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Only causation matters: reply to Ahn et al
Cognition 82 (1):71-76 (2001)
Abstract
This paper is a reply to a discussion of my paper The Essentialist Aspect of Naive Theories by Ahn, Kalish, Gelman, Medin, Luhmann, Atran, Coley and Shafto; both the discussion and my reply appeared in the November 2001 issue of Cognition.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Psychological Essentialism and the Structure of Concepts.Eleonore Neufeld - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (5):e12823.
Principled and statistical connections in common sense conception.Sandeep Prasada & Elaine M. Dillingham - 2006 - Cognition 99 (1):73-112.
The Inherence Heuristic: An Intuitive Means of Making Sense of the World, and a Potential Precursor to Psychological Essentialism.Andrei Cimpian & Erika Salomon - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (5):461-480.
Representation of Principled Connections: A Window Onto the Formal Aspect of Common Sense Conception.Sandeep Prasada & Elaine M. Dillingham - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (3):401-448.
Essentialist Beliefs About Bodily Transplants in the United States and India.Meredith Meyer, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Susan A. Gelman & Sarah M. Stilwell - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (1):668-710.
References found in this work
Insides and Essences: Early Understandings of the Non- Obvious.Susan A. Gelman & Henry M. Wellman - 1991 - Cognition 38 (3):213-244.
Why essences are essential in the psychology of concepts.Woo-Kyoung Ahn, Charles Kalish, Susan A. Gelman, Douglas L. Medin, Christian Luhmann, Scott Atran, John D. Coley & Patrick Shafto - 2001 - Cognition 82 (1):59-69.
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