Virtue and practical deliberation

Philosophical Studies 111 (2):147-172 (2002)
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Abstract

The question of how to reason well is an important normative question,one which ultimately motivates some of our interest in the more abstracttopic of the principles of practical reason. It is this normative questionthat I propose to address by arguing that given the goal of an importantkind of deliberation, we will deliberate better if we develop certainvirtues. I give an account of the virtue of stability and I argue thatstability makes reasoners reason better. Further,I suggest at the end of the paper that an account of virtues thatconduce to good reasoning might go a long way toward answering someof the traditional questions about the principles ofpractical reason

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Valerie Tiberius
University of Minnesota

References found in this work

The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press.
Deliberation Is of Ends.Aurel Kolnai - 1962 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:195 - 218.

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