Freeride skiing is the fastest-growing sector of the skiing industry, but there are no studies analyzing its nature and values. First, we provide descriptions of freeride skiing and competitive freeride skiing, trying to analyzing the nature of these activities in comparison and contrast with conceptions of traditional sport and nature sport. Whilst freeride skiing must be seen in some sense as a nature sport, competitive freeride skiing is best seen within the category of traditional sport. (...) However, these ‘new’ sports raise questions about the adequacy of our current categories, leading us to our second task, which was to identify and discuss the values of freeride skiing. We identify freedom and creativity as primary values, which lead to a greater rapport with nature, and a greater attention to risk, danger and safety, as concomitant values. Finally, we briefly indicate further values of the activity, such as responsibility, community and preservation of the practice. (shrink)

For contagious diseases like measles a successful immunization program can result in herd protection. Small outbreaks may still occur but fade out soon, because the possibilities for the pathogen to spread in the ‘herd’ are very small. This implies that people who refuse to participate in such a program will still benefit from the protection it offers, but they don’t do their part in maintaining protection. Isn’t that a case of freeriding—and isn’t that unfair towards all the people who do (...) collaborate? If so, that might be considered an additional ground for making vaccination mandatory or compulsory.In this paper I argue that vaccination refusal can be considered as freeriding, but that this might not be unfair. The public good of herd protection is a peculiar public good because it supervenes on private benefits that are enjoyed by all who do opt for vaccination. For vaccinated individuals, the additional benefit of herd protection comes about, as it were, for free, and hence they can’t complain that others benefit without sharing in the burdens. There are however still other grounds for making vaccination compulsory or at least for seeing refusal as a morally wrong choice. (shrink)

There has been a persistent tendency to identify what is called “the freerider problem” in the production of collective goods with the prisoner's dilemma. However, in this article I want to challenge that identification by presenting an analysis of what are in fact a variety of collective action problems in the production of collective goods. My strategy is not to consult any intuitions about what the free-rider problem is; rather I will be looking at the problematic game-theoretic structures of various (...) situations associated with the production of different types of collective goods, thereby showing what sorts of difficulties a community concerned with their voluntary production would face. I call all of these dilemmas free-rider problems because in all of them certain individuals find it rational to take advantage of others' willingness to contribute to the good in a way that threatens its production. Some readers may feel that the term ‘free-rider problem’ is so identified with the prisoner's dilemma that my extension of the term in this way “jars”; if so, I invite them to coin another word for the larger phenomenon. My aim is not to engage in linguistic analysis but to attempt at least a partial analysis of the complicated structure of collective good production. (shrink)

In this chapter, I examine three deontological objections to adblocking: the objection from property (according to which adblocking involves accessing another’s property without satisfying the conditions placed on such access by the owner), the objection from complicity (according to which, by blocking ads, consumers become complicit in wrongdoing of adblocking software providers), and the objection from freeriding (according to which adblocking consumers free-ride on other consumers who allow ads to be served). I argue that, though these objections plausibly establish the (...) moral impermissibility of some instances of adblocking, they do not, even collectively, establish a blanket moral prohibition on adblocking, as it is currently done. (shrink)

In this article I develop a big picture of the evolution of human cooperation, and contrast it to an alternative based on group selection. The crucial claim is that hominin history has seen two major transitions in cooperation, and hence poses two deep puzzles about the origins and stability of cooperation. The first is the transition from great ape social lives to the lives of Pleistocene cooperative foragers; the second is the stability of the social contract through the early Holocene (...) transition to complex hierarchical societies. The first of these transitions is driven, at least initially, by individual advantage: cooperation paid off for individual foragers, initially through mutualist interaction, then through reciprocation. This argument leads to a reanalysis of the role of violence and the nature of the freeriding threat to cooperation. But the conditions that select for cooperative individuals in the Pleistocene were eroded in the Pleistocene–Holocene transition. So we need an alternative account of the survival, and indeed the expansion, of cooperation in the Holocene. Group selection driven by intercommunal conflict really may well be central to this second transition. (shrink)

