Is causation necessary for what matters in survival?

Philosophical Studies 126 (3):375-396 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper I shall argue that if the Parfitian psychological criterion or theory of personal identity is true, then a good case can be made out to show that the psychological theorist should accept the view I call “psychological sequentialism”. This is the view that a causal connection is not necessary for what matters in survival, as long as certain other conditions are met. I argue this by way of Parfit’s own principle that what matters in survival cannot depend upon a trivial fact

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,491

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Trivial Personal Differences.Tove Finnestad - 2001 - Philosophical Papers 30 (1):41-55.
Parfit on what matters in survival.Anthony Brueckner - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22.
Why there still are no people.Jim Stone - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.
Nothing matters in survival.Torin Alter & Stuart Rachels - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):311-330.
Parfit, causation and survival.Neil McKinnon & John Bigelow - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):467-476.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
134 (#124,407)

6 months
5 (#239,721)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Boltzmannian Immortality.Christian Loew - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):761-776.
Is Psychology What Matters in Survival?Johan E. Gustafsson - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):504-516.
Against Psychological Sequentialism.Huiyuhl Yi - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (2):247-262.
Delayed Fission and the Standard Psychological View of Personal Identity.Huiyuhl Yi - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (2):173-191.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.
Personal identity.Sydney Shoemaker - 1984 - Oxford, England: Blackwell. Edited by Richard Swinburne.
Remembering.C. B. Martin & Max Deutscher - 1966 - Philosophical Review 75 (April):161-96.

View all 13 references / Add more references