This book provides both an introduction to the philosophy of scientific modeling and a contribution to the discussion and clarification of two recent philosophical conceptions of models: artifactualism and fictionalism. These can be viewed as different stances concerning the standard representationalist account of scientific models. By better understanding these two alternative views, readers will gain a deeper insight into what a model is as well as how models function in different sciences. Fictionalism has been a traditional epistemological stance related to (...) antirealist construals of laws and theories, such as instrumentalism and inferentialism. By contrast, the more recent fictional view of models holds that scientific models must be conceived of as the same kind of entities as literary characters and places. This approach is essentially an answer to the ontological question concerning the nature of models, which in principle is not incompatible with a representationalist account of the function of models. The artifactual view of models is an approach according to which scientific models are epistemic artifacts, whose main function is not to represent the phenomena but rather to provide epistemic access to them. It can be conceived of as a non-representationalist and pragmatic account of modeling, which does not intend to focus on the ontology of models but rather on the ways they are built and used for different purposes. The different essays address questions such as the artifactual view of idealization, the use of information theory to elucidate the concepts of abstraction and idealization, the deidealization of models, the nature of scientific fictions, the structural account of representation and the ontological status of structures, the role of surrogative reasoning with models, and the use of models for explaining and predicting physical phenomena. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze Leibniz and Newton’s conception of space, and to point out where their agreements and disagreements lie with respect to its mode of existence. I shall offer a definite characterization of Leibniz and Newton’s conceptions of space. I will show that, according to their own concepts of substance, both Newtonian and Leibnizian spaces are not substantiva!. The reason of that consists in the fact that space is not capable of action. Moreover, there is (...) a sense in which space is relational, because their parts are individuated only by means of their mutual relations. (shrink)

In this paper I contend that standard quantum theory has a minimal interpretation, on which all physicists agree. That interpretation is sufficient for every application of quantum theory and it has been confirmed by a countless number of experiments. However, it provides neither an overall picture of the quantum world nor an intended ontology for quantum theory. For those reasons, several full interpretations have been proposed in order to complete the minimal interpretation. I then argue that those interpretations –which are (...) empirically equivalent, but mutually incompatible- are metaphysical ventures that cannot be confirmed by any conceivable experience. Moreover, I claim that the program of finding the ontology for quantum theory rests on the false assumption that there is a unique ontology compatible with each physical theory. I conclude that there is no direct path either from the formalism of quantum theory to its intended ontology, or from determinate metaphysical assumptions to the quantum formalism. (shrink)

in this paper i assess Pierre Duhem’s criticism of crucial experiments, and argue that we have reasons to vindicate their existence. i then analize the experiments carried out by Fizeau and Foucault in 1850, and criticize Duhem’s interpretation of their results. i contend that the results of crucial experiences can be described in terms that are neutral with respect to the competing theories. For that reason an experimental result is relatively stable and open to different interpretations in the light of (...) new theories. i conclude by distinguishing successful crucial experiments from decisive experiments. The former are meant to provide evidence that confirms one theory and disconfirms its rivals, but not necessarily to provide sufficient reasons for accepting or rejecting one of those theories. (shrink)

En este trabajo hago una comparación sistemática entre las dos teorías de la confirmación más populares en la actualidad: el método hipotético-deductivo y el bayesianismo. En primer lugar, enumero los cinco problemas fundamentales de la teoría hipotético-deductivista. Estos son el problema de las hipótesis estadísticas, el del grado de confirmación, el de la conjunción irrelevante, el del holismo epistemológico y el de las hipótesis alternativas. Luego, hago una presentación general de la epistemología bayesiana y muestro de qué manera estos problemas (...) resultan tratables en el marco bayesiano. Finalmente, concluyo que los tres primeros admiten una solución satisfactoria, sobre la base de algunos supuestos razonables. Los dos últimos, en cambio, todavía son problemas abiertos para la teoría bayesiana de la confirmación. Bayesians often affirm they have produced the best available theory of confirmation. In particular, they claim to have superseded the venerable hypothetico-deductive method. In this paper I intend to assess that claim by making a systematic comparison between both theories of confirmation. I begin by listing the main problems of hypothetico-deductive confirmation. I then show that this conception is incompatible with Hempel's conditions of adequacy for qualitative confirmation. I expound the Bayesian theory of confirmation with some detail in order to show that this theory is able to solve three out of the five fundamental problems of hypothetico-deductive confirmation. largue that the remaining two problems are still open questions for the Bayesians. (shrink)

PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...) ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade. ENGLISH: In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions. (shrink)

