Abstract

This essay consists of two main sections and an appendix. §1 argues that what Spinoza means by 'eternity' depends on the context in which he uses the term. In particular, given his characterization of substance, Spinoza must be interpreted to mean something different by 'eternity' as said of natura naturans than as said of natura naturata or any of its elements. §2 argues that, given the stark difference in the type of being characteristic of substance and that of the modes, Spinoza's epistemology as developed in the Ethics involves a fundamental incoherence: his epistemology requires, and yet his metaphysics renders impossible, that we have an adequate idea of god. Even if the incoherence is put to one side, Spinoza's epistemology and metaphysics seem jointly to imply other bizarre results. §§'s 1 and 2 provide good reasons to identify substance, natura naturans , and god on the one hand, and the system of modes, natura naturata, and creation on the other, with the consequence that there is some basis for interpreting Spinoza as having retained in his philosophical system the concept of an at least remotely traditional deity. The appendix discusses the incredibility of the evidence we have that seems on its face to imply that Spinoza was an atheist, as well as the apparent credibility of other evidence we have that seems on its face to imply that he was a theist. It therefore appears that Spinoza creates a system with a stark internal rift that finds certain expression in his ontology and epistemology, and probable expression in his theology