Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Behavioural and heuristic models are as-if models too – and that’s ok.Ivan Moscati - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy:1-31.
    I examine some behavioural and heuristic models of individual decision-making and argue that the diverse psychological mechanisms these models posit are too demanding to be implemented, either consciously or unconsciously, by actual decision makers. Accordingly, and contrary to what their advocates typically claim, behavioural and heuristic models are best understood as ‘as-if’ models. I then sketch a version of scientific antirealism that justifies the practice of as-if modelling in decision theory but goes beyond traditional instrumentalism. Finally, I relate my account (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the economic foundations of decision theory.Aldo Montesano - 2022 - Theory and Decision 93 (3):563-583.
    Economics bases the choice theory on the mental experiment that introduces the choice correspondence, which associates to every set of possible actions the subset of preferred actions. If some conditions are satisfied, then the choice correspondence implies a binary preference ordering on actions and an ordinal utility function. This approach applies both to decisions under certainty and decisions under uncertainty. The preference ordering depends on the consequence of actions. Under certainty, there is only one consequence to every action, while, under (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • The Problem of Reindividuation and Money-Pump Arguments: Analysis of Mamou’s Solution.Nenad Filipović - forthcoming - Topoi:1-10.
    In this article, I examine the consequences of Mamou’s recent solution to the so-called problem of reindividuation. The problem is first proposed by John Broome as an argument against the Humean view of rationality and subjective decision theory. Essentially, Broome argues that the reindividuation of outcomes must be constrained in some way if the axioms of rationality are not to be vacuous, but the constraints on individuation cannot be consistent with the Humean view of rationality. Mamou offers an elegant Humean (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•