Authors
Judith Jarvis Thomson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
Moral theorists often say such things as “But surely A ought to do such and such,” or “Plainly it is morally permissible for B to do so and so,” and do not even try to prove that those judgments are true. Moreover, they often rest weight on the supposition that those judgments are true. In particular, they often rest theories on them: they take them as data. Others object. They say that nobody is entitled to rest any weight at all on judgments such as those. They say, not that the judgments are false, but that there is no reason to believe them true. They say, more generally, that there is no reason to think of any moral judgment that it is true. I will call this The No Reason Thesis. Is there reason to think The No Reason Thesis true? There are lots of arguments for it in the literature, but I want to focus on one of them in particular. I think that the one I will focus on lies behind all the others, but no matter if it does not: I suggest that if this argument fails, they all fail
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/s0265052500000996
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,714
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
The Right and the Good.Some Problems in Ethics.W. D. Ross & H. W. B. Joseph - 1933 - Journal of Philosophy 30 (19):517-527.
How to Derive "Ought" From "Is".John R. Searle - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (1):43-58.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Cultural Relativism.John J. Tilley - 2000 - Human Rights Quarterly 22 (2):501–547.
Closing the ‘Is’-‘Ought’ Gap.Stephen Maitzen - 1998 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):349-366.
Law, Morality, Coherence and Truth.Aleksander Peczenik - 1994 - Ratio Juris 7 (2):146-176.
Years of Moral Epistemology: A Bibliography.Laura Donohue & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (S1):217-229.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.
Hume’s Reasons.Aaron Zimmerman - 2007 - Hume Studies 33 (2):211-256.
Desires and Practical Reasons.John J. Tilley - 2006 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9:123-128.
Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384.
Buck-Passers' Negative Thesis.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):341-347.
Teaching, Reason and Risk.Allen T. Pearson - 1997 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 16 (1/2):103-111.
The Life of Reason.George Santayana - 1905 - Prometheus Books.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-31

Total views
38 ( #289,147 of 2,462,777 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #179,092 of 2,462,777 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes