Williamson on inexact knowledge

Philosophical Studies 139 (2):171 - 180 (2008)
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Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through. The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.



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Anna Mahtani
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook for the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.

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References found in this work

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - New York: Routledge.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.
Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):460-462.
Critical Notices.Rosanna Keefe - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):491-500.

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