Noûs:2020: 1-23 (forthcoming)

Authors
Katharina Kraus
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
Kant’s theory of cognition centrally builds on his conception of self-consciousness and the transcendental use of the phrase “I think”: the ability to add the phrase “I think” to a representation is a necessary condition of the ability to cognize objects. The paper argues that “I think”, rather than denoting the content of a predicative judgement, is typically an expression of the subject’s thinking. It expresses a kind of self-consciousness that, without assertively representing the subject itself, indicates that representational contents are unified in a single consciousness of a single subject. Our aim is thus to develop and defend an expressivist interpretation of Kant’s “I think”.
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12350
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References found in this work BETA

Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.

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Citations of this work BETA

Kant on Modality.Colin Marshall & Aaron Barker - forthcoming - In Anil Gomes & Andrew Stephenson (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Kant. Oxford University Press.

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