[ES]Una historia de la ontología que pretenda dar cuenta de su acontecer de manera integral y equilibrada, ha de considerar tanto los aspectos historiográficos y filosóficos de sus fuentes así como los relativos a su contexto socio-cultural y necesariamente en relación con los de la metafísica, pues sus historias están indisolublemente ligadas, aunque ello no significa que necesariamente sean las mismas. En este trabajo, se intenta de manera elemental y mínima bosquejar dichas consideraciones, a través de una breve revisión historiográfica (...) de distintas nociones y hechos que puedan configurar una base sólida para la constitución de la historia de la ontología e interpretación de su significado y naturaleza. [EN] A history of ontology that pretends to be an integral and well-balanced account of its development, must considerer the historiographical and philosophical aspects of its sources, as well as the relation with its socio-cultural context, and necessarily, the relation with the same aspects of Metaphysics, as both histories are inextricably related, without necessarily being the same. In this work, it is intended, in a minimal way, to outline such considerations, trough a brief historiographic revision of the distinctive facts and notions that can configure a solid ground for the constitution of the history of ontology and the interpretation of its significance and nature. (shrink)

[ES] En este breve trabajo, se presenta una edición bilingüe de Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, de Edmund L. Gettier, donde se presentan contraejemplos a la definición de «conocimiento» como «creencia verdadera justificada». [ES] In this brief text, a bilingual edition of Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, by Edmund L. Gettier, some counterexamples are presented to the definition of «knowledge» as «justified true belief».

In this article we propose to carry out an examination of the notions of ‘other’ based on the philosophical proposals of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Maurice Blanchot. It seeks to show the common point between both thoughts, from a proposal in which the other is understood as a dislocation, which manifests itself in the way of an opening. For this reason, the notion of opening becomes the central element of this analysis, from which the other manifests itself in an ambiguous way. (...) To this end, the proposals of both authors will be analyzed separately, however, highlighting and relating to each other their respective conceptions of opening and the implications they have regarding the question of the other. (shrink)

This article analyses the concept of people in language, as a collective identity and as a subject of political representation in the crisis of the Hispanic monarchy from 1808 and throughout the constituent process that culminated in the promulgation of the Constitution of 1812. Based on the discursive uses of pueblo in chronicles, essays on political philosophy, press articles and parliamentary speeches, it points out the relevance of the semantics of pueblo in the political language of the time until its (...) displacement by that of nation. This semantic shift is related to the problems of constitutional engineering derived from the crisis of the privileged nobility in the context of the Napoleonic invasion. The view reinterprets the urban juntas of 1808 by stressing changes in the foundations of sovereignty, and puts into question the conventional characterisation from social history. It also traces the persistence of a rhetoric about the people in the wake of the Cadiz Constitution. Finally, the proposal claims the need to recover the category of people for the narrative of contemporary history. (shrink)

Los estudios sobre la constitución de la noción y el término «metafísica» han sido poco abordados por la historia de la filosofía, y sobre todo, por la tradición filosófica misma. Este trabajo, sobre la base de lo realizado por Pérez Fernández (1975), es una parte de una serie de publicaciones que pretende arrojar luz sobre este proceso. Concretamente, aquí se narra brevemente cómo el término «metafísica» fue mudando gradualmente su uso y grafía en la tradición latina. Sugeriré que Boecio usa (...) las locuciones theologia y μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ en dos sentidos, la primera la emplea para referirse al tema que es propio de los libros metafísicos de Aristóteles (i.e. teología filosófica), en tanto que la segunda locución la usa en un sentido bibliográfico. De este uso daría cuenta Abelardo en sus obras, que plausiblemente influyeron más tarde en la constitución definitiva del término en la Escuela de Toledo. Se incluyen imágenes de manuscritos para ilustrar lo apuntado. (shrink)

In this provocative and insightful work, Philip Leon examines the nature of power and its ethical implications, delving into topics such as social justice, democracy, and civil disobedience. Drawing on a wide variety of sources from philosophy, politics, and history, Leon offers a nuanced and thought-provoking exploration of one of the most fundamental issues of our time. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. (...) This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