En la primera parte de este artículo, respondemos a los comentarios críticos de Michel Paty sobre nuestro trabajo "Einstein y el efecto Compton". Si bien nuestra intención no fue evaluar la respuesta de Einstein a la evidencia experimental de la hipótesis cuántica de la luz más allá del año 1923, en la segunda parte del artículo evaluamos dos importantes experimentos completados en 1924: los realizados por Bothe y Geiger en Alemania y los de Compton y Simon en los Estados Unidos. (...) Discutimos por qué ambos experimentos proporcionaron pruebas adicionales que respaldaron los puntos de vista de Einstein sobre la teoría cuántica de la radiación. Sin embargo, afirmamos que aun después de conocer estos resultados, Einstein nunca expresó un juicio categórico sobre la realidad de los cuantos de luz tal como el que formuló De Broglie a principios de 1923, con el que comparamos el punto de vista de Einstein. In the first part of this paper we reply to Michel Paty's critical remarks on our paper "Einstein and the Compton effect". We state that we did not evaluate Einstein's response to the experimental evidence about the light quantum hypothesis beyond 1923. Nevertheless, in the second part we analyze two important experiments completed in 1924: those performed by Bothe and Geiger in Germany and by Compton and Simon in the United States. We point out that both experiments provided additional evidence that supported Einstein's views about the quantum theory of radiation. Nonetheless, we contend that even after becoming aware of these results, Einstein never expressed a categorical judgment about the reality of light quanta, such as the one stated by De Broglie as early as 1923, with which we compared Einstein's position. (shrink)

This paper analyses the ancient atomism from a modern point of view. It focuses its attention on the essential properties of clasical atoms. First, it considers the principles of the atomist ontology and the concept of void. Then, it studies the concept of atom and its fundamental properties: shape, size, weight, and motion. It discusses three significant problems of the clasical atomism: i) the theoretical character to the atoms and their resemblances and differences with respect to the macroscopical bodies; ii) (...) the atomist explanation and its limits; and iii) the visual representation of the atoms. Finally, it outlines some reasons which indicate a radical change and the very dissolution of the classical concept of particle in the field of the contemporary physical science. (shrink)

According to all traditional theories of confirmation, statements such as “E confirms H” (where H is a hypothesis and E is the evidence that supports H) are a priori. Peter Achinstein has recently challenged this orthodox position. He claims that at least some confirmation statements are empirical. In this paper I criticize this thesis. I first show that Achinstein´s arguments are either flawed or inconclusive. I then argue that there are strong reasons to conceive of all confirmation statements as a (...) priori. I conclude that inductive logic, if possible, must be a priori knowledge. (shrink)

En este trabajo me ocupo de la manera en que Klimovsky concibió a las teorías y a los modelos en la ciencia. Comienzo describiendo la concepción hipotético-deductiva de las teorías empíricas de Klimovsky. Luego presento los distintos significados del término "modelo" que Klimovsky distinguió y discuto la manera en que entendió la relación entre teorías y modelos. Después analizo la concepción semántica de las teorías y señalo la ambigüedad de la posición de Klimovsky respecto de ella, a la que no (...) consideró una auténtica alternativa al método hipotético-deductivo. Expongo, entonces, una concepción proposicional de las teorías que permitiría superar aquellas críticas semanticistas que afectan a la concepción enunciativa de Klimovsky. En la conclusión intento mostrar la unidad de la concepción de Klimovsky acerca de la estructura de las teorías formales y empíricas. In this work I address the way Klimovsky conceived of theories and models in science. I start by describing Klimovsky's hypothetico-deductive conception of empirical theories. I then present the different senses of "model" identified by Klimovsky, and I discuss his understanding of the relation between theories and models. Next I analyze the semantic conception of theories, and argue that Klimovsky held an ambiguous stance towards them, insofar as he did not considered them to be a genuine alternative to the hypothetico-deductive method. I further present a propositional conception of theories that enables us to overcome various criticisms from semanticists to Klimovsky's statement conception of theories. I conclude by showing that Klimovsky embraced a unified perspective on the structure of empirical and formal theories. (shrink)

La posición inicial de Einstein con respecto al éter electromagnético y su posterior eliminación del escenario de la relatividad especial resultaron profundamente alteradas por la relatividad general. En este artículo analizamos los diferentes argumentos de Einstein contra el éter electromagnético. Luego estudiamos las razones que lo llevaron a reintroducir el éter gravitatorio en la relatividad general. Después de comparar las propiedades y funciones del antiguo éter con las del nuevo éter relativista, concluimos que se ha producido un cambio conceptual y (...) que el término "éter" ha experimentado un cambio de significado. No obstante, mostramos que el nuevo éter retuvo algunas de las propiedades y funciones características del viejo éter electromagnético. Einstein's initial attitude towards electromagnetic ether in special relativity was deeply disrupted by general relativity. In this paper we analyze Einstein's different arguments against electromagnetic ether in the frame of special relativity. We then study his reasons for postulating a gravitatory ether in general relativity. After comparing the properties and functions of the traditional electromagnetic ether with those of the new relativistic ether, we conclude that a conceptual change has occurred, because the term "ether" has undergone a change of meaning. However, we also show that the new ether still retains many properties and functions characteristic of the old electromagnetic ether. (shrink)