Is aesthetics a product of evolution? Are human aesthetic behaviors in fact evolutionary adaptations? The creation of artistic objects and experiences is an important aesthetic behavior. But so is the perception of aesthetic phenomena qua aesthetic. The question of evolutionary aesthetics is whether humans have evolved the capacity not only to make beautiful things but also to appreciate the aesthetic qualities in things. Are our near-universal love of music and cute baby animals essential to our (...) species’ evolutionary development, which took place over thousands of years? In other words, do aesthetic practice and appreciation help people to survive or reproduce? Do aesthetic behaviors help to propel natural selection? If so, what does that tell us about ourselves as human beings? What does it tell us about art, our other aesthetic practices, and aesthetic experience? (shrink)

To say that an object is beautiful or ugly is seemingly to refer to a property of the object. But it is also to express a positive or negative response to it, a set of aesthetic values, and to suggest that others ought to respond in the same way. Such judg- ments are descriptive, expressive, and normative or prescriptive at once. These multiple features are captured well by Humean accounts that analyze the judgments as ascribing relational properties. To say (...) that an object is beautiful is to say, in part, that it is such as to elicit a response expressing pleasure in certain observers. The observers in question must not be ignorant, biased, insensitive, or of poor taste, and they must not base their evaluations on aesthetically irrelevant properties of the objects they judge. The reference to the object's "being such . . ." captures the objective side of the relation; refer- ence to the pleasurable response captures the expressive function of these judgments; and the ideal properties of the observers suggest that others ought to judge in the same way. (shrink)

Je sais que la poesie est indepensable, mais je ne sais pas a quoi. [I know poetry is indispensable, but I don’t know what for.]A crucial characteristic of any aesthetic education is to understand the nature of aesthetic quality, that is, how to determine whether one artwork is superior to another. For example, I want to say that J. S. Bach’s Sixth Suite for Unaccompanied Cello performed by YoYo Ma is superior to “Thriller,” composed by Rod Temperton (...) and performed by Michael Jackson. I would also suggest that the oeuvre of Wallace Stevens is superior to that of Robert Service. Finally, anything done by Rembrandt is superior to anything done by Thomas Kinkade. Now, one might agree or disagree with my assessments of... (shrink)

PREFACE One of the most difficult yet sadly neglected questions in the extant spectrum of contemporary aesthetic analysis is the relationship between ...

After describing a constantly changing aesthetic environment in which artistic and architectural works are created and destroyed, this paper asks how legal judgments are made to preserve such works. Specifically the paper addresses legal standards for art preservation such as "recognized quality," "serious artistic value," and "historic, artistic or aesthetic interest." The discussion surveys many of the laws which require "quality" in art, the court opinions which interpret these laws and legal standards, the rules of evidence, (...) and suggestions for how to make legal decisions about art preservation in an age whose motto may become ars brevis, vita longa. (shrink)

There is widespread view among numerous aestheticians that aesthetic and value properties are response-dependent. According to some philosophers the dependence has a rich and multilayered structure: value qualities (e.g. beauty) depend on our response to aesthetic properties (e.g. harmonious), which in turn depend on our response to a pattern of primary and secondary qualities (shapes and colors). Secondary qualities are themselves response-dependent. The basic dependence relation is thus iterated. The resulting structure is one of iterated response-dependence. The integral (...) part of such a position is a relational view, best captured by the response-dispositional analysis: My states of being appeared to magnificently in front of a painting manifests the disposition of painting to induce such experience in the normal viewer.There are two main objections against the dispositional analysis: (1) argument from circularity and (2) argument from introducing two kinds of quality, one categorical, for experiential states, and one dispositional for objects. In this paper we will suggest the arguments against second objection. (shrink)

The paper proposes a reflection on mathematical beauty, considering the possibility of aesthetic qualities for formal language. Through a concise overview of the way this question is understood by some famous scientists and mathematicians, we turn our attention to Gian-Carlo Rota’s theoretical proposal: his reflections as a mathematician and philosopher offer a perspective, of phenomenological matrix, fruitful for looking at the question. Rota’s contribution allows us to focus on the role of competence, acquired through effort, sedimentation and habit of (...) repetition, in cultivating the potential to recognise the aesthetic quality of formal language. Finally, we draw on some contributions from Gestalt theory, closely connected to twentieth-century phenomenology for chronological and conceptual reasons, applying the idea of gestalt wholeness to the mathematical product and proposing some reflections that may help to clarify some of the dynamics underlying the attribution of qualities of beauty to formulas or the detection of its lack. (shrink)

