Artificial Intelligence and Agency: Tie-breaking in AI Decision-Making

Science and Engineering Ethics 30 (2):1-16 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Determining the agency-status of machines and AI has never been more pressing. As we progress into a future where humans and machines more closely co-exist, understanding hallmark features of agency affords us the ability to develop policy and narratives which cater to both humans and machines. This paper maintains that decision-making processes largely underpin agential action, and that in most instances, these processes yield good results in terms of making good choices. However, in some instances, when faced with two (or more) choices, an agent may find themselves with equal reasons to choose either - thus being presented with a tie. This paper argues that in the event of a tie, the ability to create a voluntarist reason is a hallmark feature of agency, and second, that AI, through current tie-breaking mechanisms does not have this ability, and thus fails at this particular feature of agency.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,612

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Human Side of Artificial Intelligence.Matthew A. Butkus - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (5):2427-2437.
Artificial Intelligent Systems and Ethical Agency.Reena Cheruvalath - 2023 - Journal of Human Values 29 (1):33-47.
Artificial Intelligent Systems and Ethical Agency.Reena Cheruvalath - 2023 - Journal of Human Values 29 (1):33-47.
Computational Goals, Values and Decision-Making.Louise A. Dennis - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (5):2487-2495.
The Problem Of Moral Agency In Artificial Intelligence.Riya Manna & Rajakishore Nath - 2021 - 2021 IEEE Conference on Norbert Wiener in the 21st Century (21CW).

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-03-30

Downloads
27 (#142,020)

6 months
27 (#573,316)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by J. David Velleman.
The View from Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.

View all 26 references / Add more references