Nonconceptual Self-Awareness and the Constitution of Referential Self-Consciousness

ProtoSociology 36:491-515 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This essay argues that persons not only have nonconceptual bodily self-awareness and nonconceptual mental anonymous self-awareness but also, at least if they produce the expression ‘I’, nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. It contains information of ‘I’ being produced by oneself. It is argued that this can be seen if we examine the constitution of referential self-consciousness, i.e. the consciousness of being the referent of ‘I’ oneself. The main argument is: A. It is not possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness if it is not assumed that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. B. It is possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness if it is assumed that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. C. Thus it is reasonable to assume that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness. The justification of the thesis that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness is presented while discussing Tomis Kapitan’s analysis of conceptual egological self-consciousness. Conceptual egological self-consciousness contains infor­mation of being a subject oneself. It is argued that it is not possible to explain the constitution of referential self-consciousness with the help of Kapitan’s interpretation of conceptual self-consciousness. However, it is possible to ex­plain the constitution of referential self-consciousness within the framework of Kapitan’s account if it is assumed that persons have nonconceptual mental egological self-awareness.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,907

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Thinking about oneself.Kristina Musholt - 2015 - London, England: MIT Press.
Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content.Kristina Musholt - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):649-672.
Self-consciousness and intersubjectivity.Kristina Musholt - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):63-89.
Nietzsche on the Nature of the Unconscious.Paul Katsafanas - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):327-352.
Motivated aversion: Non-thetic awareness in bad faith.Jonathan Webber - 2002 - Sartre Studies International 8 (1):45-57.
Indexicality and self-awareness.Tomis Kapitan - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 379--408.
Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
An independent, empirical route to nonconceptual content.Monima Chadha - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (2):439-448.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-05-08

Downloads
17 (#892,088)

6 months
6 (#582,229)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stefan Lang
Martin Luther Universität Halle-Wittenberg

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references