Being of Two Minds (or of One in Two Ways): A New Puzzle for Constitution Views of Personal Identity

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):22-42 (2019)
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Abstract

According to constitution views of persons, we are constituted by spatially coinciding human animals. Constitution views face an ‘overpopulation’ puzzle: if the animal has my brain, there is another thinker where I am. An influential solution to this problem distinguishes between derivative and non‐derivative property possession: persons non‐derivatively have their personal properties, while inheriting others from their constituters. I will show that this solution raises a new problem, by constructing a puzzle with the absurd result that we instantiate certain properties incompatibly. In setting up the puzzle, I demonstrate the relevance of the bodily awareness and self‐awareness literatures to overpopulation puzzles.

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Rina Tzinman
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

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Individuals.P. F. Strawson - 1959 - Garden City, N.Y.: Routledge.
The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.

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