Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 4 Seiten: 568-588.

Name der Zeitschrift: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Jahrgang: 98 Heft: 8 Seiten: 89-105.

This essay focuses on the systematic role that the concept of “nature in God” plays in Kant’s philosophy, and on the way Fichte and Schelling have drawn on this concept in their respective philosophies. Having expounded Kant’s argument regarding “nature in God” and established Fichte’s and Schelling’s point of congruence, I argue that Schelling’s criticism of Fichte discloses an inherent inconsistency in the latter’s position. I ground my explanation on the difference between the claim that Fichte’s concept of nature is (...) “dead” – mistakenly ascribed to Schelling – and Schelling’s genuine claim, according to which Fichte’s concept of nature is “not even dead”. In the last section I concisely explain why this controversy between Fichte and Schelling is intertwined with Kant’s concept of Ding an sich. (shrink)

The term ‘miracle’ generally refers to events that are not explicable by natural causes alone. Kant’s notion of miracles is usually understood along these lines. However, Kant’s occupation with miracles should be understood in a practical context. Belief in miracles plays a constitutive role in Kant’s philosophy of religion concerning the need to strengthen the will both before and after departing from original evil. I demonstrate how my argument sheds new light on Kant’s claim that theoretical reason precludes the possibility (...) of material miracles. (shrink)

In his essay on theodicy, Kant explicitly claims that while the disproportion between crime and punishment poses a theodicean challenge concerning God’s justice, the suffering of the righteous is compatible with God’s justice [Gerechtigkeit], goodness [Gütigkeit], and holiness [Heiligkeit]. In light of this, Kant’s reason for addressing the book of Job in this context is puzzling. However, the location of Job’s story in the text reveals that Job’s suffering is rendered relevant only concerning the relation between two of God’s moral (...) attributes: goodness as subordinated to holiness, i.e., God’s benevolence [Güte]. Implications concern the difference between ‘authentic’ and ‘doctrinal’ theodicy. (shrink)

A series of attempts have been made to determine Kant’s exact position towards theodicy, and to understand whether it is a direct consequence of his critical philosophy or, rather, whether it is merely linked to some inner development within his critical philosophy. However, I argue that the question of Kant’s critical relation to theodicy has been misunderstood; and that in fact, Kant redefines the essence of the theodicean question anew. After introducing some major aspects of Kant‘s new conception of theodicy, (...) I show how understanding this conception is necessary for correctly analysing his specific arguments against theodicy. I demonstrate this point by examining Kant’s second argument against theodicy, in which he tackles the Leibnizian problem of ‘metaphysical evil’, and show why, in light of the above, interpretations thus far have failed to capture the essence of Kant’s claim in this regard. (shrink)

According to Kant’s dictum, morality leads inescapably to religion. Notably, this implies two unavoidable shifts: From ‘morality’ to the ‘religion of reason’ and from the ‘religion of reason’ to ‘positive religions’ (‘revelation’). I explain the grounds for each shift, focusing on the different kinds of necessity involved. I then analyze Fichte’s Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung (1792), which mainly addresses the second shift, discussed only briefly by Kant. As I show, whereas for Kant revelation is conditioned by a prior free (...) determination of the will, for Fichte it obtains a primordial status. I explain how Fichte’s approach fills in the Kantian gap between the concept of God, which seems to exclude the possibility of revelation, and the unavoidable human need to assume such an occurrence. (shrink)