A Second Form of Argument from Analogy

Theoria 73 (3):221-239 (2007)
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Abstract

One form of argument from analogy is identified and Stephen Barker's remarks about a second kind of argument from analogy, non-inductive (and non-deductive) argument from analogy, are used as a springboard to identify a second form. That form is then refined, explained, exemplified, and related to the first form. It is argued that there is a spectrum of different forms of argument from analogy, with the two forms identified being end points on the spectrum. Except in terms of form, however, there is no reason to speak of two different kinds of argument from analogy.

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Michael J. Wreen
Marquette University

Citations of this work

The Paradox of Analogy.David Botting - 2012 - Informal Logic 32 (1):98-115.
The Cumulative Force of Analogies.David Botting - 2018 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 27 (1):105-141.

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