From the ferment of recent debates about the intellectual virtues, Roberts and Wood develop an approach they call 'regulative epistemology', exploring the connection between knowledge and intellectual virtue. In the course of their argument they analyse particular virtues of intellectual life - such as courage, generosity, and humility - in detail.

Since the publication of Edmund Gettier's challenge to the traditional epistemological doctrine of knowledge as justified true belief, Roberts and Wood claim that epistemologists lapsed into despondency and are currently open to novel approaches. One such approach is virtue epistemology, which can be divided into virtues as proper functions or epistemic character traits. The authors propose a notion of regulative epistemology, as opposed to a strict analytic epistemology, based on intellectual virtues that function not as rules or even as skills (...) but as habits of the heart. To that end, they divide the task of clarifying and expounding their notion in the book's two parts.In the first part, Roberts and Wood examine various components that constitute their notion of regulative epistemology. The first are the epistemic goods or goals that drive the epistemic process. What is needed, claim Roberts and Wood, is an enriched notion of these goods rather than the restricted notion of justified true belief. Epistemic agents are more than calculating devices in that …. (shrink)

Some of the most interesting works in virtue ethics are the detailed, perceptive treatments of specific virtues and vices. This chapter aims to develop such work as it relates to intellectual virtues and vices. It begins by examining the virtue of intellectual humility. Its strategy is to situate humility in relation to its various opposing vices, which include vices like arrogance, vanity, conceit, egotism, grandiosity, pretentiousness, snobbishness, haughtiness, and self-complacency. From this list vanity and arrogance are focused on in particular. (...) Humble persons are not distinguished from arrogant persons by being unaware of or unconcerned with entitlements; rather, they lack the arrogance that entails a specific kind of motivation called ‘ego-exalting potency’. Humble people are motivated by pure interests regarding entitlements given their ability to serve as means to some valuable purpose or project. The chapter ends by considering a wide variety of ways intellectual humility can promote the acquisition of epistemic goods. (shrink)

Analytic theology can flourish in the secular academy, and flourish as authentically Christian theology. Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion explains analytic theology to other theologians and scholars of religion, while simultaneously explaining those other fields to analytic theologians. William Wood defends analytic theology from some common criticisms, but also argues that analytic theologians have much to learn from other forms of inquiry. Analytic theology is a legitimate form of theology, and a legitimate form of academic inquiry, and (...) it can be a valuable conversation partner within the wider religious studies academy. Analytic Theology and the Academic Study of Religion articulates an attractive vision of analytic theology, fosters a more fruitful inter-disciplinary conversation, and enables scholars across the religious studies academy to understand one another better. (shrink)

In evolutionary psychology predictions, women’s mate preferences shift between fertile and nonfertile times of the month to reflect ancestral fitness benefits. Our meta-analytic test involving 58 independent reports was largely nonsupportive. Specifically, fertile women did not especially desire sex in short-term relationships with men purported to be of high genetic quality. The few significant preference shifts appeared to be research artifacts. The effects declined over time in published work, were limited to studies that used broader, less precise definitions of the (...) fertile phase, and were found only in published research. (shrink)

In this study of how we know what we know, W. Jay Wood surveys current views of foundationalism, epistemic justification and reliabilism.

The Christian Tradition has Consistently claimed that, somehow, God may be identified with the truth as such. The claim has a fine biblical pedigree: John’s gospel asserts that Christ, and therefore God, is truth (John 14:6, 16:13). It is prominent in the early church fathers, especially Augustine; and the medievals, including Anselm, largely followed his lead. Nor is the claim confined to the pre-Reformation era. It is also found in the Reformed Church’s Westminster Confession, for example.1 Despite its pedigree, the (...) claim that God is truth strikes modern sensibilities as bizarre, a gross category mistake. For example, many contemporary philosophers treat truth as a property of statements or .. (shrink)

Analytic theology as currently practiced has an ambiguous character. It may be understood either formally, as any instance of theology that draws on analytic philosophy, or substantively, as a cohesive theological school that draws on analytic philosophy in defense of traditional Christian orthodoxy. Both conceptions assume that analytic philosophy furnishes “tools and methods” to the analytic theologian. Yet on the best recent accounts of analytic philosophy, analytic philosophy has no unique tools and methods. I argue that analytic philosophy should be (...) understood as a robust and distinctive intellectual tradition. This understanding of analytic philosophy raises a worry for the emerging field of analytic theology, however: that analytic theologians might be more deeply grounded in the analytic philosophical tradition than in any tradition of theology. (shrink)

Software piracy has become recognized as a major problem for the software industry and for business. One research approach that has provided a theoretical framework for studying software piracy has been to place the illegal copying of software within the domain of ethical decision making assumes that a person must be able to recognize software piracy as a moral issue. A person who fails to recognize a moral issue will fail to employ moral decision making schemata. There is substantial evidence (...) that many individuals do not perceive software piracy to be an ethical problem. This paper applies social exchange theory, in particular equity theory, to predict the influence of situational factors on subjects' intentions to participate in software piracy. Consistent with the predictions of equity theory this study found that input and outcome situational variables significantly effect a person's intentions to commit software piracy. (shrink)

Our social role/biosocial theory provides a more adequate account of aggression sex differences than does Archer's sexual selection theory. In our theory, these sex differences arise flexibly from sociocultural and ecological forces in interaction with humans' biology, as defined by female and male physical attributes and reproductive activities. Our comments elaborate our theory's explanations for the varied phenomena that Archer presents.