Altruistic punishment has been shown to invade when rare if individuals are allowed to opt out of cooperative ventures. Individuals that opt out do not contribute to the common enterprise or derive benefits from it. This result is potentially significant because it offers an explanation for the origin of large-scale cooperation in oneshot interactions among unrelated individuals. Here, we show that this result is not a general consequence of optional participation in cooperative activities, but depends on special assumptions about cooperative (...) pay-offs. We extend the pay-off structure of optional participation models to consider the effects of economies and diseconomies of scale in public-goods production, rival and non-rival consumption of goods, and different orderings of the pay-offs of freeriding and opting out. This more general model highlights the kinds of pay-offs for which optional participation favours cooperation, and those in which it does not. (shrink)

In an important article published in this journal, Dryzek, Bächtiger and Milewicz (2011) champion the convocation of a Deliberative Global Citizens’ Assembly (DGCA). In this article, I aim to further strengthen the case for a DGCA by addressing: (i) why a DGCA is likely to take a long-term perspective in the global interest and (ii) why it is so vital that a global institution should do so. I start by analyzing the nature of the issues requiring global policy. These issues, (...) I will argue, are typically global cooperation problems. Cooperation problems pose two major challenges. The first is to prevent freeriding – i.e. serving one’s short-term interests at the expense of the long-term global interest. The second is to align on an efficient global policy. In both respects, I will argue, a DGCA is a good candidate to yield desirable results (and is likely to do better than current supranational institutions). (shrink)

Cultural group selection theorists propose that humans evolved prosocial preferences. These claims revolve largely around the centrality of punishment in cultural groups, which helped to eliminate free riders. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether distinguishing between free-riding as an action, and free riders as entities, undermines or supports this view. I develop three individual-based models of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The first model shows that strong reciprocity removes overt freeriders from a population, and maintains a high rate of (...) cooperation. In the second, I introduce individuals that mimic cooperative preferences, but who defect when they trick opponents into cooperating. I show that strong reciprocity is robust against this strategy, but not because individuals are replaced by strong reciprocators. Finally, I introduce a third strategy, covert mimicry, where some mimics may defect without detection. I draw attention to the problem highlighted in these models, which is that cooperation may be maintained in populations only because freeriders are not presented with the opportunity to defect. I discuss this problem in the context of cultural group selection and the human capacity for innovation, and suggest that hypotheses relying on prosocial preferences for maintaining cooperation require some revision. (shrink)

In this paper, we want to analyze conceptually whether and when merely using economic discourse – talking money – can crowd out people's positive attitudes towards environmental goods and their reasons to protect them. We concentrate on the specific case of market-based or monetary valuation as an instance of ‘commodification in discourse’ and argue that it can have the same moral problems as real commodification. We aim to bring together insights from philosophy, ethics, economics and psychology to argue that there (...) are good reasons to think about how and when to apply MV in environmental cases. On the basis of this interdisciplinary analysis and in order to promote further empirical research, we develop four empirically falsifiable hypotheses. Commodification in discourse can bring about real commodification. MV can have framing and crowding effects on those who come into contact with it. Intrinsic motivation is more robust than extrinsic motivation and leads less to freeriding. MV's framing and crowding effects can decrease environmental protection. (shrink)

Evolutionary researchers argue that religion evolves to support cooperation, where it is assumed that cooperation is threatened by freeriding. I identify a distinct threat to cooperation from uncertainty. I briefly explain how the distinction between freeriding and uncertainty is relevant to both ultimate and proximate explanations of the biocultural mechanisms that express religious traits.

The objective of this work is to demonstrate how cooperative sharers and uncooperative free riders can be placed in different groups of an electronic society in a decentralised manner. We have simulated an agent-based open and decentralised P2P system which self-organises itself into different groups to avoid cooperative sharers being exploited by uncooperative free riders. This approach encourages sharers to move to better groups and restricts free riders into those groups of sharers without needing centralised control. Our approach is suitable (...) for current P2P systems that are open and distributed. Gossip is used as a social mechanism for information sharing which facilitates the formation of groups. Using multi-agent based simulations we demonstrate how the adaptive behaviour of agents lead to self-organisation. We have tested with varying the gossip level and checked its impact in the system’s behaviour. We have also investigated the impact of false gossip in this system where gossip is the medium for information sharing which leads to self-organisation. (shrink)