Rechtsverhältnis und aufrechter Gang. Rechtsethik im zweiten Versuch

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (3):439-453 (2011)
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Abstract

The concept of law presupposes the concept of the legal relationship. Law authorizes, potentially or actually, the use of coercion in order to guarantee freedom from interference by others. But coercive norms also constitute internal negative liberty for their addressees. A legal obligation cannot require adopting, let alone endorsing, the internal perspective of the law-giver. Legal subjects remain strangers to one another. Reconciling legality with autonomy involves, therefore, conceiving of one′s self-determination from the perspective of someone whose reasoning remains ultimately secluded from others. Realizing this type of relation to oneself gives rise to the ethical legal obligation to assert oneself as a morally self-reliant individual

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