The ultimate causes of sex differences in human aggressive behavior can lie mainly in evolved, inherited mechanisms that differ by sex or mainly in the differing placement of women and men in the social structure. The present commentary contrasts Campbell's evolutionary interpretation of aggression sex differences with a social structural interpretation that encompasses a wider range of phenomena.

Schmitt's findings provide little evidence that sex differences in sociosexuality are explained by evolved dispositions. These sex differences are better explained by an evolutionary account that treats the psychological attributes of women and men as emergent, given the biological attributes of the sexes, especially female reproductive capacity, and the economic and social structural aspects of societies.

Redish et al. trace vulnerabilities in habit and planning systems almost exclusively to pharmacological effects of addictive substances on underlying brain systems. As we discuss, however, these systems also can be disrupted by purely psychological factors inherent in normal decision-making and everyday behavior. A truly unified model must integrate the contribution of both sets of factors in driving addiction.

This reply addresses the issues raised by the thoughtful commentaries on Wood, Kressel, Joshi, and Louie’s meta-analysis. We maintain that menstrual cycle influences on women’s mate preferences are obtained inconsistently in the literature and are linked to research artifacts. This pattern provides little support for the simple evolutionary psychology biology-to-behavior models that inspired this research. As illustrated by the commentaries, more promising theories of human reproduction situate biological and psychological processes within societal structures.

Blaise Pascal is highly regarded as a religious moralist, but he has rarely been given his due as an ethical theorist. The goal of this article is to assemble Pascal's scattered thoughts on moral judgment and moral wrongdoing into an explicit, coherent account that can serve as the basis for further scholarly reflection on his ethics. On my reading, Pascal affirms an axiological, social-intuitionist account of moral judgment and moral wrongdoing. He argues that a moral judgment is an immediate, intuitive (...) perception of moral value that we willfully disregard in favor of the attractive, though self-deceptive, deliverances of our socially constructed imaginations. We can deceive ourselves so easily because our capacity to evaluate goods is broken, a dark legacy of the fall. In the article's concluding section, I briefly compare Pascal to contemporary ethicists and suggest directions for future research. (shrink)

Paul Helm’s Faith With Reason articulates and defends an account of reasonable religious faith that claims that religious faith consists of both cognitive and fiduciary elements. One part of religious faith consists of propositions about the object of religious devotion whose strength “ought to conform to the evidence for the proposition in question, ” if they are to held reasonably. Religious belief is not a special species of belief, says Helm, but is subject to the same standards of evidence and (...) criticism as other beliefs. In addition to the epistemic and evidential aspects of religious faith one must add the element of trust. Faith is distinguished from mere notional assent by the fact that the persons of faith actively entrust themselves to God, and depend upon Him to bring about various good purposes they deem to be of great importance. (shrink)

Paul Helm’s Faith With Reason articulates and defends an account of reasonable religious faith that claims that religious faith consists of both cognitive and fiduciary elements. One part of religious faith consists of propositions about the object of religious devotion whose strength “ought to conform to the evidence for the proposition in question, ” if they are to held reasonably. Religious belief is not a special species of belief, says Helm, but is subject to the same standards of evidence and (...) criticism as other beliefs. In addition to the epistemic and evidential aspects of religious faith one must add the element of trust. Faith is distinguished from mere notional assent by the fact that the persons of faith actively entrust themselves to God, and depend upon Him to bring about various good purposes they deem to be of great importance. (shrink)

The first part of the book addresses the epistemological concerns, focusing on arguments for and against the claim that theism is rationally justifiable. These include discussion of cosmological arguments, the ontological argument, the argument from design, and the moral argument for God's existence. Metaphysical questions about God's nature, in particular God's knowledge and power, and the nature of religious experience constitute the second part of the book. Epistemological and metaphysical questions are shown to be related since, if the concept of (...) a God perfect in wisdom, power, and goodness is incoherent, it cannot be reasonable to believe that God exists. Throughout his discussion Wood draws on the most recent writings in the field as well as classic arguments and offers readers a clear, balanced, and incisive analysis of the core philosophical arguments for the existence of God. The book equips readers with the necessary understanding of issues in natural theology that will enable them to tackle more specialized and complex questions in the philosophy of religion. (shrink)

