14 found
Order:
  1. Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity.David Schmeidler - 1989 - Econometrica 57:571-589.
  2.  10
    A Theory of Case-Based Decisions.Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
    Gilboa and Schmeidler provide a paradigm for modelling decision making under uncertainty. Unlike the classical theory of expected utility maximization, case-based decision theory does not assume that decision makers know the possible 'states of the world' or the outcomes, let alone the decision matrix attaching outcomes to act-state pairs. Case-based decision theory suggests that people make decisions by analogies to past cases: they tend to choose acts that performed well in the past in similar situations, and to avoid acts that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  3.  41
    Is it always rational to satisfy Savage's axioms?Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):285-296.
    This note argues that, under some circumstances, it is more rational not to behave in accordance with a Bayesian prior than to do so. The starting point is that in the absence of information, choosing a prior is arbitrary. If the prior is to have meaningful implications, it is more rational to admit that one does not have sufficient information to generate a prior than to pretend that one does. This suggests a view of rationality that requires a compromise between (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  4.  96
    Rationality of belief or: why savage’s axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality.Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):11-31.
    Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a “Grand State Space”, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs. Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, is inherently incapable of describing (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  5.  20
    An expected utility theory for state-dependent preferences.Edi Karni & David Schmeidler - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (4):467-478.
    This note is a generalization and improved interpretation of the main result of Karni and Schmeidler. A decision-maker is supposed to possess a preference relation on acts and another preference relation on state-prize lotteries, both of which are assumed to satisfy the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms. In addition, the two preference relations restricted to a state of nature are assumed to agree. We show that these axioms are necessary and sufficient for the existence of subjective expected utility over acts with state-dependent (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  6.  26
    What are axiomatizations good for?Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - 2019 - Theory and Decision 86 (3-4):339-359.
    Do axiomatic derivations advance positive economics? If economists are interested in predicting how people behave, without a pretense to change individual decision making, how can they benefit from representation theorems, which are no more than equivalence results? We address these questions. We propose several ways in which representation results can be useful and discuss their implications for axiomatic decision theory.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  7. On the definition of objective probabilities by empirical similarity.Itzhak Gilboa, Offer Lieberman & David Schmeidler - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):79 - 95.
    We suggest to define objective probabilities by similarity-weighted empirical frequencies, where more similar cases get a higher weight in the computation of frequencies. This formula is justified intuitively and axiomatically, but raises the question, which similarity function should be used? We propose to estimate the similarity function from the data, and thus obtain objective probabilities. We compare this definition to others, and attempt to delineate the scope of situations in which objective probabilities can be used.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  14
    Economic theories and their Dueling interpretations.Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite, Larry Samuelson & David Schmeidler - 2022 - Journal of Economic Methodology:1-20.
    The interpretation of economic theories varies along several dimensions. First, models can describe reality, illustrate a recommended state of affairs, or analyze the structure and implications of a theory. Second, theories can be used for prediction or for explanation. Third, theories can relate to reality in a rule-based or case-based manner. Fourth, theories can be statements about economic reality or about the act of economic reasoning itself. Fifth, theories can offer predictions or merely critique reasoning. We argue that theories are (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  29
    On the definition of objective probabilities by empirical similarity.Itzhak Gilboa, Offer Lieberman & David Schmeidler - 2010 - Synthese 172 (1):79-95.
    We suggest to define objective probabilities by similarity-weighted empirical frequencies, where more similar cases get a higher weight in the computation of frequencies. This formula is justified intuitively and axiomatically, but raises the question, which similarity function should be used? We propose to estimate the similarity function from the data, and thus obtain objective probabilities. We compare this definition to others, and attempt to delineate the scope of situations in which objective probabilities can be used.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Subjective Distributions.Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler - 2004 - Theory and Decision 56 (4):345-357.
    A decision maker has to choose one of several random variables whose distributions are not known. As a Bayesian, she behaves as if she knew the distributions. In this paper we suggest an axiomatic derivation of these (subjective) distributions, which is more economical than the derivations by de Finetti or Savage. Whereas the latter derive the whole joint distribution of all the available random variables, our approach derives only the marginal distributions. Correspondingly, the preference questionnaire needed in our case is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11.  9
    Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner.Leonid Hurwicz, David Schmeidler & Hugo Sonnenschein (eds.) - 1985 - Cambridge University Press.
    Published as a tribute to the memory of Elisha Pazner, this book contains a collection of essays providing a comprehensive view of the design and evaluation of economic mechanisms, written and edited by the major contributors to the field. Amongst the topics included are bargaining theory and the economics of competitive bidding. The surveys are preceded by 'A Perspective', by Leo Hurwicz which contains a systematic account of the development of the literature on mechanism design, and this provides a context (...)
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12.  11
    Desirability relations in Savage’s model of decision making.Dov Samet & David Schmeidler - 2022 - Theory and Decision 94 (1):1-33.
    We propose a model of an agent’s probability and utility that is a compromise between Savage (The foundations of statistics, Wiley, 1954) and Jeffrey (The Logic of Decision, McGraw Hill, 1965). In Savage’s model the probability–utility pair is associated with preferences over acts which are assignments of consequences to states. The probability is defined on the state space, and the utility function on consequences. Jeffrey’s model has no consequences, and both probability and utility are defined on the same set of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13.  7
    Frames and decisions under uncertainty in economics theory.David Schmeidler - 2021 - Theory and Decision 92 (3-4):759-764.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14.  77
    Rationality of belief or: why savage’s axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality. [REVIEW]Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):11-31.
    Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a “Grand State Space”, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs. Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, is inherently incapable of describing (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations