Dismantling the deficit model of science communication using Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thinking collectives

In Jonathan Y. Tsou, Shaw Jamie & Carla Fehr (eds.), Values, Pluralism, and Pragmatism: Themes from the Work of Matthew J. Brown. Cham: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science. Springer (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Numerous societal issues, from climate change to pandemics, require public engagement with scientific research. Such engagement reveals challenges that can arise when experts communicate with laypeople. One of the most common frameworks for framing these communicative interactions is the deficit model of science communication, which holds that laypeople lack scientific knowledge and/or positive attitudes towards science, and that imparting knowledge will fill knowledge gaps, lead to desirable attitude/behavior changes, and increase trust in science. §1 introduces the deficit model in more detail and shows that adhering to this model often fails to achieve its aims, which motivates the main question of this chapter: how can Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thinking collectives address the persistent problem of deficit approaches in science communication? I suggest that it can do so by exposing the deficit model’s implicit assumption of an expert-lay divide. Accordingly, §2 lays out Fleck’s theory and §3 contrasts it with contemporary debates about science communication. Following this descriptive work, §4 draws on Fleck’s ideas to make four concrete suggestions for further questioning the expert-lay divide.

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Victoria Min-Yi Wang
University College London (PhD)

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