My paper examines a vital but neglected aspect of Frank Sibley's pioneering account of aesthetic concepts. This is the claim that many aesthetic qualities are such that they can be characterized adequately only by metaphors or ‘quasi-metaphors’. Although there is no indication that Sibley embraced it, I outline a radical, minimalist conception of the experience of perceiving an item as possessing an aesthetic quality, which, I believe, has wide application and which would secure Sibley's position for (...) those aesthetic qualities that conform to it. (shrink)

This paper emphasizes the place and the role of the aesthetic quality and the role of the erotic in Levinas’s project that deals with ethical an-archaeology. Despite Levinas’s categorical statements that there are irreconcilable differences between ethics and aesthetics, i.e. between ethics and the erotic, above all, it is emphasized here that these differences do not represent a stark or sharp contrast, but quite contrary, they often constitute a subversive ontological element. On the other hand, somewhat unexpectedly, with (...) its ethical anti-aestheticism Levinas’s “noncontemporary” thought appears to be, at the same time, both significant and critical, elementary, emancipatory and contemporary in relation to present-day reactionary reactualization and revitalization of the aesthetic quality which mechanically proceeds to develop on the margins of Levinas’s emancipatory past. (shrink)

INTUITIVELY, WE RECOGNIZE at least two broad ways in which we talk about musical performances. On the one hand, we talk about them as lasting twenty minutes, having a tempo of 120 quarter notes per minute, being a string quartet, loud or soft, sounding like a trumpet rather than a cornet, and out of tune. These descriptions refer to the nonaesthetic properties of musical performances. On the other hand, we talk about musical performances as being expressive of sorrow, sounding thematically (...) unified, having a swinging rhythm, portraying the harshness of living under economic distress, representing the howling of a wolf, and placid. These descriptions refer to the aesthetic qualities of musical performances. (shrink)

This paper emphasizes the place and the role of the aesthetic quality and the role of the erotic in Levinas?s project that deals with ethical an-archaeology. Despite Levinas?s categorical statements that there are irreconcilable differences between ethics and aesthetics, i.e. between ethics and the erotic, above all, it is emphasized here that these differences do not represent a stark or sharp contrast, but quite contrary, they often constitute a subversive ontological element. On the other hand, somewhat unexpectedly, with (...) its ethical anti-aestheticism Levinas?s?noncontemporary? thought appears to be, at the same time, both significant and critical, elementary, emancipatory and contemporary in relation to present-day reactionary reactualization and revitalization of the aesthetic quality which mechanically proceeds to develop on the margins of Levinas?s emancipatory past. nema. (shrink)

K. Mitchells; IV—Aesthetic Perception and Aesthetic Qualities, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 67, Issue 1, 1 June 1967, Pages 53–72, https://do.

Joseph Margolis, a relativist with respect to aesthetic qualities, has argued that nonrelativists must produce a theory of perception capable of providing a basis for the distinction between an object’s actually possessing a specified aesthetic quality and an object’s only seeming to possess it. Although I think Margolis is probably right on the point, my concern is not with the need for the non relativist to produce such a theory; rather, it is with the need for the (...) relativist to give an account of the perception of aesthetic qualities. (shrink)

Microphenomenology (the refelctive reconstruction of attentional processes operative in perception) explicates the distinction between aesthetic and nonaesthetic qualities in a way that avoids traditional objections. aesthetic qualities are identified as phenomenal manifestations of a specific sort of spontaneous attentional event. particular aesthetic qualities are show to fall within any of six different categories of features attributable to this event. some aesthetic predicates strictly imply such features while others only 'suggest' them.