This paper is a brief introduction to and interpretation of the work of Joe Orton, an English playwright of the 1960s who achieved notoriety through the violent and obscene content of his plays, his scandalous homosexual lifestyle and brutal death at the hands of his lover. Orton’s work is presented as a dramatic exemplification of distinctive themes pertaining to a radically materialistic strain in philosophy anticipated in Machiavelli and Spinoza but finding its fullest expression in Deleuze’s thought : the radical (...) immanence of the political, the critique of self-identity and clinical concepts of madness, and the anarchic and impersonal force of sexual desire. Orton achieves this aim through comic experimentation with language and a radicalisation of farce that serve to produce a laughter that is both destructive and affirmative : destructive of the boundaries artificially erected by reason , and affirmative of this process of destruction and the pre-subjective desire through which it is accomplished. (shrink)

Leo Strauss is well known for his thesis that there is an irreconcilable conflict between philosophy and “revelation,” i.e. monotheistic revealed religion, which cannot be harmonized. The philosopher qua philosopher cannot be a believer, while the believer qua believer cannot be a philosopher. However, it is less widely recognized that Strauss’ thought about religion as the fundamental alternative to philosophy follows two divergent trajectories. The first emphasizes the unique importance of revealed religion, while the other emphasizes the conflict between philosophy (...) and what he calls “religion in general.” Sometimes, Strauss suggests that revelation poses a unique “challenge” to philosophy, such that the philosopher must refute the mere possibility of revelation in order to justify the legitimacy of philosophy itself. Sometimes, however, he suggests rather that revelation is a religion like any other, not essentially different from e.g. ancient polytheism, which would seem therefore to pose no unique “challenge.” I argue that Strauss ultimately fails to reconcile these two strands of this thought and that this failure is related both to tensions internal to his positive conception of philosophy itself as a middle path between dogmatism and skepticism and to the fact that he begs the question by assuming, rather than proving, that it follows necessarily from “the very idea of revelation” that it cannot be harmonized with philosophy. (shrink)

The practice of model-building is very common in analytic philosophical theology. Yet many other theologians worry that any attempt to model God must be hubristic and idolatrous. A better understanding of scientific modeling can set the stage for a more fruitful engagement between analytic theologians and their critics. I first present an account of scientific modeling that draws on recent work in the philosophy of science. I then apply that account to a prominent analytic model of the trinity, Michael Rea (...) and Jeffrey Brower’s “material constitution model.” I argue that modeling – whether scientific or theological – need not be understood as a hubristic enterprise. A model does not always try to grasp its target at all, let alone grasp it fully and completely. Even theologians who are committed to a strong doctrine of divine mystery can therefore find value in analytic modeling. (shrink)

Wood, Kressel, Joshi, and Louie’s meta-analysis of menstrual cycle influences on mate preferences identified three artifacts that influenced study findings: imprecise estimates of the fertile phase, decline over time, and publication effects. These artifacts also were evident in another recent meta-analysis by Gildersleeve, Haselton, and Fales. This consistent evidence of artifacts is not challenged by Gildersleeve et al.’s failure to find another artifact–chasing significance levels. In addition, Wood et al. correctly coded the findings of Gangestad and colleagues’ research, given the (...) variation in their reporting formats and inclusion criteria, which in some studies included only 54% of the sample. The controversy over menstrual cycle effects could be beneficial in increasing interest in publishing null results as well as in identifying evolutionary models that build on women’s capacity to regulate reproduction according to societal roles. (shrink)

This dissertation examines the strategy of justifying doctrinal beliefs by appealing to special revelation. Even if one thinks that belief in God is rationally warranted, it does not follow that one's distinctive religious doctrines are justified. Though theism may be justified, it remains an open question whether or not believers are entitled to believe, for example, that Jesus Christ is God Incarnate or that God is triune. Traditionally, religious believers have claimed that their doctrinal beliefs are justified because they have (...) been revealed by God. ;My assessment of this claim consists of three parts. First I examine the concept of special revelation and defend it against charges of incoherence. But if even it makes sense to say that God can reveal himself, the more philosophically interesting question concerns how we could know that he has in fact done so. Hence the second part of the dissertation assesses criteria for adjudicating revelation claims. Locke's claim that the veracity of revelation is vouchsafed through miracles is examined. I argue that it is preferable to understand our doctrinal beliefs as properly basic rather than attempt to authenticate revelation claims through appeals to miracles. Finally, in part three, I consider and respond to several objections against the claim that our doctrinal beliefs can be justified. The first objection says that the strategy of justifying doctrinal beliefs through appeals to special revelation is undermined by competing claims to revelation. The second criticism claims that appeals to special revelation fail to provide the degree of justification required to underwrite decisive assent to doctrinal beliefs. I argue that neither of these criticisms is effective. (shrink)

Paul Helm’s Faith With Reason articulates and defends an account of reasonable religious faith that claims that religious faith consists of both cognitive and fiduciary elements. One part of religious faith consists of propositions about the object of religious devotion whose strength “ought to conform to the evidence for the proposition in question, ” if they are to held reasonably. Religious belief is not a special species of belief, says Helm, but is subject to the same standards of evidence and (...) criticism as other beliefs. In addition to the epistemic and evidential aspects of religious faith one must add the element of trust. Faith is distinguished from mere notional assent by the fact that the persons of faith actively entrust themselves to God, and depend upon Him to bring about various good purposes they deem to be of great importance. (shrink)