This paper compares Cohen’s Logic of Pure Knowledge and Cassirer’s Substance and Function in order to evaluate how in these works Cohen and Cassirer go beyond the limits established by Kantian philosophy. In his Logic, Cohen seeks to ground in pure thought all the elements which Kant distinguishes in empirical intuition: its matter (sensation) as well as its form (time and space). In this way, Cohen tries to provide an account of knowledge without appealing to any receptivity. In accordance with (...) Cohen’s project of reformulating the Kantian theory of sensibility, Cassirer undertakes in Substance and Function the task of developing an alternative doctrine of pure and empirical manifolds. But whereas Cohen analyzes the laws of pure thought, Cassirer aims to highlight the functional character of concepts in the development of modern mathematics and physics. I will discuss these two different approaches to the problems raised by Kantian philosophy and I will argue that Cassirer went further than Cohen in the project of critical idealism. (shrink)

Se investigan las condiciones que la doctrina de Kant establece para la predicación de la realidad efectiva de objetos empíricos determinados. Se sostiene: a) que para tal predicación no solo es necesario que haya percepción, sino que también se requiere cierta homogeneidad de los datos sensibles y b) que el conocimiento de la existencia de objetos empíricos determinados depende de la aplicación de principios regulativos de la experiencia.

This paper compares Cassirer´s and Bohr´s views on symbolic knowledge in quantum physics. Although both of them consider quantum physics as symbolic knowledge, for Cassirer this amounts to a complete renunciation to intuition in quantum physics, while according to Bohr only spatio-temporal images may provide the mathematical formalism of the theory with physical reference. We show the Kantian roots of Bohr´s position and we claim that his Kantian concept of symbol enables Bohr to account for the sensible content of quantum (...) theory as well as for its systematic relation to classical physics. (shrink)

The Critique of the Quantum Power of Judgement analyzes the a priori principles which underlie the empirical knowledge provided by quantum theory. In contrast to other transcendental approaches to quantum physics, none of the transcendental principles established by Kant is modified in order to cope with the new epistemological situation that arises with the asumption of the quantum postulate. Rather, by considering Bohr's views, it is argued that classical concepts provide the mathematical formalism of quantum theory with physical reference through (...) symbolic analogies in the strict Kantian sense. The main result of the investigation is the determination of the highest principle under which quantum objects are subsumed. This principle states that the conditions of the possibility of the systematic unity of contextual experience are at the same time the conditions of the possibility of quantum objects. Upon this principle rests the possibility of any a priori synthetic knowledge of quantum objects. Therefore, the Critique of the Quantum Power of Judgement yields the prolegomena to any future quantum metaphysics. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to discuss how Bruno Bauch deals with the problem of the coordination between empirical concepts and spatiotemporal objects. We shall argue that Bauch reformulates the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions by means of a philosophical consideration of differential calculus and that he thereby explains the possibility of such coordination, avoiding certain difficulties of the Kantian doctrine. RESUMO O propósito deste trabalho é discutir como o neokantismo de Bruno Bauch trabalha o problema da (...) coordenação de conceitos e objetos espaço-temporais. Sustentaremos que Bauch reformula a distinção kantiana de conceitos e intuições mediante uma consideração filosófica do cálculo diferencial e que, assim, explica a possibilidade de tal coordenação, evitando certas dificuldades da doutrina de Kant. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze Dimitry Gawronsky’s doctrine of actual infinitesimals. I examine the peculiar connection that his critical idealism establishes between transcendental philosophy and mathematics. In particular, I reconstruct the relationship between Gawronsky’s differentials, Cantor’s transfinite numbers, Veronese’s trans-Archimedean numbers and Robinson’s hyperreal numbers. I argue that by means of his doctrine of actual infinitesimals, Gawronsky aims to provide an interpretation of calculus that eliminates any alleged given element in knowledge.

PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...) ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade. ENGLISH: In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions. (shrink)

En la primera parte de este artículo, respondemos a los comentarios críticos de Michel Paty sobre nuestro trabajo "Einstein y el efecto Compton". Si bien nuestra intención no fue evaluar la respuesta de Einstein a la evidencia experimental de la hipótesis cuántica de la luz más allá del año 1923, en la segunda parte del artículo evaluamos dos importantes experimentos completados en 1924: los realizados por Bothe y Geiger en Alemania y los de Compton y Simon en los Estados Unidos. (...) Discutimos por qué ambos experimentos proporcionaron pruebas adicionales que respaldaron los puntos de vista de Einstein sobre la teoría cuántica de la radiación. Sin embargo, afirmamos que aun después de conocer estos resultados, Einstein nunca expresó un juicio categórico sobre la realidad de los cuantos de luz tal como el que formuló De Broglie a principios de 1923, con el que comparamos el punto de vista de Einstein. In the first part of this paper we reply to Michel Paty's critical remarks on our paper "Einstein and the Compton effect". We state that we did not evaluate Einstein's response to the experimental evidence about the light quantum hypothesis beyond 1923. Nevertheless, in the second part we analyze two important experiments completed in 1924: those performed by Bothe and Geiger in Germany and by Compton and Simon in the United States. We point out that both experiments provided additional evidence that supported Einstein's views about the quantum theory of radiation. Nonetheless, we contend that even after becoming aware of these results, Einstein never expressed a categorical judgment about the reality of light quanta, such as the one stated by De Broglie as early as 1923, with which we compared Einstein's position. (shrink)

