Originally the constitution was expected to express and channel popular sovereignty. It was the work of freedom, springing from and facilitating collective self-determination. After the Second World War this perspective changed: the modern constitution owes its authority not only to collective authorship, it also must commit itself credibly to human rights. Thus people recede into the background, and the national constitution becomes embedded into one or other system of 'peer review' among nations.This is what Alexander Somek argues is the creation (...) of the cosmopolitan constitution. Reconstructing what he considers to be the three stages in the development of constitutionalism, he argues that the cosmopolitan constitution is not a blueprint for the constitution beyond the nation state, let alone a constitution of the international community; rather, it stands for constitutional law reaching out beyond its national bounds. This cosmopolitan constitution has two faces: the first, political, face reflects the changed circumstances of constitutional authority. It conceives itself as constrained by international human rights protection, firmly committed to combating discrimination on the grounds of nationality, and to embracing strategies for managing its interaction with other sites of authority, such as the United Nations. The second, administrative, face of the cosmopolitan constitution reveals the demise of political authority, which has been traditionally vested in representative bodies. Political processes yield to various, and often informal, strategies of policy co-ordination so long as there are no reasons to fear that the elementary civil rights might be severely interfered with. It represents constitutional authority for an administered world. (shrink)

According to Immanuel Kant, legality means the quality of an action being merely and simply in conformity with a law. The article defends the significance of this notion and explains how it indicates the existence of a legal relation. The legal relation, in turn, is the result of resolving an antinomy between the social and the substantive dimension of moral judgment.

In an age of widespread cutbacks on social spending, the prospects of social policy generally appear to be grim. If noticeable progress has been recently made in the European Union, then it is in regard to rooting out discrimination. Indeed, anti-discrimination law and policy appears to be the one sphere of social policy whose success is causally connected to the European Union. But how successful can anti-discrimination law be? This book uses legal analysis in order to expose the intrinsic shortcomings (...) of common approaches. Anti-discrimination law fails to provide adequate legal guidance and therefore invites constant supplementation by pedagogical projects of social engineering. This book offers a genuinely leftist critique on anti-discrimination law, and concludes with a discussion of alternative models of solidarity in the Union. (shrink)

What is law? The usual answer is that the law is a system of norms. But this answer gives us at best half of the story. The law is a way of relating to one another. We do not do this as lovers or friends and not as people who are interested in obtaining guidance from moral insight. In a legal context, we are cast as 'character masks', for example, as 'buyer' and 'seller' or 'landlord' and 'tenant'. We expect to (...) have our claims respected simply because the law has given us rights. We do not want to give any other reason for our behavior than the fact that we have a legal right. Backing rights up with coercive threats indicates that we are willing to accept legal obligations unwillingly. This book offers a conceptual reconstruction of the legal relation on the basis of a critique of legal positivism. (shrink)

This book presents an original picture of the legitimacy underlying the European Union. Drawing on ancient and modern political philosophy, the book argues that the transnational regime is rooted in an individualist social and intellectual culture, and depends on an apolitical, isolated citizenship.

In this article it is argued that Jhering’s conception of legal formality, which became notorious for being the most extreme expression of conceptualism, makes sense if it is recast as a theory of rights. It is from this vantage point that Jhering’s later methodological self‐critique becomes intelligible in which he mitigated the strains of conceptual constructivism by reflecting on the value of choice granted by a system of rights.

volume 1: Legal positivism, institutionalism and globalisation -- volume 2: Normativism and anti-normativism in law.

La 4e de couverture indique : "The common good and how it can be pursued is a contested question in every polity. It touches upon the core principles of a society and shapes political debates and processes, institutional logics and constitutional settings. The nature and potential finality of the European integration project cannot be understood without taking the question into account. Despite the success story of European integration, it is still an open question wether the Union is in fact more (...) than the sum total of fragmentary compromises between and among the Member states. Is there a European Common Good beyond peace? The current controversies over collective responsibilities and values that surfaced in the financial crisis make a discussion of the common good within the European context compelling.". (shrink)

§1. I consider myself blessed with receiving such kind and sympathetic critiques. All authors have taken it upon themselves to make sense of an enterprise that combines a historical account of juri...

This chapter contains sections titled: Nineteenth‐Century Idealism From Idealism to Nineteenth‐Century Constructivism: The Case of the Historical School From the Turn of the Century to World War II: Disintegration and Reconstruction The Period from 1933 to 1945: “Völkische” Jurisprudence The Period from 1945 to the Present: From Natural Law to Postmodernism References.

