Martin Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy reflects his famous philosophical "turning." In this work, Heidegger returns to the question of being from its inception in Being and Time to a new questioning of being as event. Heidegger opens up the essential dimensions of his thinking on the historicality of being that underlies all of his later writings. Contributions was composed as a series of private ponderings that were not originally intended for publication. They are nonlinear and radically at odds with the (...) traditional understanding of thinking. This translation presents Heidegger in plain and straightforward terms, allowing surer access to this new turn in Heidegger’s conception of being. (shrink)

One of the great virtues of the book is its impeccable clarity and readability." —Peter Warnek In her concise introduction to Martin Heidegger’s second most important work, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), Daniela Vallega ...

In theCompanion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophyan international group of fourteen Heidegger scholars shares strategies for reading and understanding this challenging work.

Comparisons between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s writings on the body tend to focus on the earlier works of these philosophers, i.e. on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, and Heidegger’s Zollikon Seminars in the context of Being and Time. This paper focuses on their later works in order to show how each philosopher respectively opens venues to think the human body non-subjectively and as emerging from being, where being includes the being also of other bodies, things, or events. This thinking of bodies “from (...) being” articulates them in terms of spatio-temporal events. The article shows that in thinking from being, both Heidegger’s and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts harbor a sense of being with a unifying force, which is tied to meaning or sense. The article ends by questioning the possibility of accounts of bodies as spatio-temporal events not bound by a unifying force of being, bodies that may carry both sense and non-sense. (shrink)

Using as guiding thread the difference between being and beings, this article traces and questions the movement of Heidegger’s thinking in his non-public writings from Contributions to Philosophy to The Event and ends with references to the thought of Gelassenheit. In 1941–42 this movement takes the form of a “downgoing” into the abyssal, withdrawing dimension of being. Heidegger rethinks the event in terms of inception as he attempts to let go of any form of representational thinking more radically than in (...) Contributions and seeks to respond in imageless saying to nothing but the silent call of beyng. Heidegger’s downgoing brings with it a transformed relation to history and to what he calls “machination,” as well as a shift from dispositions marked by decision, strife, and endurance to thinking in terms of releasing, following, and thanking. (shrink)

This essay traces the movement of Heidegger’s thinking first from Contributions to Philosophy to The Event and then in the latter volume itself as a downgoing movement Heidegger performs through language, i.e. in how he thinks and speaks. The essay highlights a shift in attunement and in the relation to history that occurs in The Event, which is a shift from a resistance to the epoch of machination to letting it pass by as thinking ventures into the most concealed dimension (...) of the event and attempts an “imageless saying.” The last part of the essay focuses on the issue of language in The Event, both in relation to how Heidegger thinks language and in view of the performative aspects of Heidegger’s writing. (shrink)

This article juxtaposes Derrida’s last seminar, The Beast and the Sovereign with Heidegger’s The Event in order to question Derrida’s reading of the notion of Walten in Heidegger’s texts in relation to the themes of sov­ereignty and death. It draws out different senses of Walten depending on whether Heidegger thinks Greek φύσις or the other beginning and it points out the importance of constancy for the notion of Walten. In each case Walten shatters in relation to death or to the (...) notions of the “beingless” and “expropriation” that Heidegger introduces at the beginning of the 40s. At the same time, there emerges a strange proximity between an originary differencing Heidegger thinks in relation to the notions of “the beingless” and “expropriation” on the one hand, and Derrida’s notion of différance on the other hand as well as a strange proximity in the circular character of both Heidegger’s and Derrida’s writings that has to do with how death informs their writing. (shrink)

This essay engages Scott’s Living with Indifference by inquiring how we may understand experiences of indifference as occurring in our bodily being. It brings together Heidegger’s notion of being-there (Da-sein) and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of world and body as flesh. With respect to Merleau-Ponty, the discussion highlights his thought of a “dehiscence” of body and world, which opens the idea of a hollow in the flesh that “echoes” indifferent dimensions accompanying the happening of things and events. The essay concludes with the (...) insight that we can be attuned to indifference because we carry indifference with us in our bodies. (shrink)

For Heidegger, to experience and think being as such in its finite temporality necessitates that one exist in exposure to one’s own possibility of death. In the thirties, when he thinks of being in...

