Wright on the epistemic conception of vagueness

Analysis 56 (1):39-45 (1996)
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Abstract

According to the epistemic conception of vagueness defended in Williamson 1994, what we use vague terms to say is true or false, but in borderline cases we cannot know which. Our grasp of what we say does not open its truth-value to our view. Crispin Wright 1995 offers a lively critique of this conception. A reply may help to clarify the issues.

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Timothy Williamson
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Indeterminate truth.Patrick Greenough - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.
Sex, Vagueness, and the Olympics.Helen L. Daly - 2015 - Hypatia 30 (4):708-724.
Semantic plasticity and epistemicism.Adam Sennet - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):273-285.
Williamson on inexact knowledge.Anna Mahtani - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):171 - 180.
Margins for error: A reply.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):76-81.

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References found in this work

Is knowing a state of mind?Timothy Williamson - 1995 - Mind 104 (415):533--65.
The Epistemic Conception of Vagueness.Crispin Wright - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):133-160.
The Epistemic Conception of Vagueness.Crispin Wright - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):133-160.
Definiteness and Knowability.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):171-192.
Definiteness and Knowability.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):171-192.

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