This book provides a selective and somewhat cheeky account of prominent positions in legal theory, such as American legal realism, modern legal positivism, sociological systems theory, institutionalism and critical legal studies. It presents a relational approach to law and a new perspective on legal sources. The book explores topics of legal theory in a playful manner. It is written and composed in a way that refutes the widespread prejudice that legal theory is a dreary subject, with a cast of characters (...) that occasionally interact in order to illustrate the claims of the book. Legal experts claim to know what the law is. Legal theory-or jurisprudence-explores whether such claims are warranted. The discipline first emerged at the turn of the 20th century, when the self-confidence of both legal scholarship and judicial craftsmanship became severely shattered, but the crisis continues to this day. (shrink)

Modern legal positivism tries to preserve the normativity of law while abstaining from generally viewing positive laws as reasons for action. This effort is epitomised, in particular, in Raz' idea that the substance of positive law can be imparted from the detached perspective of the ‘legal man’. From that perspective, it is not stated what one ought to do, all things considered, but merely what one ought to do from the legal point of view. The first part of this article (...) shows that the problem that the introduction of the ‘legal man’ is supposed to solve originates from an assimilation of Kelsen's legal positivism to ‘common sense’. The embrace of ‘common sense’, however, divests modern legal positivism of its critical edge. The second part of the article offers both a reductio ad absurdum of a conventionalist understanding of the ‘legal man’ and an analysis of legal knowledge that abstains from exploring its claim to validity. Legal knowledge of that type embraces bitter irony. (shrink)

Historically, the connection between law and practical reason has been subject to at least two expositions. According to the first, the law is the deposit of the moral reasons people have to create a set of institutions. The existence of law is, thus understood, a consequence of potentially universal reasons for action (and a wellspring of further such reasons). Alternately, practical reason can be seen as relevant to positive law in the dual role to limit the tolerable content of positive (...) law and to explain the significance of moral arguments in legal reasoning. The article explores a third perspective that views the emergence of the legal relation as a consequence of the self-critique of practical reason. (shrink)

The concept of law presupposes the concept of the legal relationship. Law authorizes, potentially or actually, the use of coercion in order to guarantee freedom from interference by others. But coercive norms also constitute internal negative liberty for their addressees. A legal obligation cannot require adopting, let alone endorsing, the internal perspective of the law-giver. Legal subjects remain strangers to one another. Reconciling legality with autonomy involves, therefore, conceiving of one′s self-determination from the perspective of someone whose reasoning remains ultimately (...) secluded from others. Realizing this type of relation to oneself gives rise to the ethical legal obligation to assert oneself as a morally self-reliant individual. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen’s claim that the state and the law are identical is surrounded by a somewhat mystical air. Yet, the ‘identity thesis’ loses much of its mystical aura when it is seen as an attempt to recast the state, qua social fact, in deontological terms. The state is seen as a condition necessary to account for the validity of legal acts. Indeed, the meaning of the state is reduced to the function performed by a conception of order in the reproduction (...) of a system of norms. No further social fact would attest to its existence. From a sociological point of view, all law is essentially, and principally, law sans state. (shrink)

This paper explores the issue of whether an international system of nation‐states can be defended from a global perspective of impartiality. At present, it seems as if the nation‐state were the only suitable institutional location for the realization of effective systems of social justice. Provided that national politics is indeed disposed to promote the freedom and well‐being of its citizens, a decentralized system of nation‐states is likely to produce beneficial effects. Experience, however, teaches that national politics has in many instances (...) had decidedly negative effects. For that reason, the existing system of nation‐states cannot be defended from a global point of view. Hence, the question turns on whether a system of nation‐states could conceivably find the support of rational persons if it incorporated substantive restrictions on national politics. This paper discusses the liberty to migrate as one of the many options potentially available for the correction of the existing international regime. As the closer inspection of the underlying philosophical question reveals, the problem can only be resolved with reference to a normatively relevant understanding of the kind of persons we take ourselves to be. From the conclusion that the freedom to migrate is to be understood as a fundamental liberty, the discussion then turns to the legitimate limitations that might be imposed by national immigration policies. It is argued that—in order to accommodate what is demanded by both global impartiality and national solidarity—open admission policies must not in effect place at a disadvantage those who are already relatively worse off under a present distribution, for this would violate basic conditions for the development and confirmation of socially acquired self‐esteem. (shrink)

Hans Kelsen’s claim that the state and the law are ”the same” is surrounded by a somewhat mystical air. Yet, the so-called ”identity thesis” loses much of its mystical aura when it is seen as an attempt to recast the state, as a social fact, in deontological terms. Thus understood, it gives rise to viewing the state as a mere product of legal acts and implicates the rejection of the idea that some further social fact is needed in order to (...) account for the existence of the state. Accordingly, all law is essentially, and principally, law without a state. (shrink)