Abstract

Modern legal positivism tries to preserve the normativity of law while abstaining from generally viewing positive laws as reasons for action. This effort is epitomised, in particular, in Raz' idea that the substance of positive law can be imparted from the detached perspective of the ‘legal man’. From that perspective, it is not stated what one ought to do, all things considered, but merely what one ought to do from the legal point of view. The first part of this article shows that the problem that the introduction of the ‘legal man’ is supposed to solve originates from an assimilation of Kelsen's legal positivism to ‘common sense’. The embrace of ‘common sense’, however, divests modern legal positivism of its critical edge. The second part of the article offers both a reductio ad absurdum of a conventionalist understanding of the ‘legal man’ and an analysis of legal knowledge that abstains from exploring its claim to validity. Legal knowledge of that type embraces bitter irony.