ABSTRACTIn this paper, I explore new perspectives that an ethics of care approach brings to our understanding of, and responses to, poverty and development. Building on the works of care-ethics scholars such as Virginia Held and Fiona Robinson, I argue that an ethics of care approach provides a unique theory-practice nexus that offers alternative concrete ways to tackle human poverty that lends itself to both local and cross-border applications. In addition to providing crucial insights into women’s struggles in varied contexts, (...) such an approach also uses the lens of care to re-envision human securities and vulnerabilities, thereby deserving of greater attention by scholars, practitioners, and institutions in search of effective ethical models of global development. I provide a case-study of Karma Kutir, a women’s development organization based in the city of Kolkata, India, to shed light on context-specific care-centered development practices aimed at alleviating poverty. I show how such practices are highly effective and provide concrete evidence of the value of an ethics of care approach to poverty and women’s development. (shrink)

After a brief discussion of Hindu views on abortion as reflected in classical Hindu philosophical and religious texts, this article examines, from an interdisciplinary perspective, current social attitudes towards abortion among lower-income Hindu women in Calcutta and attempts to identify the reasons for the striking disparity between traditional and modern Hindu views. Does Hindu dharma have the regulatory power it wielded in the past? What accounts for the changing face of mores in urban centers like Calcutta? These and related issues (...) are the focus of this essay. (shrink)

In this dissertation I defend a particular naturalistic view in meta-ethics which is a kind of meta-ethical soft realism. The main features of such a view are as follows. ;On my view, moral properties are to be understood as dispositional properties which supervene upon the natural properties of the objects or states of affairs on the one hand, and on the psychological properties of the human subjects on the other. Such a dispositional account of moral properties emphasizes both the subjective (...) and objective aspects of our moral life. ;On such a view, moral properties are not identical with natural properties. Rather, moral properties strongly supervene upon natural properties with metaphysical necessity, while weakly supervening upon natural properties with conceptual necessity. I show that such a naturalistic view , is a distinct type of ethical naturalism from the first type of ethical naturalism , according to which moral terms are synonymous with natural terms and hence the moral and natural properties which these terms respectively designate are identical. ;I critically examine the anti-realist positions of Blackburn and Mackie, as well as the non-naturalistic realist position of Moore, with a view to establishing such a particular naturalistic view of meta-ethics which is a kind of soft realism. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there is an inherent difficulty in Frankfurt’s theory of moral responsibility. After developing Frankfurt’s account of the necessary conditions for moral responsibility complete with its thesis that the causes of our actions are irrelevant for moral responsibility, I discuss his notion of “real want,” “identification,” and personhood in search of his account of the sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. I conclude by arguing that there is a tension betweenFrankfurt’s notion of a person (and thus (...) his notion of moral responsibility) and Frankfurtian causal irrelevance. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there is an inherent difficulty in Frankfurt’s theory of moral responsibility. After developing Frankfurt’s account of the necessary conditions for moral responsibility complete with its thesis that the causes of our actions are irrelevant for moral responsibility, I discuss his notion of “real want,” “identification,” and personhood in search of his account of the sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. I conclude by arguing that there is a tension betweenFrankfurt’s notion of a person (and thus (...) his notion of moral responsibility) and Frankfurtian causal irrelevance. (shrink)