La crítica kantiana de la razón tiene como principal propósito determinar la posibilidad de la metafísica como ciencia. El objetivo de este trabajo es presentar un panorama de aquella metafísica cuya posibilidad resulta finalmente establecida. Distinguiremos tres tipos de conocimiento metafísico posible: la metafísica de la experiencia, la metafísica de las costumbres y la metafísica práctico-dogmática. Posteriormente, discutiremos el modo en el que estas metafísicas se ordenan en un sistema.

El principio de correspondencia y el punto de vista de la complementariedad constituyen los sucesivos ejes alrededor de los cuales gira la interpretación de Bohr de la teoría cuántica. En este trabajo sostenemos que el concepto kantiano de analogía resulta un hilo conductor que permite comprender satisfactoriamente tal desarrollo histórico del pensamiento de Bohr. Mostraremos que el principio de correspondencia guía la búsqueda de analogías en la experiencia, mientras que desde el punto de vista de la complementariedad Bohr establece analogías (...) simbólicas. The principle of correspondence and, later, the viewpoint of complementarity are the axes around which Bohr´s interpretation of quantum theory rotates. In this paper we claim that the Kantian notion of analogy enables a satisfactory understanding of such historical development of Bohr's thought. We shall show that the principle of correspondence guides the search for analogies in experience, while from the viewpoint of complementarity Bohr establishes symbolic analogies. (shrink)

Se investigan las condiciones que la doctrina de Kant establece para la predicación de la realidad efectiva de objetos empíricos determinados. Se sostiene: a) que para tal predicación no solo es necesario que haya percepción, sino que también se requiere cierta homogeneidad de los datos sensibles y b) que el conocimiento de la existencia de objetos empíricos determinados depende de la aplicación de principios regulativos de la experiencia. The conditions that Kant's doctrine establishes are examined for the predication of the (...) effective reality of certain empirical objects. It is maintained that a) for such a predication, it is necessary to have not only perception but also a certain homogeneity of sensible data, and b) the knowledge of the existence of certain empirical objects depends on the application of regulative principles of experience. (shrink)

This paper analyzes Cassirer's account of the coordination of concepts and spatio-temporal objects. We shall see that, in contradistinction to Kantian schematism, Cassirer maintains that this coordination is not achieved by means of a third element, which albeit intellectual is nevertheless also sensible. Rather, in Cassirer's view, the coordination will take place through a specification of the concepts that should be sought “within the domain of concepts itself.”.

The goal of this paper is to explain Hermann Cohen´s logic of origin and the role that negativity plays in it. In the first section, we will consider Cohen´s transcendental method. This will lead us to Cohen´s early interpretation of differential calculus, that contains the presuppositions necessary to understand his logic of origin. In the second section, we will analyze Cohen´s mature doctrine of pure thinking in order to study the connections that Cohen establishes between the concepts of origin, something (...) and nothing. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to investigate the relation between Cohen's approach to differential calculus and his doctrine of pure thinking. We claim that Cohen's logic of origin is firmly based on his interpretation of infinitesimal analysis. More precisely, the transcendental method, when applied to differential calculus, reveals the productive capacity of thinking expressed by the judgment of origin.

Este trabajo estudia la teoría de los diferenciales de Salomon Maimon como respuesta a la cuestión quid juris y a la vez como clave para la fundamentación de la posibilidad de la metafísica como ciencia. Se reconstruye primero la crítica de Maimon al tratamiento kantiano de la pregunta quid juris. Luego, se analiza la respuesta del propio Maimon a esa pregunta, para establecer finalmente cómo tal respuesta abre el camino para la explicación de la posibilidad de la metafísica como ciencia.

This paper analyzes the role of the principle of causality in Cassirer’s account of the coordination of concepts and spatio-temporal objects. We shall see that, in contradistinction to Kantian schematism, Cassirer maintains that this coordination is not achieved by means of a third element, which albeit intellectual is nevertheless also sensible. Rather, in Cassirer’s view, the coordination will take place through a specification of the concepts that should be sought “within the domain of concepts itself.” We shall show that the (...) principle of causality is the ultimate condition upon which the possibility of the coordination of concepts and spatio-temporal objects depends. (shrink)