The Unnaturalness Objection to De-Extinction: A Critical Evaluation Carolyn Mason, University of Canterbury, New Zealand Abstract De-extinction of species has been criticised for being unnatural, as have the techniques that might be used to accomplish de-extinction. This objection of unnaturalness will be dismissed by those who claim that everything that humans do is natural, by those who claim that naturalness is a social construct, and by those who argue that ethical concerns arising from considerations of unnaturalness rest on a failure (...) properly to distinguish facts from values. However, none of these criticisms of the objection of unnaturalness is convincing, for reasons I will explain in this paper. The objection of unnaturalness might be motivated by concerns about either: (i) the attitude to nature that underpins de-extinction practices; or (ii) the consequences of interfering with nature. I show that objections of type (i) are rare in the literature, while objections of type (ii) can generally be ameliorated by working with cultures that have ties to the flora and fauna at issue, careful research into the value and nature of ecological systems, limiting risky activities, and limiting the use of de-extinction processes whenever their consequences are unclear. I conclude that the unnaturalness objection to de-extinction is of real but limited force. It gives reasons for caution rather than prohibition. (shrink)

Disputes between separated couples over whether frozen embryos can be used in an attempt to create a child create a moral dilemma for public policy. When a couple create embryos intending to parent any resulting children, New Zealand’s current policy requires the consent of both people at every stage of the ART process. New Zealand’s Advisory Committee on Assisted Reproductive Technology has proposed a policy change that would give ex-partners involved in an embryo dispute twelve months to come to an (...) agreement before the embryos are destroyed. New Zealand’s current policy and the proposed policy both favour the person who wishes to avoid procreation. Two alternative policy approaches that do not favour procreative avoidance are considered. Using pre-fertilisation contracts to determine the decision reached in embryo disputes allows the couple’s wishes at the time the embryos are created to determine what happens to the embryos if they separate. However, pre-fertilisation contracts are agreements about healthcare and personal relationships, and changing circumstances can make enforcing such agreements unjust. Finally, it is argued that New Zealand’s Family Court system should be used to reach decisions that balance the interests of those involved in the dispute. (shrink)

Could someone who wants a gin and tonic have a normative reason to drink petrol and tonic? Bernard Williams and Michael Smith both say, 'No'. They argue that what an agent has normative reason to do is determined by rational deliberation that involves correcting the agent's beliefs and current motivations. On such an account of normative reasons, an agent who is motivated to act in some way due to a false belief does not have reason to act in that way. (...) I argue that the agent could have reason to drink the petrol, because an agent's epistemic circumstances, what that agent can come to know, can be as relevant to what the agent has reason to do as other aspects of his circumstances. Moreover, if an agent's epistemic circumstances are taken into account when determining what the agent has reason to do, this can still give an account of reasons that is normative, ensures that the agent and onlookers agree on what the agent has reason to do, is appropriately connected to rationality and fairly represents the agent's beliefs about the knowledge they need to have to know how they have reason to act. (shrink)

Young people are increasingly required to demonstrate civic engagement in their communities and help deliver the aspirations of localism and Big Society. Using an ecological systems approach this paper explores the experiences of different groups of young people living in areas of socio-economic disadvantage. Using volunteering as an example of civic engagement it is shown that barriers and motivators for young people stem from within the micro, meso, exo and macrosystems, and that these interact with each other, and with bio-psychological (...) factors within individuals, to bring about differential opportunities and outcomes for young people. Through examining the experiences of three different groups of young people placed within socio-economically disadvantaged communities, considerable variation in levels of civic engagement are identified and it is suggested that some young people's lived experiences are resulting in decisions to civically disengage. It is argued that young people need to benefit from genuine opportunities to develop self-efficacy if they are to respond to the demands of Big Society aspirations for localised decision-making. (shrink)