Oxford University Press (1975)

Peter Unger
New York University
In these challenging pages, Unger argues for the extreme skeptical view that, not only can nothing ever be known, but no one can ever have any reason at all for anything. A consequence of this is that we cannot ever have any emotions about anything: no one can ever be happy or sad about anything. Finally, in this reduction to absurdity of virtually all our supposed thought, he argues that no one can ever believe, or even say, that anything is the case.
Keywords Ignorance (Theory of knowledge  Skepticism
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Reprint years 1978, 2002
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Call number BD221.U53 2002
ISBN(s) 0198244177   9780198244172   0198244088
DOI 10.2307/2218871
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Against Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:237–293.
Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.

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