Ethics 130 (4):514-529 (2020)

Authors
Joe Horton
University College London
Abstract
Is there any number of people you should save from paralysis rather than saving one person from death? Is there any number of people you should save from a migraine rather than saving one person from death? Many people answer “yes” and “no,” respectively. The aim of partially aggregative moral views is to capture and justify combinations of intuitions like these. In this article, I develop a risk-based reductio argument that shows that there can be no adequate partially aggregative view. I then argue that the only plausible response to this reductio is to accept a fully aggregative view.
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DOI 10.1086/708534
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Partial Aggregation in Ethics.Joe Horton - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):1-12.
Aggregation and Reductio.Patrick Wu - 2021 - Ethics 132 (2):508-525.
Well-Being as Need Satisfaction.Marlowe Fardell - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (3).

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