Philosophy and Public Affairs 46 (2):117-159 (2018)
AbstractMany of us believe (1) Saving a life is more important than averting any number of headaches. But what about risky cases? Surely: (2) In a single choice, if the risk of death is low enough, and the number of headaches at stake high enough, one should avert the headaches rather than avert the risk of death. And yet, if we will face enough iterations of cases like that in (2), in the long run some of those small risks of serious harms will surely eventuate. And yet: (3) Isn't it still permissible for us to run these repeated risks, despite that knowledge? After all, if it were not, then many of the risky activities that we standardly think permissible would in fact be impermissible. Nobody has yet offered a principle that can accommodate all of 1-3. In this paper, I show that we can accommodate all of these judgements, by taking into account both ex ante and ex post perspectives. In doing so, I clear aside an important obstacle to a viable deontological decision theory.
Similar books and articles
Can Contractualism Save Us from Aggregation.Barbara H. Fried - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):39-66.
Arrow's theorem in judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review.Christian List - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
A generalised model of judgment aggregation.Franz Dietrich - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 4 (28):529-565.
Linear Aggregation of SSB Utility Functionals.Arja H. Turunen-Red & John A. Weymark - 1999 - Theory and Decision 46 (3):281-294.
Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
The aggregation of propositional attitudes: Towards a general theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
Judgement aggregation in non-classical logics.Daniele Porello - 2017 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 27 (1-2):106-139.
Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees.Elisabeth Schulte - 2010 - Theory and Decision 69 (1):97-118.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Costa, cancer and coronavirus: contractualism as a guide to the ethics of lockdown.Stephen David John & Emma J. Curran - 2022 - Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (9):643-650.
Enough is too much: the excessiveness objection to sufficientarianism.Carl Knight - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (2):275-299.
One-by-one: moral theory for separate persons.Bastian Steuwer - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
References found in this work
Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives.Alastair Norcross - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (2):135-167.
The Subjective Moral Duty to Inform Oneself before Acting.Holly M. Smith - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):11-38.