Order:
See also
Aaron Halper
Catholic University of America
  1.  16
    Rethinking Kant 's Distinction Between the Beauty of Art and the Beauty of Nature.Aaron Halper - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):857-875.
    This paper argues that Kant presents two different accounts of beauty, one that applies properly to art and one that applies properly to nature. The judgment of beauty that applies properly to nature can be free and thus judged without concepts. The work of art, however, is judged beautiful when it expresses aesthetic ideas. This distinction then enables me to explain several problematic passages in Kant's text: those that serve to distinguish these two conceptions of beauty from one another as (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2.  23
    Aesthetic Judgment as Parasitic on Cognition.Aaron Halper - 2019 - Kant Yearbook 11 (1):41-59.
    When we judge something to be beautiful, do we identify an inherent feature of the object, or only our subjective response to it? This paper argues that, for Kant, pure aesthetic judgment occupies a middle ground. Such judgments are based upon affective responses to our own cognitive faculties. Thus, pure aesthetic judgment is subjective insofar as it concerns our feeling ourselves to be engaged in a certain task; it is objective insofar as the task we are engaged in is cognition (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3.  31
    An Antinomy Between Regulative Principles: An Aporetic Resolution to the Antinomy of Teleological Judgment.Aaron Halper - 2019 - Kant-Studien 110 (2):211-235.
    The antinomy of teleological judgment has increasingly been understood as a conflict between regulative principles. But it is not clear why regulative principles can be in conflict at all, since Kant otherwise takes the realization that two conflicting principles are regulative to be sufficient to resolve an antinomy. I argue that in Kant’s view regulative principles do not conflict with one another only if they are reducible to reason’s interest in systematicity. Given that the principles of this antinomy do conflict, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation