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Is knowing a state of mind?
Mind 104 (415):533--65 (1995)
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Citations of this work
Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.Timothy Williamson - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess.
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