Jild-i 1: Muntakhab-i ās̲ār-i: Sant Agūstīn, tarjumah-ʼi Muḥammad Taqī Bahrāmī Ḥarrān; Tūmās Akvīnās, tarjumah-ʼi Manūchihr Buzurgmihr; Bārūkh Ispīnūzā, tarjumah-ʼi Abū Ṭālib Ṣārimī; Bilz Pāskāl, tarjumah-ʼi Ḥusayn Kasmāʼī, va muntakhabātī az: Ūpānīshādhā, Dimāpādā, Sūrāngāmāsūtrā, Bhāgavat Gītāyā tarjumah-ʼi Riz̤ā Ṣaddūqī --.

[1] Man and spirit: the speculative philosophers.--[2] Man and man: the social philosophers.--[3] Man and the state: the political philosophers.--[4] Man and the universe: the philosophers of science.

Shors & Matzel's target article is a thought-provoking attempt to reconceptualise long-term potentiation as an attentional or arousal mechanism rather than a memory storage mechanism. This is incompatible with the facts of the neurobiology of attention and of the behavioural neurophysiological properties of hippocampal neurons.

Le livre de L. L. Downs présente une qualité encore rare en proposant une approche comparatiste entre la France et le Royaume Uni. Grâce à cette méthode, l'auteure veut mettre en lumière l'originalité de la démarche de chacun des deux pays, même si l'on aboutit finalement à des résultats similaires. Dans cette perspective, L. L. Downs définit dès l'introduction ses objectifs. Elle entend d'abord montrer comment les femmes sont entrées dans une industrie dont elles étaient exclues jusq...

Psychologists from nineteen countries in Asia and Oceania report on the expansion of western psychology in the region at both the academic and the professional levels. With its own network of associations, conferences, and journals, the comminity of psychologists in the East has braved new frontiers for the discipline.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:66 Discussion REJOINDER TO DEJNOZKA'S REPLY GARY OSTERTAG Philosophy/ New YorkU. New York,NY 10003, USA [email protected] It is common knowledge that Russell does not explicitly endorse modal logic in any of his major logical writings. Nor does my review of BertrandRusseli onModalityand LogicalRelevance' suggest that Jan Dejnozka denies or is somehow unaware of this. On the contrary, I assume it to be obvious that any commitment Russell may have (...) had to modal logic must be implicitin his writings, nor explicit. The real issue is whether there is evidence of any such commitment. I will state, briefly,why I remain sceptical. First, Dejnozka's book lacks any interpretive methodology. When the question arises, In whichcontextsis itpermissibleto translateRusseli's language(formal orinformal)intoa modalsystem?, we get the following: amibute a modal logic to Russell if "it is more reasonable than not to paraphrase Russell's thinking into the modal logic." This condition, we are told, "is met to the extent that acertain modal logic is logicallyimplicit in Russell's thinking." All of which goes without saying, but it simply delays the inevitable question: when is a modal logic logicallyimplicit in a text? Dejnozka's current answer: a modal logic is logically implicit in a text when the text logically implies the paraphrase.2 But the final suggestion is incoherent, since we cannot tell what a text logical1y implies until we have discerned its logicalform-i.e. until we havealready paraphrased it into some formal idiom or other. A related problem is that Dejnozka consistently failsto distinguish two sorts of claims: • Certain passagesin Russell lend themselves to a modal interpretationthey can be captured in a given system of modal logic, e.g. S13. • Such an interpretation reflects Russell'sintentions. That a modal system captures one or another of Russell's accounts of logical truth in itself entails nothing regarding Russell'sintentions. The modal system G described by George Boolos in a munber of publications provides an alterna- ' "Russell's Modal Logic?", Russelin.s. 20 (2000): 165-72. 2 "Reply to Ostertag", Russell, n.s. 21 (2001): 63-5 (at 65). Discussion 67 rive formalization of Peano Arithmetic, enabling the derivation of Godel's incompleteness theorems. Yet the fact that this is possible does not in any way suggest that Godel himself was implicitly committed to G. Unfortunately, Dejnozka often writes as if the mere possibility of a modal interpretation is genuinely revealing as to Russell's intemions. Bm it is just as implausible to maintain this as it is to claim that it was Gi:idel'sintention to present Boolos's G.3 Second, as I maintain in my review, Dejnozka fails to take seriously the many comexts in which Russell is explicitly critical of modality. Dejnozka responds that he has quoted these very passagesand that he "embraces them as half-but only half-of [his] basic message" ("Reply", p. 64). But citing contexts in which Russell appears to find modality congenial does nothing to mitigate the force of the contexts in which Russell explicitly repudiates modality. It is Dejnozka's responsibility to explain how the latter are to cohere with his interpretation. To avoid this issue is to skirt the real philosophical and interpretive challenge that the project entails. Finally, we come to Dejnozka's confusions surrounding MDL-the triad of equivalences that underwrite the interpretation of Principiaas a modal logic. In light of Dejnozka's steadfast refusal to formalize the various modal systems he amibmes to Russell, it hardly makes a differencewhether MDLis a modal logic or merely, to use his terminology, a "modal theory" (assuming that the latter ultimately amounts to something other than a modal logic).4What is importam is whether MDLis trivial. If it is, then it is quite beside the point to pursue the various extensions of MDL.Since I maimain that Russell is not commined, implicitly or otherwise, to a substantive reading of MDL-one in which the modal operators have their conventional meanings-then he is not committed to these extensions, so there is no need for detailed discussion. What remains central is my argtunent for the claim that MDL is trivial. Bm this argmnent (unacknowledged by Dejnozka) is there for... (shrink)

Globalization, migration, and an increasingly complex connection between nation and culture, have prompted a renewed recognition of religion as a major social, political, and cultural force. For the main-stream religions [in-power in each State] this has come as both a shock and a challenge facing the long-held presumption about the oneness of religious faith. The new form of establishment that the megalopolitan life brings challenges religions both to coexist, to coop, and to reconsider their values and methods in order to (...) be kept significant and trustworthy for the civil life. Whoever do not adjust is doomed to vanish, and we have seen so many examples from which nowadays religions should learn some. (shrink)