Dotting the I think

In James Conant & Jesse M. Mulder (eds.), Reading Rödl: on Self-consciousness and objectivity. New York, NY: Routledge (2023)
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Abstract

This chapter discusses a central problem in Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness & Objectivity (SC&O) and in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. In a statement of the form “I think p”, the words “I think” do not contribute to the content and yet they are not redundant. What comes to the same, a thinking subject is not something and yet not nothing. But then in what sense is a thinking subject a part of the world? The problem is intractable on a merely negative understanding of “I think”, like Anscombe’s merely negative thesis, endorsed by SC&O, that “I” is not a referring expression. In search of a positive understanding, this chapter proposes to understand “I think” by comparison to “hello”. A speaking subject is the expression of mutual presence in conversation — in that sense a limit of the world. Such expression may be compared to facial expression, with the crucial difference that a verbal expression can be taken up - repeated - in the third person. A speaking subject, then, is potentially absent from conversation — in that sense a part of the world.

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Martijn Wallage
King's College London (PhD)

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