This essay proposes a reading of Scheler’s work that puts into question the separation of principles he claims for life and spirit, or body and thought. After considering how Scheler opens possibilities to think the body non-objectively when he conceives it as an analyzer that determines if and how one perceives something, the essay moves to a discussion of his late work Man’s Place in Nature. Here Scheler thinks the mutual penetration of life and spirit while still maintaining their distinction (...) by claiming that they have separate principles. By focusing on the performativity of Scheler’s thought, the essay aims at uncovering a dimension of his thought that undermines this distinction and allows for new possibilities of understanding the lived body. (shrink)

This essay proposes a reading of Scheler’s work that puts into question the separation of principles he claims for life and spirit, or body and thought. After considering how Scheler opens possibilities to think the body non-objectively when he conceives it as an analyzer that determines if and how one perceives something, the essay moves to a discussion of his late work Man’s Place in Nature. Here Scheler thinks the mutual penetration of life and spirit while still maintaining their distinction (...) by claiming that they have separate principles. By focusing on the performativity of Scheler’s thought, the essay aims at uncovering a dimension of his thought that undermines this distinction and allows for new possibilities of understanding the lived body. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 47, Issue 1, pp 1 - 18 This essay addresses time’s dissemination both in the sense of an undoing or fracturing of unifying conceptions of time, as well as in the sense of ‘scattering seeds’ by conceiving of manifold temporalizing configurations of living beings, things, and events without an overarching sense of time. After a consideration of traditional conceptions of time, this essay explores the notion of duration in Bergson in order to make it fruitful for thinking (...) duration without centering it in human consciousness. The author suggests that we can begin to think the temporal happening of things and events in terms of different temporal configurations of various degrees and qualities of complexity that may be occasioned by chance, whereby chance is understood as the freeing of time-spaces of indeterminacy in which temporal configurations take shape or manifest themselves. 1. (shrink)

Engaging the development of Heidegger's non-public writings on the event between 1936 and 1941, Daniela Vallega-Neu reveals what Heidegger's private writings kept hidden. Vallega-Neu takes readers on a journey through these volumes, which are not philosophical works in the traditional sense as they read more like fragments, collections of notes, reflections, and expositions. In them, Vallega-Neu sees Heidegger searching for a language that does not simply speak about being, but rather allows a sense of being to emerge in his thinking (...) and saying. She focuses on striking shifts in the tone and movement of Heidegger's thinking during these important years. Skillfully navigating the unorthodox and intimate character of these writings, Vallega-Neu provides critical insights into questions of attunement, language, the body, and historicity in Heidegger's thinking. (shrink)

This article aims at making Heidegger’s understanding of history fruitful for a consideration of history that both takes into account the complexity and multitude of historical lineages and also pays attention to smaller historical events. After revisiting Heidegger’s understanding of history in terms of a history of being and our being-historical, the author brings into play the notion of rhythm. She thinks of rhythms of history in terms of durations of historical configurations of things and events in relation to their (...) beginnings and endings (their rhythmic caesura), and in relation to other historical confi gurations. This leads to an understanding of history in terms of being-historical that does not simply indicate things happening in time, but instead focuses on the happening that determines how things appear and are deployed. (shrink)

An ontology of bodily being featuring Plato, Nietzsche, Scheler, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and Foucault.

Beginning with a discussion of truth and errancy and how these relate to Heidegger’s differentiation between grounding attunements and non-grounding attunements, the essay subsequently brings into discussion the role of the lived body. In order to mark a difference between, on the one hand, fundamental attunements that are disclosive of being and non-being as such and, on the other hand, attunements in so far as they relate to specific things or events and involve our body, the latter are addressed as (...) bodily dispositions. The last part of the essay puts into question that very distinction and suggests that even when it comes to fundamental attunements, these occur through or with bodily dispositions. (shrink)