Ethics 125 (1):64-87 (2014)

Authors
Alex Voorhoeve
London School of Economics
Abstract
Many believe that we ought to save a large number from being permanently bedridden rather than save one from death. Many also believe that we ought to save one from death rather than a multitude from a very minor harm, no matter how large this multitude. I argue that a principle I call “Aggregate Relevant Claims” satisfactorily explains these judgments. I offer a rationale for this principle and defend it against objections.
Keywords Distributive ethics  The numbers problem  Rational choice theory  Aggregation  Sympathy
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1086/677022
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References found in this work BETA

Should the Numbers Count?John Taurek - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):293-316.
Priority or Sufficiency …or Both?Campbell Brown - 2005 - Economics and Philosophy 21 (2):199-220.
Contractualism and Aggregation.Sophia Reibetanz - 1998 - Ethics 108 (2):296-311.
Replies.T. Scanlon - 2002 - Social Theory and Practice 28 (2):337-358.
Aggregation and Two Moral Methods.F. M. Kamm - 2005 - Utilitas 17 (1):1-23.

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Citations of this work BETA

Who Should Bear the Risk When Self-Driving Vehicles Crash?Antti Kauppinen - 2021 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (4):630-645.
Vaulting Intuition: Temkin's Critique of Transitivity.Alex Voorhoeve - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (3):409-425.

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