Norms of assertion

Philosophy Compass 2 (2):187–195 (2007)
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Abstract

Recently attention has been paid to the epistemic requirements for proper assertion. The most popular account has been the knowledge account, that we can only properly assert what we know. Others have criticized the knowledge account and argued that the norm of assertion is truth, belief, or assertion of what it is reasonable to believe.

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10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00065.x

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Matt Weiner
University of Vermont

Citations of this work

Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.
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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.
Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.

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