Res Publica 14 (2):101-116 (2008)
AbstractA common anti-egalitarian argument is that equality is motivated by envy, or the desire to placate envy. In order to avoid this charge, John Rawls explicitly banishes envy from his original position. This article argues that this is an inconsistent and untenable position for Rawls, as he treats envy as if it were a fact of human psychology and believes that principles of justice should be based on such facts. Therefore envy should be known about in the original position. The consequences for Rawlsian theory—both substantive and methodological—are discussed.
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Egalitarianism and the Great Recession: A Tale of Missed Connections?Pietro Maffettone - 2018 - Res Publica 24 (2):237-256.
Envy, Self-Esteem, and Distributive Justice.Vegard Stensen - forthcoming - European Journal of Political Theory.
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