A growing genre of ‘crisis studies’ traces liberal-democratic instability to technocratic reformism and populist reaction to it. Most contributions recommend restoring economic growth, rebuilding civic culture and eschewing populist ‘us-versus-them’ narratives. This literature relies on a problematic way of thinking we label irenicism, and show to be a contemporary variant of what political realists call progressive moralizing. Irenicism portrays liberal-democracy as the product of voluntary consensus among rational individuals to sustain institutions that, by promoting endless economic growth, support universal interests (...) and values. By way of a synthesis of realist thinking and Dewey’s pragmatic approach to experimental theory-building, irenicism is shown to preserve a lacuna for political interpretation. The task for current political theory should not be to affirm old ideas in the face of new challenges. Rather, it should be to do away with ‘traditionalized’ ideas, to clear the field for experimental responses to democratic political thought and action. (shrink)

This article discusses the career of anthropological motives in the work of Jürgen Habermas. The main thesis is that besides his explicit criticism of the use of anthropological arguments in the field of moral and social philosophy there is a more or less strong commitment to this kind of thinking in his own work. This becomes most explicit in Habermas’ early writings around Knowledge & Human Interest, where he tries to formulate an anthropological grounded interest in emancipation, and in his (...) recent publication The Future of Human Nature, where he slightly moves away from his strict Kantian discourse ethics. But even in the formulation of his universal pragmatics we can find some weak anthropological grounding. (shrink)

This article compares Axel Honneth’s method of normative reconstruction with John Dewey's method of problem-solving. We argue that Dewey’s method is more open to “radical” measures of social transformation because it does not bear Honneth’s inherent conservative implications. Dewey’s “more radical” measures include, in particular, demands for a socialist transformation of the economy, whereas Honneth’s approach leads to mere reformist proposals within the existing property system, such as the introduction of a minimum wage. We situate this juxtaposition in the more (...) recent discussion on the methodology of critical theories and argue that, despite the recent turn of Critical Theorists towards Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy, the potential of the latter has so far been largely neglected. (shrink)