It is argued that the application of such predicates as 'is lovely' and 'is somber' to works of art must be construed relativistically. it is first argued that interpretations of works of art bear important similarities to scientific theories, such that the application of aesthetic predicates cannot proceed independently of these interpretations. it is then argued that there are important differences between scientific theories and works of art, such that relativism is precluded with respect to the former but demanded (...) with respect to the latter. hence, relativism is demanded also with respect to aesthetic predicates. (shrink)

Is there a role for aesthetic judgements in science? One aspect of scientific practice, the use of thought experiments, has a clear aesthetic dimension. Thought experiments are creatively produced artefacts that are designed to engage the imagination. Comparisons have been made between scientific (and philosophical) thought experiments and other aesthetically appreciated objects. In particular, thought experiments are said to share qualities with literary fiction as they invite us to imagine a fictional scenario and often have a narrative form (...) (Elgin 2014). But philosophical discussions of aesthetics in science have focused mainly on the epistemic role of beauty and elegance when it comes to theories and mathematical proofs, and thought experiments have been widely overlooked. My aim in this chapter is to address how the aesthetic choices scientists make in the design of a thought experiment contribute to its function: to communicate, convince, or explain a theory or phenomenon. A key issue is whether any aesthetic features in science provide anything beyond catching our attention, or are at best, a mere heuristic aid. I respond to accounts that argue this way and show how formulation is important in scientific thought experiments and, similarly to literary fictions, there is more than one way of interpreting a thought experiment scenario. I end by considering which literary examples are most appropriate when making comparisons with thought experiments. As a result, the difference between representations in art and science raised in current discussions is not as stark as it has been made out to be, and science is a more heterogeneous practice than has been allowed. Part of the value of thought experiments in scientific practice includes the qualities they share with literary works. (shrink)

Roger Scruton appears to have been the first to argue for and articulate an anti-realist theory of aesthetic properties. In the case of emotional qualities of music, his principal argument against realism is unsound and cannot, I believe, be repaired. Nevertheless an anti-realist view of emotional qualities of music is in my view correct and I defend Scruton's insight against a rival realist conception. However, I prefer a rather different form of anti-realism to Scruton's.

Colin Lyas; X*—Aesthetic and Personal Qualities, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Issue 1, 1 June 1972, Pages 171–194, https://doi.org/10.109.

Colin Lyas; X*—Aesthetic and Personal Qualities, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Issue 1, 1 June 1972, Pages 171–194, https://doi.org/10.109.

Hutchesonʹs theories offer an objective referent for beauty linked with a subjective determination to be pleased. As Kenneth Winkler’s terminology suggests, Hutcheson is an eighteenth‐century aesthetic realist, a beauty realist, because the aesthetic object need not be identified with the natural object. I argue that this aesthetic realism helps to settle key disputes concerning moral qualities in the moral sense theory. The natural and automatic operation of the aesthetic and moral senses allows a role for new (...) experiences of beauty and virtue beyond their root forms, and permits a cultural refinement that remains true to a widely held, even if not universal, set of moral parameters for virtuous motivation. (shrink)

This paper is about the similarity between the appreciation of a piece of art, such as a cherished music album, and the loving appreciation of a person whom one knows well. In philosophical discussion about the rationality of love, the Qualities View (QV) says that love can be justified by reference to the qualities of the beloved. I argue that the oft-rehearsed trading-up objection fails to undermine the QV. The problems typically identified by the objection arise from the idea that (...) love-worthy qualities could be coarse-grained, when in fact they must be fine-grained. The analogy with appreciation of aesthetic qualities helps to draw out this point. Once the fine-grained nature of love-worthy qualities is properly understood, it is clear that critics of the QV cannot rely on the trading-up objection to motivate its rejection. Moreover, the paper’s core argument helps to illuminate the persistently aesthetic nature of interpersonal affections. (shrink)

This book defends Aestheticism- the claim that everything is aesthetically valuable and that a life lived in pursuit of aesthetic value can be a particularly good one. Furthermore, in distilling aesthetic qualities, artists have a special role to play in teaching us to recognize values; a critical component of virtue. I ground my account upon an analysis of aesthetic value as ‘objectified final value’, which is underwritten by an original psychological claim that all aesthetic values are (...) distal versions of practical values. This is followed by systematic accounts of beauty, sublimity, comedy, drama, and tragedy, as well as appendix entries on the cute, the cool, the kitsch, the uncanny, the horrific, the erotic, and the furious. (shrink)