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The no-slip condition of fluid dynamics

Erkenntnis 33 (3):285 - 296 (1990)

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  1. How the laws of physics lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this sequence of philosophical essays about natural science, the author argues that fundamental explanatory laws, the deepest and most admired successes of modern physics, do not in fact describe regularities that exist in nature. Cartwright draws from many real-life examples to propound a novel distinction: that theoretical entities, and the complex and localized laws that describe them, can be interpreted realistically, but the simple unifying laws of basic theory cannot.
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  • On the current status of the issue of scientific realism.Richard Boyd - 1983 - Erkenntnis 19 (1-3):45 - 90.
  • The Structure and Dynamics of Theories.[author unknown] - 1978 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 40 (4):680-681.
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  • A logical reconstruction of simple equilibrium thermodynamics.C. Ulises Moulines - 1975 - Erkenntnis 9 (1):101-130.
  • The logical structure of mathematical physics.C. A. Hooker - 1975 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 37 (1):151-152.
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  • Galilean Idealization.Ernan McMullin - 1985 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 16 (3):247.
  • The encyclopedia of philosophy. [REVIEW]Mary Hesse - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):263-269.
  • The structure and dynamics of theories.Wolfgang Stegmüller - 1976 - New York: Springer Verlag.
  • Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science.Ian Hacking - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This 1983 book is a lively and clearly written introduction to the philosophy of natural science, organized around the central theme of scientific realism. It has two parts. 'Representing' deals with the different philosophical accounts of scientific objectivity and the reality of scientific entities. The views of Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Putnam, van Fraassen, and others, are all considered. 'Intervening' presents the first sustained treatment of experimental science for many years and uses it to give a new direction to debates about (...)
  • The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics.Joseph D. Sneed - 1975 - Erkenntnis 9 (3):423-436.
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  • Representing and Intervening.Ian Hacking - 1987 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 92 (2):279-279.
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