τοτων σ οτωσ χóντων χρ σοκεν νεναι πολλ τε καì παντοα ν πσι τοσ συγκρινομνοισ κα σπρματα π;ντων χρημ;των κα σασ χοντα κα χροισ κα σονσ. κα νθρπονσ τε συμπαγναι κα τ λλα ξᾦα σα Ψυχ;ν χει. κα τοσ γε νθρποισιν ευναι κα πλεισ συνκημνασ κα τ λλα σᾦα óσα κατεσκνασμενα, ωσπερ παρ' ημíν, και την γην αυτοισι πυειν πολλ τε και παντοιων εκεινοι τα ονηιστα συνενεγκμενοι εíσ την οικησιν χρωνται. ταυτα μεν ουν μοι λλεκται περι τσ ποκρισιοσ, xsτι οửκ (...) ν παρ' μíν μóνον ποκπιθεíη, λλ καì λλη. (shrink)

τοτων σ οτωσ χóντων χρ σοκεν νεναι πολλ τε καì παντοα ν πσι τοσ συγκρινομνοισ κα σπρματα π;ντων χρημ;των κα σασ χοντα κα χροισ κα σονσ. κα νθρπονσ τε συμπαγναι κα τ λλα ξᾦα σα Ψυχ;ν χει. κα τοσ γε νθρποισιν ευναι κα πλεισ συνκημνασ κα τ λλα σᾦα óσα κατεσκνασμενα, ωσπερ παρ' ημíν, και την γην αυτοισι πυειν πολλ τε και παντοιων εκεινοι τα ονηιστα συνενεγκμενοι εíσ την οικησιν χρωνται. ταυτα μεν ουν μοι λλεκται περι τσ ποκρισιοσ, xsτι οửκ (...) ν παρ' μíν μóνον ποκπιθεíη, λλ καì λλη. (shrink)

There has been for some years a feeling in the philosophical world in this country that we have had enough of the unproductive working of the treadmill of linguistics and of the new logic and that Metaphysics is at least not criminal, and even justifiable; notable justifications of Metaphysics are Professor Emmet's The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking and Professor Barnes” The Philosophical Predicament . But what is Metaphysics about? That, it seems to me, is a question which has to be (...) looked into far more carefully than it has been, before we can think of justifying Metaphysics . “About the Whole” would appear to be the answer which no would-be metaphysician can avoid, however frightened he may be of being sent into a concentration camp by his Ayerian colleagues for giving it. What is this Whole and how is it to be got? Judging at least by most nineteenth-century metaphysics, it would seem that the Whole is some kind of totality , comparable, save in respect of comprehensiveness, to the totality say which Physics deals with, and that it is got by reflecting on the nature of any knowing and/or on all the branches of knowledge and their relations to each other; Metaphysics, we should conclude, is a synthesis or construct both crowning, and confirmed by, knowledge. (shrink)

The following is an attempt at an analysis of some of the difficulties of a certain religious or metaphysical attitude which, common as it has been to many ages, and familiar as we are with it in what we know of the early Greek thinkers and the Sophists, may yet, in the status of settled and almost universally accepted dogma which it has assumed, be said to be the peculiar inheritance of our own generation. We meet it in formal philosophic (...) garb in Alexander’s Space, Time and Deity and in Croce's idealism; with scientific claims it confronts us in Smuts’s Holism ; with more emphasis but less exactness it speaks in J. S. Huxley’s Religion without Revelation and in Middleton Murry's God, Being an Introduction to the Science of Metabiology; in imaginative literature it has found its ample "iconography" in Shaw's Back to Methuselah; best of all, strong and silent, unquestioned and unexplaining, like any master secure of his position, we may find it enthroned each in his own mind. Though here referred to as a religious attitude, we may also call it antireligionor the religion of the professedly anti-religious, and its God the God of the "Godless.". (shrink)