite feelings of identity (...) with the European Union project. Yet the event occasioned press, politicians, and public to delve into backward looking nationalist projections, the result of which was a media event riddled by fragmentation and diverging readings, which have to be interpreted via the multifarious relationships between globalization, national dishes and national identity. (shrink)