Parfit on what matters in survival

Philosophical Studies 70 (1):1-22 (1993)
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Abstract

Parfit's most controversial claim about personal identity is that personal identity does not matter in the way we uncritically think it does) I would like to analyze Parfit's reasons for making this claim. These reasons are complex, and they stand in some tension with one another. I would like to examine them carefully and to try to arrive at the strongest case that can be made for Parfit's controversial claim about what matters.

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Citations of this work

Non-branching personal persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.
Identity over time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Parfit on fission.Jens Johansson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):21 - 35.
The Unimportance of Being Any Future Person.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):745-750.

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